Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Green R&D in Supply Chain Management
2.2. E-Commerce Supply Chain Management
2.3. Retail Service and Free-Riding Management
2.4. Research Gaps
3. Model Development
3.1. Green Technology Innovation and Promotional Services
3.2. Product Market Demand
- In the offline channel, consumers can physically experience and immediately possess products, so we assume that consumer utility is (the consumer utility of product functional attributes and shopping experience). is uniformly distributed in the range of [0, 1] with a density of 1.
- In the online channel, due to a lack of physical experience and immediate access, we assume that consumer utility is , where represents the consumer e-commerce preference.
- The consumer can obtain nonnegative surplus (consumer surplus is the total consumer utility minus the unit sales price of product) when he purchases products through one channel. Based on this, the consumer surplus from purchasing products through the offline channel is expressed as , where is the offline retail price. There exists a threshold of where under condition , a positive consumer surplus can be achieved by purchasing products through the offline channel. Therefore, the market demand of the pure offline channel is . Likewise, the consumer surplus achieved when purchasing products through the online channel is expressed as , where is the online sales price. There also exists a threshold where under condition , the consumer can obtain a positive consumer surplus when he purchases products in this channel. Therefore, the market demand of the pure online channel is .
- The consumer surplus obtained through one channel is greater than that obtained from the other channel. Specifically, the consumer will compare the surpluses of both channels and then choose the channel that can generate more consumer surplus. Therefore, at another critical threshold , the consumer can obtain the same utility from both sales channels, i.e., . Now, we can easily conclude that, when keeping the online and offline retail prices unchanged, increases with an increase in consumer e-commerce preference and free riding, while it decreases with the promotional service level. This is the case because the stronger e-commerce preferences and free riding behavior are, the more surplus consumers can obtain from the online channel, causing more consumers to turn to the online channel. On the other hand, a higher promotional service level will enable offline consumers to obtain more consumer surplus, causing more consumers to shift from online to offline channels.
3.3. Impact of Green and E-Commerce Activities on the Manufacturer’s Sales Channel Choice
- When consumer green preference and product greenness increase, the lower price bound decreases, and the upper price bound remains unchanged. This means that as these two parameters (variables) increase, the manufacturer should open the online channel earlier but should not close the offline channel if at the beginning. This is the case because as , increases, and decrease, and remains the same. The increase in , means that consumers with green preferences are more willing to pay in offline and online channels. From and , we find that consumers’ willingness to pay increases more in the online channel than in the offline channel (). When , increases further, resulting in , some consumers can obtain a more positive surplus in the online channel than in the offline channel. Then, the manufacturer should open the online channel to sell products based on the offline channel. Now the offline market demand is , which has no relationship to , so the manufacturer maintains the offline channel.
- When the green promotional service level increases, the lower price bound decreases when and increases when , and the upper price bound increases. This means that as this variable increases, the manufacturer should open the online channel early if the degree of free riding exceeds e-commerce preferences. In addition, now, the manufacturer closes the offline channel later. Otherwise, the manufacturer should not open the online channel if the degree of free riding is lower than the e-commerce preference. This is the case because as increases, , and decrease at the same time. An increase in means that consumers can obtain more surplus from both offline and online channels. (a) When , from and , we easily find that consumers can obtain more positive surplus in the online channel than in the offline channel when . Now, when increases further, resulting in , some consumers can obtain a more positive surplus in the online channel than in the offline channel, and the manufacturer should open the online channel along with the offline channel. Meanwhile, from , the continual increase of causes it to decrease. This implies that more consumers can obtain a more positive surplus in the offline channel, while the upper price bound will increase. (b) When , from and , we easily find that consumers can obtain more positive surplus in the offline channel than from the online channel when , and the manufacturer does not open the online channel.
- If consumers’ e-commerce preferences and degree of free riding increase, the lower and upper price bounds decrease. This indicates that the manufacturer should open the online channel and close the offline channel earlier as the two parameters (variables) increase. This is the case because as , increases, remains the same, decreases, and increases. A decrease in means that more consumers can obtain a positive surplus from the online channel. As this value decreases further, which results in , some consumers can obtain more surplus in the online channel than in the offline channel, so the manufacturer should open the online channel along with the offline channel. The continual decrease in and continual increase in mean that an increasing number of consumers can obtain a more positive surplus in the online channel than in the offline channel. When , all consumers obtain a more positive surplus in the online channel than in the offline channel. Then, the manufacturer should close the offline channel and only operate the online channel.
4. Cooperative Models
4.1. Centralized Model (C Model)
4.2. Wholesale Price Model (W Model)
4.3. Green Promotional Cost-Sharing Model (G Model)
4.4. Impact of Cooperative Relationships on the Manufacturer’s Sales Channel Choice
- The lower and upper bounds (, ) are highest in the C model, the second highest in the G model, and the lowest in the W model. This indicates that a higher level of cooperation will lead to the latest opening of the online channel and the latest closing of the offline channel. This is the case because in the W model, opening the online channel earlier and closing the offline channel earlier can enable the manufacturer as the leader to obtain more profits, even if this damages the retailer’s profits. Although the G model improves the level of cooperation through service cost sharing, it is still impossible to make joint efforts to maximize the total supply chain profits. Thus, the C model with the highest level of cooperation will open the online channel and close the offline channel at the latest time.
- With an increase in the level of free riding, we find that similar to what is shown in Table 3, the lower bound decreases in different models. This is the case because in different cooperation models, an increase in the level of free riding will cause more consumers to shift to the online channel, which should be opened earlier. Meanwhile, with an increase in the level of free riding, the upper bound in the W model will decrease, while the G and C models will first decrease and then increase. This is the case because in the W model, more consumers turn to the online channel with an increase in the level of free riding, at which point the manufacturer closes the offline channel earlier to obtain more profits. In the G and C models, when the degree of free riding is not high, the manufacturer will choose to close the offline channel earlier as well; when the degree of free riding is high enough, the online channel’s revenue can be improved by closing the offline channel later through promotional service cost sharing and centralized cooperation.
- Figure 3 shows that with an increase in greenness preferences, the lower and upper bounds increase slightly. Different from Table 3, which keeps the retail price unchanged, we specifically analyze the influence of the equilibrium solution of the retail price, product greenness and green promotional service level on the upper and lower bounds under different models. The increase in the online channel’s retail price with increasing greenness preferences will undoubtedly improve the lower and upper bounds.
5. Comparative Analysis
- Similar to corollary 1, the higher the level of cooperation is, the stronger the greenness of products and the level of green promotional services are.
- With a change in parameters, , , , and are satisfied. These results suggest that: (1) in the dual-channel W and G models, the manufacturer has an incentive to invest more in green technology innovation in dual channels than in pure offline channels. This is the case because when the manufacturer can open the online channel, it can obtain more profits than it can from the pure offline channel, which favors input costs for green technology innovation. (2) In the dual-channel W model, the retailer can invest more in green promotional services in the pure offline channel than in the dual channels. In the G model, the opposite relation is present. This is the case because in the dual-channel W model, the manufacturer does not share green promotional costs with the retailer, and when consumers exhibit free-riding behaviors in dual channels, the incentive for the retailer to provide promotional services will be reduced.
- Under different cooperation models, product greenness increases with the increase in consumers’ preferences for green products. This is the case because product greenness can affect consumers. When consumers’ preferences for green products increase, the manufacturer can invest more in green technology innovation to bring more surplus to consumers to increase market demand and obtain more profits. Therefore, with the increase in consumers’ preferences for green products, manufacturers have an incentive to invest more in green technology innovation.
- Under different cooperation models, product greenness decreases with the increase in the cost rate of green technology innovation. The cost for the manufacturer to invest in green technology is . When the cost rate of green technology innovation increases, the level of product greenness promoted by the manufacturer with a certain cost decreases, which will then reduce the consumer surplus, further reduce market demand, and lessen the benefit to the manufacturer. Therefore, with the increase in the cost rate of green technology innovation, the manufacturer will have less incentive to invest in green technology innovation.
- Under different cooperation models, product greenness and the level of green promotional services decrease with the increase in the cost rate of green promotional services. This is the case because (1) in the dual-channel W model, with the increase in the cost rate of green promotional services, both the greenness of products provided by the manufacturer and the level of green promotional services provided by the retailer will decrease (, ), and the reduction in the online and offline channels’ retail prices (, ) is not enough to compensate for the negative impact on consumers. Therefore, consumer surplus will still decrease (Figure 7). This outcome will further lead to a decrease in market demand and a decrease in the profits of the manufacturer and retailer. In this way, an increase in the cost rate of green promotional services will reduce the enthusiasm of the manufacturer and retailer to improve product greenness and green promotional services. We obtain similar results from the dual-channel G and C models.
- In the wholesale price contract cooperation model, retailers reduce the impact of free-riding behavior by reducing the offline channel’s retail price and green promotional service level. However, the surplus brought to consumers by the reduction of offline channel retail prices is not enough to make up for the loss to consumers from the reduction of the green promotional service level, reducing the market demand of offline channels. At the same time, the profit per unit of product obtained by the retailer will also decrease, so the retailer’s profit will decrease with an increase in free riding. In the green promotional service cost-sharing contract cooperation model, both the manufacturer and retailer can achieve Pareto improvement under the wholesale price contract cooperation model. With an increase in the degree of free riding, the promotional service level of retailers decreases briefly and then increases, because the manufacturer shares a higher proportion of the service cost, so the retailer has a greater incentive to improve the level of green promotional services. Although the retailer hopes to gain more profits by raising the offline channel’s retail price, this will not only reduce their market demand but also cause the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price, which will also reduce the retailer’s profits.
- In the wholesale price contract cooperation model, while consumers’ free-riding behavior increases the online channel’s market demand, the manufacturer increases the online channel’s retail price to obtain more profits in the online channel. The manufacturer also has a greater incentive to invest in green technology innovation. When the degree of free-riding continues to increase, affected by the retailers’ reduction of the offline channel’s retail price and the level of green promotional services, the manufacturer reduces the online channel’s retail price so that consumers can obtain more consumer surplus, but this measure cannot compensate for the loss of consumer surplus. At this point, the online channel’s profit per unit decreases, the online channel’s market demand decreases, the online channel’s profit decreases, and the incentive for manufacturers to invest in green technology innovation also decreases. In the green promotional service cost-sharing contract cooperation model, promotional service cost sharing causes the green promotional service level to rise with an increase in the degree of free riding. In this context, the manufacturer increases the online channel’s retail price to a certain extent while increasing the market demand to obtain more profits. At this point, the manufacturer has a greater incentive to invest in green technology innovation.
6. Revenue-Cost Sharing Coordination Model
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
- Centralized cooperation model.
- 2.
- Wholesale price contract cooperation model.
- 3.
- Green promotion services cost-sharing contract cooperation model.
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
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Researchers | Cooperative Strategy | Green Production (GP)/R&D (GI) | Promotional Service(S)/Free Riding(F) | E-Channel | Social Welfare |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Xu C. (2019); Taleizadeh A. (2018) | √ | GI | |||
Xu Y. (2018) | GI | √ | |||
Kavian R. (2019) | GP | √ | |||
Dey K. (2019); Gao J. (2020) | GP/GI | √ | |||
Zhu W. (2017); | GP/GI | ||||
Hong Z. (2019) | GI | S | √ | ||
Ranjan A. (2019) | GI | S | √ | ||
Dan B. (2012); Wang L. (2017); Dan B. (2018); Zhang S. (2019) | S | √ | |||
Pi Z. (2019) | √ | S | √ | ||
He R. (2016) | GP | S/F | √ | √ | |
Wu D. (2004) | S/F | √ | √ | ||
Xing D. (2012); Dan B. (2014); Luo M. (2016); Zhou, Y. (2018); Pu X. (2017) | S/F | √ | |||
Our Work | √ | GI | S/F | √ | √ |
Notations | Definition |
---|---|
Superscripts | |
is a pure offline or dual-channel sales model | |
denotes the wholesale price (), green promotional service cost-sharing () or centralized () cooperation | |
Subscripts | |
Retailer’s variables | |
Manufacturer’s variables | |
Decision Variables | |
Product greenness in sales channel in model | |
Green promotional service level in sales channel in model | |
wi−j | Wholesale price in sales channel in model |
Offline channel price in sales channel in model | |
Online channel price in sales channel in model | |
Sharing proportion of the promotional service cost in sales channel in model | |
Parameters | |
Production cost | |
Cost rate of green technology innovation | |
Cost rate of green promotional service | |
Consumer utility | |
Consumers’ e-commerce preference | |
Consumers’ green preference | |
Online consumers’ sensitivity to green promotional services | |
Consumer surplus | |
Offline channel market demand in sales channel in model | |
Online channel market demand in sales channel in model | |
Manufacturer’s profit in sales channel in model | |
Retailer’s profit in sales channel in model | |
System profit in sales channel in model |
↗ | ↘ | → |
↗ | ↗ | |
↗ | ↘ | ↘ |
Centralized cooperation model | Offline channel | , , , . |
Dual-channel | , , , , , . | |
Wholesale price cooperation model | Offline channel | , , , , . |
Dual-channel | , , , , , , . | |
Green promotional service cost-sharing cooperation model | Offline channel | , , , , . |
Dual-channel | , , , , , , , . |
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Mu, Z.; Zheng, Y.; Sun, H. Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain. Sustainability 2021, 13, 7499. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/su13137499
Mu Z, Zheng Y, Sun H. Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain. Sustainability. 2021; 13(13):7499. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/su13137499
Chicago/Turabian StyleMu, Zongyu, Yuangang Zheng, and Hao Sun. 2021. "Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain" Sustainability 13, no. 13: 7499. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/su13137499