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A Note on Pivotality

Department of Economics, University of Auckland Business School, Sir Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Rd, Auckland 1010, New Zealand
Received: 4 April 2019 / Revised: 27 May 2019 / Accepted: 29 May 2019 / Published: 1 June 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning)
This note provides simple derivations of the equilibrium conditions for different voting games with incomplete information. In the standard voting game à la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), voters update their beliefs, and, conditional on their being pivotal, cast their votes. However, in voting games such as those of Ellis (2016) and Fabrizi, Lippert, Pan, and Ryan (2019), given a closed and convex set of priors, ambiguity-averse voters would select a prior from this set in a strategy-contingent manner. As a consequence, both the pivotal and non-pivotal events matter to voters when deciding their votes. In this note, I demonstrate that for ambiguous voting games the conditional probability of being pivotal alone is no longer sufficient to determine voters’ best responses. View Full-Text
Keywords: jury trial; pivotality; ambiguity jury trial; pivotality; ambiguity
MDPI and ACS Style

Pan, A. A Note on Pivotality. Games 2019, 10, 24.

AMA Style

Pan A. A Note on Pivotality. Games. 2019; 10(2):24.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Pan, Addison. 2019. "A Note on Pivotality" Games 10, no. 2: 24.

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