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Article

Quantile Stable Mechanisms

1
Analysis Group, Chicago, IL 60601, USA
2
Airbnb, Oakland, CA 94611, USA
3
Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland
4
Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
The authors contributed equally to this work.
Academic Editor: Antonio Nicolò
Received: 15 April 2021 / Accepted: 27 April 2021 / Published: 17 May 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants. View Full-Text
Keywords: matching; contracts; auctions; mechanisms; incentives matching; contracts; auctions; mechanisms; incentives
MDPI and ACS Style

Chen, P.; Egesdal, M.; Pycia, M.; Yenmez, M.B. Quantile Stable Mechanisms. Games 2021, 12, 43. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020043

AMA Style

Chen P, Egesdal M, Pycia M, Yenmez MB. Quantile Stable Mechanisms. Games. 2021; 12(2):43. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020043

Chicago/Turabian Style

Chen, Peter, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia, and M. B. Yenmez 2021. "Quantile Stable Mechanisms" Games 12, no. 2: 43. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020043

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