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Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

by and *,†
Department of Information Engineering and Mathematics, Via Roma, 56, 53100 Siena, Italy
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
The authors contributed equally to this work.
Academic Editors: Paolo Pin and Ulrich Berger
Received: 27 June 2021 / Revised: 19 July 2021 / Accepted: 27 July 2021 / Published: 29 July 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Social Networks)
Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolutionary games; cooperation; consensus; dynamics on networks; stag-hunt game; chicken game; mixed Nash equilibrium; self-regulation; stable equilibrium; complex systems evolutionary games; cooperation; consensus; dynamics on networks; stag-hunt game; chicken game; mixed Nash equilibrium; self-regulation; stable equilibrium; complex systems
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MDPI and ACS Style

Madeo, D.; Mocenni, C. Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks. Games 2021, 12, 60. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030060

AMA Style

Madeo D, Mocenni C. Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks. Games. 2021; 12(3):60. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030060

Chicago/Turabian Style

Madeo, Dario, and Chiara Mocenni. 2021. "Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks" Games 12, no. 3: 60. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030060

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