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Games, Volume 12, Issue 4 (December 2021) – 6 articles

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Article
Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents
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Games 2021, 12(4), 77; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040077 (registering DOI) - 20 Oct 2021
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating [...] Read more.
This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the agents to reveal their types unless the principal either (i) excludes one group from the productive relationship, or (ii) demands different efforts from different preference groups. I also characterize the contract-inducing pooling equilibria in which all agents are incentivized to exert a high level of effort. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)
Article
The Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures
Games 2021, 12(4), 76; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040076 - 12 Oct 2021
Viewed by 172
Abstract
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist [...] Read more.
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Weighted Majority Voting Games)
Article
Dynamic Model of Collaboration in Multi-Agent System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Games 2021, 12(4), 75; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040075 - 03 Oct 2021
Viewed by 377
Abstract
Multi-agent collaboration is greatly important in order to reduce the frequency of errors in message communication and enhance the consistency of exchanging information. This study explores the process of evolutionary decision and stable strategies among multi-agent systems, including followers, leaders, and loners, involved [...] Read more.
Multi-agent collaboration is greatly important in order to reduce the frequency of errors in message communication and enhance the consistency of exchanging information. This study explores the process of evolutionary decision and stable strategies among multi-agent systems, including followers, leaders, and loners, involved in collaboration based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The main elements that affected the strategies are discussed, and a 3D evolution model is established. The evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and stable conditions were analyzed subsequently. Numerical simulation results were obtained through MATLAB simulation, and they manifested that leaders play an important role in exchanging information with other agents, accepting agents’ state information, and sending messages to agents. Then, with the positivity of receiving and feeding back messages for followers, implementing message communication is profitable for the system, and the high positivity can accelerate the exchange of information. At the behavior level, reducing costs can strengthen the punishment of impeding the exchange of information and improve the positivity of collaboration to facilitate the evolutionary convergence toward the ideal state. Finally, the EGT results revealed that the possibility of collaboration between loners and others is improved, and the rewards are increased, thereby promoting the implementation of message communication that encourages leaders to send all messages, improve the feedback positivity of followers, and reduce the hindering degree of loners. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)
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Article
Simple Voting Games and Cartel Damage Proportioning
Games 2021, 12(4), 74; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040074 - 01 Oct 2021
Viewed by 301
Abstract
Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value [...] Read more.
Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is demanding, legal practitioners prefer workarounds based on market shares. Relative sales, revenues, and profits however fail to reflect causal links between individual behavior and prices. We develop a pragmatic alternative: use simple voting games to describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Simulations for a variety of market scenarios document that this captures relative responsibility better than market share heuristics can. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Weighted Majority Voting Games)
Article
Unravelling Theory: Strategic (Non-) Disclosure of Online Ratings
Games 2021, 12(4), 73; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040073 - 30 Sep 2021
Viewed by 271
Abstract
This paper investigates disclosure by testing if the game theoretic predictions of unravelling theory are borne out in a heretofore unstudied market. We analyse TripAdvisor disclosures from hoteliers across 22 locations (N = 4357). Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that disclosure [...] Read more.
This paper investigates disclosure by testing if the game theoretic predictions of unravelling theory are borne out in a heretofore unstudied market. We analyse TripAdvisor disclosures from hoteliers across 22 locations (N = 4357). Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that disclosure decreases linearly with TripAdvisor ratings. We find the same pattern of disclosure occurs when consumers know the information provider has information to disclose, and when they do not. We also find evidence suggesting the most elite hotels may disclose less. We provide practical as well as theoretical implications. Full article
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Review
Evolutionary Game Theory: Darwinian Dynamics and the G Function Approach
Games 2021, 12(4), 72; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040072 - 27 Sep 2021
Viewed by 429
Abstract
Classical evolutionary game theory allows one to analyze the population dynamics of interacting individuals playing different strategies (broadly defined) in a population. To expand the scope of this framework to allow us to examine the evolution of these individuals’ strategies over time, we [...] Read more.
Classical evolutionary game theory allows one to analyze the population dynamics of interacting individuals playing different strategies (broadly defined) in a population. To expand the scope of this framework to allow us to examine the evolution of these individuals’ strategies over time, we present the idea of a fitness-generating (G) function. Under this model, we can simultaneously consider population (ecological) and strategy (evolutionary) dynamics. In this paper, we briefly outline the differences between game theory and classical evolutionary game theory. We then introduce the G function framework, deriving the model from fundamental biological principles. We introduce the concept of a G-function species, explain the process of modeling with G functions, and define the conditions for evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). We conclude by presenting expository examples of G function model construction and simulations in the context of predator–prey dynamics and the evolution of drug resistance in cancer. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)
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