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Article

Simple Voting Games and Cartel Damage Proportioning

Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Maria Montero
Received: 23 August 2021 / Revised: 21 September 2021 / Accepted: 23 September 2021 / Published: 1 October 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Weighted Majority Voting Games)
Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is demanding, legal practitioners prefer workarounds based on market shares. Relative sales, revenues, and profits however fail to reflect causal links between individual behavior and prices. We develop a pragmatic alternative: use simple voting games to describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Simulations for a variety of market scenarios document that this captures relative responsibility better than market share heuristics can. View Full-Text
Keywords: simple voting games; Shapley-Shubik index; relative responsibility; cartel damage allocation simple voting games; Shapley-Shubik index; relative responsibility; cartel damage allocation
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MDPI and ACS Style

Napel, S.; Welter, D. Simple Voting Games and Cartel Damage Proportioning. Games 2021, 12, 74. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040074

AMA Style

Napel S, Welter D. Simple Voting Games and Cartel Damage Proportioning. Games. 2021; 12(4):74. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040074

Chicago/Turabian Style

Napel, Stefan, and Dominik Welter. 2021. "Simple Voting Games and Cartel Damage Proportioning" Games 12, no. 4: 74. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040074

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