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Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents

Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata, 00133 Rome, Italy
Academic Editors: Heinrich H. Nax and Ulrich Berger
Received: 30 August 2021 / Revised: 8 October 2021 / Accepted: 13 October 2021 / Published: 20 October 2021
(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)
This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the agents to reveal their types unless the principal either (i) excludes one group from the productive relationship, or (ii) demands different efforts from different preference groups. I also characterize the contract-inducing pooling equilibria in which all agents are incentivized to exert a high level of effort. View Full-Text
Keywords: screening; homo moralis; altruism screening; homo moralis; altruism
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MDPI and ACS Style

Sarkisian, R. Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents. Games 2021, 12, 77. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040077

AMA Style

Sarkisian R. Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents. Games. 2021; 12(4):77. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040077

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sarkisian, Roberto. 2021. "Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents" Games 12, no. 4: 77. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040077

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