Games

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Open AccessEditorial

Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Games in 2013

by Games Editorial Office

Games 2014, 5(1), 90-91; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g5010090 - 25 Feb 2014

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The editors of Games would like to express their sincere gratitude to the following reviewers for assessing manuscripts in 2013. [...] Full article

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Open AccessArticle

Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur

by Alexander J. Field

Games 2014, 5(1), 53-89; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g5010053 - 25 Feb 2014

Cited by 8 | Viewed by 13526

Abstract

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main [...] Read more.

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))

663 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Examining Monotonicity and Saliency Using Level-k Reasoning in a Voting Game

by Anna Bassi and Kenneth C. Williams

Games 2014, 5(1), 26-52; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g5010026 - 14 Feb 2014

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6310

Abstract

This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1] postulates that players might be [...] Read more.

This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1] postulates that players might be of different types, each corresponding to the level of reasoning in which they engage. Furthermore, to postulate the effect of financial incentives on subjects’ choice, we used the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) concept. In a QRE, players’ decisions are noisy, with the probability of playing a given strategy increasing in its expected payoff. Hence, the choice probability is a function of the magnitude of the financial incentives. Our results show that low complexity promotes the highest degree of level-k strategic reasoning in every payment treatment. Standard financial incentives are enough to induce equilibrium behavior, and the marginal effect of extra incentives on equilibrium behavior seems to be negligible. High complexity, instead, decreases the rate of convergence to equilibrium play. With a sufficiently high complexity, increasing payoff amounts does promote more strategic behavior in a significant manner. Our results show with complex voting games, higher financial incentives are required for the subjects to exert the effort needed to complete the task. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Laboratory Experimental Testing of Political Science Models)

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Open AccessArticle

Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results

by Tassos Patokos

Games 2014, 5(1), 1-25; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g5010001 - 30 Jan 2014

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Abstract

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a [...] Read more.

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and ‘satisficers’. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))

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Games, Volume 5, Issue 1 (March 2014) – 4 articles , Pages 1-91

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