Games

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by Emin Karagözoğlu and Kerim Keskin

Games 2015, 6(2), 161-174; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g6020161 - 19 Jun 2015

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 5961

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions [...] Read more.

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the tempered aspirations solution, in terms of Pareto efficiency in a strategic framework. Our main result shows that the weights solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a reference point. In particular, the introduction of a reference point brings one more degree of freedom to the model which requires also the difference in the weights placed on the reference point to be considered in reaching an efficiency ranking. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)

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1224 KiB

Open AccessArticle

How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game

by Jean Paul Rabanal and Daniel Friedman

Games 2015, 6(2), 150-160; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g6020150 - 03 Jun 2015

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 6907

Abstract

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence [...] Read more.

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has unstable oscillations around an interior Nash Equilibrium (NE), but under smoothed best response dynamics we obtain convergence to Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). Full article

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8772 KiB

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Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods

by Daria Roithmayr, Alexander Isakov and David Rand

Games 2015, 6(2), 124-149; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g6020124 - 03 Jun 2015

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 7159

Abstract

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the ability to control how quickly legal rules of [...] Read more.

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the ability to control how quickly legal rules of punishment evolve relative to social behavior that legal punishment regulates. However, at what rate should legal rules evolve relative to society to maximize compliance? We investigate this question by modeling the co-evolution of law and cooperation in a public goods game with centralized punishment. We vary the rate at which States update their legal punishment strategy relative to Citizens’ updating of their contribution strategy and observe the effect on Citizen cooperation. We find that when States have unlimited resources, slower State updating lead to more Citizen cooperation: by updating more slowly, States force Citizens to adapt to the legal punishment rules. When States depend on Citizens to finance their punishment activities, however, we find evidence of a ‘Goldilocks’ effect: optimal compliance is achieved when legal rules evolve at a critical evolutionary rate that is slow enough to force citizens to adapt, but fast enough to enable states to quickly respond to outbreaks of citizen lawlessness. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)

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Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences

by Davide Dragone, Fabio Galeotti and Raimondello Orsini

Games 2015, 6(2), 79-123; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g6020079 - 18 May 2015

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 6560

Abstract

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract [...] Read more.

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract workers have similar other-regarding preferences and display analogous contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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908 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On the Three-Person Game Baccara Banque

by Stewart N. Ethier and Jiyeon Lee

Games 2015, 6(2), 57-78; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g6020057 - 08 May 2015

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5583

Abstract

Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this [...] Read more.

Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this solution exists only for certain \(\theta\). A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exists. Under a ''with replacement'' assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all \(\theta\). Full article

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354 KiB

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A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability

by Maria Montero

Games 2015, 6(2), 39-56; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g6020039 - 22 Apr 2015

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 5619

Abstract

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may [...] Read more.

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form. We show that agreement is immediate in equilibrium, and the proposer advantage disappears as the breakdown probability goes to zero. We then turn to the special case of apex games and explore the consequences of varying the probabilities that govern the selection of formateurs and proposers. Letting the breakdown probability go to zero, most of the probabilities considered lead to the same ex post pay-off division. Ex ante expected pay-offs may follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak players may expect a lower pay-off ex ante. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy and Game Theory)

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Games, Volume 6, Issue 2 (June 2015) – 6 articles , Pages 39-174

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