Games

202 KiB

Open AccessCommunication

On Adverse Effects of Consumers’ Attaching Greater Importance to Firms’ Ethical Conduct

by Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe

Games 2017, 8(3), 39; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030039 - 14 Sep 2017

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 5158

Consumers increasingly care about firms’ ethical conduct (e.g., labor and environmental practices) when making their consumption choices. This note presents a simple framework to highlight the possibility that this development may induce a less desirable production technology choice and bring about lower market [...] Read more.

Consumers increasingly care about firms’ ethical conduct (e.g., labor and environmental practices) when making their consumption choices. This note presents a simple framework to highlight the possibility that this development may induce a less desirable production technology choice and bring about lower market transparency. When faced with consumers’ greater moral concerns, more firms may choose an undesirable mode of production and shroud information about it. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

by Ingela Alger and Jörgen W. Weibull

Games 2017, 8(3), 38; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030038 - 11 Sep 2017

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 7548

Abstract

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who [...] Read more.

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?

by Roberto Sarkisian

Games 2017, 8(3), 37; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030037 - 05 Sep 2017

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5725

Abstract

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents [...] Read more.

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts; the probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is sufficiently high; and either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is sufficiently low. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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Open AccessArticle

Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving: Learning from Non-Results

by Zachary Grossman and Joël J. Van der Weele

Games 2017, 8(3), 36; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030036 - 21 Aug 2017

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 6757

Abstract

To identify dual-process reasoning in giving, we exposed experimental participants making a charitable donation to vivid images of the charity’s beneficiaries in order to stimulate affect. We hypothesized that the effect of an affective manipulation on giving would be larger when we simultaneously [...] Read more.

To identify dual-process reasoning in giving, we exposed experimental participants making a charitable donation to vivid images of the charity’s beneficiaries in order to stimulate affect. We hypothesized that the effect of an affective manipulation on giving would be larger when we simultaneously put the subjects under cognitive load using a numerical recall task. Independent treatment checks reveal opposite responses in men and women and cast some doubt on the reliability of our mainstream treatment manipulations and assessment tools. We find no evidence for dual-process decision-making, even among women, whose responses to the manipulations conformed most to our expectations. These results highlight the need for caution in the use of these common manipulations, the importance of independent manipulation checks, and the limitations of dual-process models for understanding altruistic behavior. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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Open AccessArticle

Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long

by Lucas Wardil and Marco Antonio Amaral

Games 2017, 8(3), 35; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030035 - 18 Aug 2017

Cited by 8 | Viewed by 5668

Abstract

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals [...] Read more.

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability. Full article

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Open AccessArticle

The Impact of Previous Action on Bargaining—An Experiment on the Emergence of Preferences for Fairness Norms

by Thomas Neumann, Stephan Schosser and Bodo Vogt

Games 2017, 8(3), 34; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030034 - 14 Aug 2017

Viewed by 5599

Abstract

The communication of participants to identify an acceptable bargaining outcome in the Nash bargaining game is all about fairness norms. Participants introduce fairness norms which yield a better outcome for themselves in order to convince the other participant of their bargaining proposal. Typically, [...] Read more.

The communication of participants to identify an acceptable bargaining outcome in the Nash bargaining game is all about fairness norms. Participants introduce fairness norms which yield a better outcome for themselves in order to convince the other participant of their bargaining proposal. Typically, these fairness norms are in line with theoretical predictions, which support a wide variety of different but fair outcomes the participants can choose from. In this experiment, we play two treatments of the Nash bargaining game: in one treatment, the participants play a dictator game prior to bargaining, and in the other treatment they do not. We find that participants who have not played the dictator game intensively discuss the outcome of the game and come to solutions closer to the equal split of the pie the longer they chat. This effect vanishes as soon as the participants have previous experience from a dictator game: instead of chatting, they establish the fairness norm introduced in the dictator game. Remarkably, if the dictator is unfair in the dictator game, he also gets a higher share of the pie in the Nash bargaining game. Full article

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Open AccessCommunication

A Note on Disbelief in Others regarding Backward Induction

by Andreas Tutić and Sascha Grehl

Games 2017, 8(3), 33; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030033 - 08 Aug 2017

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5519

Abstract

We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player’s own inability to perform backward [...] Read more.

We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player’s own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so. We find that behavior is responsive to the dependence on others who might fail in backward induction as well as information regarding their backward induction skills. Full article

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Open AccessArticle

Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques

by Antoni Rubí-Barceló

Games 2017, 8(3), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030032 - 01 Aug 2017

Viewed by 5496

Abstract

It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even [...] Read more.

It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Combinatorial Optimization and Games)

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Open AccessArticle

The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game

by Mark Whitmeyer

Games 2017, 8(3), 31; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030031 - 26 Jul 2017

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 8728

Abstract

This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies [...] Read more.

This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty’s motives and incentives. We endow Monty and the contestant with common prior probabilities (p) about the motives of Monty and show that, under certain conditions on p, the unique equilibrium is one in which the contestant is indifferent between switching and not switching. This coincides and agrees with the typical responses and explanations by experimental subjects. In particular, we show that our formulation can explain the experimental results in Page (1998), that more people gradually choose switch as the number of doors in the problem increases. Full article

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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects

by Katharina Schüller, Kateřina Staňková and Frank Thuijsman

Games 2017, 8(3), 30; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030030 - 18 Jul 2017

Cited by 8 | Viewed by 8533

Abstract

In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players [...] Read more.

In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players minimize the present value of their own costs defined as a linear combination of pollution costs and costs of environmentally friendly policies, where the state vector of the system consists of the pollution stock per country. A player’s time-varying decision is her investment into clean policies, while her expected costs include also pollution caused by her neighbors. We analyze three variants of this game: (1) a Nash game in which each player chooses her investment into clean policies such that her expected costs are minimal, (2) a game in which the players imitate the investments into clean policies of their neighbors without taking the neighbor’s success concerning their costs into account and (3) a game in which each player imitates her neighbors’ investments into clean policies if this behavior seems to bring a profit. In each of these scenarios, we show under which conditions the countries have incentives to act environmentally friendly. We argue that the different results of these games can be used to understand and design effective environmental policies. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Global Collaborative Solution for Climate Change—A Game-Theoretic Perspective)

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Open AccessArticle

Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game

by Mario Capizzani, Luigi Mittone, Andrew Musau and Antonino Vaccaro

Games 2017, 8(3), 29; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030029 - 14 Jul 2017

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6723

Abstract

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains [...] Read more.

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant. Full article

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Open AccessArticle

Reacting to Unfairness: Group Identity and Dishonest Behavior

by Nives Della Valle and Matteo Ploner

Games 2017, 8(3), 28; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030028 - 14 Jul 2017

Cited by 8 | Viewed by 7196

Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either [...] Read more.

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either share the same group identity or have distinct group identities. Then, they approach a task in which they can opportunistically engage in dishonest behavior. Our results show that when individuals share the same group identity, unfair distributive decisions do not trigger a dishonest reaction. In contrast, when different group identities coexist, dishonest behavior is observed as a reaction to unfairness. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)

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Open AccessArticle

Cycles in Team Tennis and Other Paired-Element Contests

by Shane Sanders, Justin Ehrlich and James Boudreau

Games 2017, 8(3), 27; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030027 - 30 Jun 2017

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5113

Abstract

Team Tennis competitions produce aggregate scores for teams, and thus team rankings, based on head-to-head matchups of individual team members. Similar scoring rules can be used to rank any two groups that must be compared on the basis of paired elements. We explore [...] Read more.

Team Tennis competitions produce aggregate scores for teams, and thus team rankings, based on head-to-head matchups of individual team members. Similar scoring rules can be used to rank any two groups that must be compared on the basis of paired elements. We explore such rules in terms of their strategic and social choice characteristics, with particular emphasis on the role of cycles. We first show that cycles play an important role in promoting competitive balance, and show that cycles allow for a maximum range of competitive balance within a league of competing teams. We also illustrate the impact that strategic behavior can have on the unpredictability of competition outcomes, and show for a general class of team tennis scoring rules that a rule is strategy-proof if and only if it is acyclic (dictatorial) and manipulable otherwise. Given the benefits of cycles and their relationship with manipulability, a league valuing competitive balance may invite such social choice violations when choosing a scoring rule. Full article

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Open AccessArticle

Gender, Emotions, and Tournament Performance in the Laboratory

by Brianna Halladay

Games 2017, 8(3), 26; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030026 - 28 Jun 2017

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 6396

Abstract

Individuals face competitive environments daily, and it is important to understand how emotions affect behavior in these environments and resulting economic consequences. Using a two-stage laboratory experiment, I analyze the role of reported emotions in tournament performance and assess how the behavioral response [...] Read more.

Individuals face competitive environments daily, and it is important to understand how emotions affect behavior in these environments and resulting economic consequences. Using a two-stage laboratory experiment, I analyze the role of reported emotions in tournament performance and assess how the behavioral response differs across genders. The first stage serves to induce emotions, while the second stage presents the subject with a one-on-one winner-take-all tournament with the individual who generated the feeling, using a real-effort task. Ultimately, I show that women respond to the negative feelings more strongly than men. I find that women increase performance when experiencing negative emotions, while male performance remains unaffected. Remarkably, there is no gender gap in tournament performance when there are negative emotions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavior Regulation and Conflicted Emotions: Theory and Experimental Evidence)

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Open AccessArticle

Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty

by Lina Mallozzi and Roberta Messalli

Games 2017, 8(3), 25; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g8030025 - 22 Jun 2017

Cited by 10 | Viewed by 6255

Abstract

We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the [...] Read more.

We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic resulting game. Some examples are illustrated. Full article

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Games, Volume 8, Issue 3 (September 2017) – 15 articles

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