Drunk with Wisdom: Metaphors of Ecstasy in Plato’s Symposium and Lucian of Samosata

Abstract

Among the metaphors that Plato employed in the context of his apophatic approach to philosophical truth and its experience, inebriation stands out in the Symposium, where famously Socrates is compared to Dionysian figures such as the Silenoi and Marsyas (215a-c), and to frenzied Corybantic dancers (215e; 216d; 218b). The contentious nature of inebriation as a proxy of ecstasy is aptly exemplified in Euripides’ Bacchae, where Pentheus, the distrusting new tyrant of Thebes, is keen to associate the Bacchic trance with common intoxication and lewd behavior; although Plato tries to anticipate such criticisms by repeatedly stating in the Symposium that Socrates is sober and of sound mind (e.g., 214a; 216d; 219d; 220a), later authors are unforgiving of his metaphorical style, which is deemed inconsistent with Plato’s stern disapproval of poetry. Among such later authors, Lucian of Samosata deserves closer attention apropos his treatment of inebriation as a most confusing and inappropriate metaphor for philosophical inspiration. Despite the jocular style of his dialogues, Lucian’s depiction of Platonic inebriation powerfully sketches a deep intellectual crisis that especially afflicts the young people of his time. Thus, Lucian sheds unexpected light on a less prominent chapter of Plato’s reception during the Roman imperial period.

1. Introduction: Philosophical Conversion and “Platonic Inebriation”

Conversion, the result of undergoing an altered state of consciousness,1 was invariably described in Greek antiquity as ecstasy or divine possession,2 and was linked with philosophy rather than religion.3 For example, in the Platonic dialogues Socrates is typically portrayed as preoccupied with abstract notions, meditating for hours in full public view, lost in his thoughts,4 often talking to himself,5 yet candidly musing on his frequent divine visitations (his daimonion).6 Hence, Socrates becomes an easy target of fifth-century BCE Athenian anti-intellectualism,7 spearheaded by Aristophanes.8 This, however, does not alter that fact that our encounter with the secrets of the cosmos or the divine is typically marked by an inexpressible sublimity, often accompanied by feelings of amazement, fear, and awe. Thus, Plato’s descriptions of the inner experience of philosophy are full of lacunae, such as, for example, in the Symposium, where Diotima resorts to a series of negatives to convey the ineffable uniqueness of Beauty (Symp. 211b2). Still, Plato needs to relate in some way the experience of philosophical conversion and thus he coins a number of metaphors for which he draws on culturally familiar states of altered consciousness (see n.1). One of the most controversial metaphors that Plato employed to describe philosophical conversion is inebriation,9 notably expounded in the Symposium (e.g., Symp. 218b3-4), which relates the events that took place during a splendid banquet organized by Agathon in 416 BCE to celebrate his dramatic victory at the Lenaia festival of that year. The guests are some of the most prominent politicians and members of the Athenian intellectual elite of the time, including Socrates and aristocratic bad-boy Alcibiades.

The latter is, in fact, portrayed as gate-crashing the party (212d4-7) and proclaiming himself symposiarch (213e9-10) before urging everyone to drink beyond measure (213e10-214a4). In addition, when prompted by Eryximachus to participate in the competition of praises about Eros which the guests have chosen as their pastime, Alcibiades resolves to deliver a praise of Socrates, comparing him to the Silenoi and Marsyas,10 figures typically associated with Dionysus,11 who, according to Euripides’ iconic representation of the god’s cult, drove his followers “out of their mind,”12 stinging them with bouts of mania.13 Framed by repeated references to drinking in the dialogue–that of the other guests (176a7-c4),14 of Poros in Diotima’s tale (203b6-8), and notably, Alcibiades’ undeniable state of intoxication, as he is supported by a flute girl into the banqueting hall (212d-e)–Socrates’ philosophical inspiration is described as an ecstatic experience that leads his audiences to shock and amazement (215d6):15

ἐπειδὰν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος, …, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα.

For whenever one listens to you or to someone else relating your speeches…we are all astounded and possessed.

Alcibiades has first-hand experience of this frenzy, which he compares to the orgiastic rites of the Corybantes (215e1-4):16

ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας.

For when I hear him, I am much worse than those partaking in the Corybantic dances; and my heart leaps and tears run down my eyes at the sound of his speeches, and I have witnessed many others undergoing the same experience.

Alcibiades’ statement focuses on the difference between appearance and essence and aims to dramatize the effect that Socrates has on his audiences: despite being rather unassuming in appearance (remember the joke at the start of the Symposium about Socrates looking unusually polished; 174a10-11), always joking with his interlocutors (175e8 and 215b9: Ὑβριστὴς εἶ; cf. 219c6; 221e4; 222b1 and especially 216e5-6: εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ), and claiming to know little (216d4-5: καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν), in reality, he is a deft speaker that leads his interlocutors to aporia before guiding them to change their views and way of life (cf. 215b4-5; 216e3-8). Thus, indeed he resembles the Silenoi statues that look ridiculous at first (221e2-3: φανεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον) with their deceptively ludicrous exterior though inside them they hide statues of the gods. Similarly, an inexperienced and thoughtless person might at first laugh at Socrates’ speeches (221e7-222a1: ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν) before realizing that his are the only speeches that make sense.

Nevertheless, Socrates’ philosophical inspiration, defined by Alcibiades as mania and baccheia (218b3-4), and supplemented by testimonies of the philosopher’s reputation for being able to quaff considerable amounts of wine,17 could easily render him misunderstood, even ridiculed, as being “under the influence” of wine, as being drunk.18 Despite repeated references in the Symposium to Socrates’ sophrosyne (214a; 216d; 219d), reinforced by Alcibiades’ assurance that “no-one has ever seen Socrates drunk” (220a6-7: Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν ἀνθρώπων), Plato’s bold attempt to defend Socrates backfired. “Platonic” or “Socratic inebriation” attracted considerable criticism by later readers for confusing philosophy, expected to unpack abstract notions in plain language, with the literary endeavor, typically associated with florid, figurative language. Thus, Plato was accused of misguiding students of philosophy who were unable to appreciate his penchant for metaphors. My paper, then, discusses the negative reception of Plato’s metaphorical style in the Hellenistic and early Roman imperial periods before focusing on the rejection of Socrates’ baccheia by Lucian of Samosata, the second century CE satirist who offers a refreshing insight into the renewed debate of his time on philosophical conversion.19

2. Critiquing Plato’s Metaphorical Language

As Millet has pointed out,20 Socrates was already a controversial figure in his own time, and shortly after his death, a plethora of Socratic literature came into circulation, including “the so-called Sokratikoi Logoi or ‘Conversations with Socrates’, which was possibly as much hostile to Socrates as in his favour.” Among this wide variety of approaches to Socrates, Plato’s metaphorical attempts to articulate Socratic wisdom came in for criticism. Hence, in the fourth century BCE, Dicaearchus shows little sympathy for Socrates’ discursive tropes and accuses Plato of encouraging people to engage with philosophy at a superficial level (Phld. Hist. Acad., PHerc. 1021, col. 1.1-21):21

ἐνδεχ̣όμενον [οὖ]ν ἐπα-

νεκαίνιϲ^⌈ε^⌉ πάλιν ἅπαϲαν

τὴν τέ[χνην κ]^⌈αὶ κ^⌉[α]τὰ τοῦτ’

ἐν το^⌈ῖϲ^⌉ [λ]^⌈ό^⌉γοιϲ εὐρυθμίαν

προϲέλαβεν, αὐτὸϲ δε πολ-

λὰ ἐπειϲηνέγκατο ἴδια· [δι’] ὧν

– εἴ γε διὰ παρρη[ϲίαϲ δ]ε[ῖ c. 3 ] ̣ ̣

νόμενα λέγειν–πλ̣[εῖϲτον]

δὴ τῶν πάντων [ἀνθρ]ώ-

πων οὗτοϲ εὔξηϲε[ν φ]ιλο-

ϲοφίαν καὶ κατέλυϲ[ε]ν· προ-

[ετ]ρέψατο μὲγ γὰρ ἅπ[α]νταϲ

ὡϲ εἰπεῖν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν διὰ

τῆϲ ἀναγραφῆϲ τῶν λ[ό]-

γων, ἐπιπολαίωϲ δὲ καί

τ̣[ι]ναϲ ἐποίηϲε φιλοϲοφεῖν̣

φανερὰν ἐκτρέ[πων] εἰ̣[ϲ]

τριβή[ν]. φηϲὶ δ’ ὅτι [c. 7 ]

[c. 5 ]εκαιπ ̣ ̣ ̣[c. 2 ] ̣ ναϲ[_(.)]

[c. 2 ] τ̣οῦ φιλ[οϲ]οφεῖν ἐνδ[ό]-

ϲιμον ἔδω[κεν], ….

…possible ... he (sc. Plato) renewed again the entire art and, in doing so, added good rhythm in his dialogues.22 He himself introduced many things of his own. [Through] these–if (I may) say ... frankly–indeed [most] of all humans this man strengthened and broke up philosophy. For he urged everyone so to speak to practice it by writing down his dialogues. However, he also made some people practice philosophy in a superficial manner, leading them astray to a visible practice. Additionally, he (sc. Dicaearchus) says that ... [he] gave an impulse for practicing philosophy...

This mode of criticism was still operative in the first century CE; thus, while focusing on the use of metaphors in speeches, Demetrius, the author of On Style,23 offers aspiring writers the following advice (Eloc. 80):24

Ἐπὰν μέντοι κινδυνώδης ἡ μεταφορὰ δοκῇ, μεταλαμβανέσθω εἰς εἰκασίαν: οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλεστέρα γίγνοιτ̓ ἄν. εἰκασία δ̓ ἐστὶ μεταφορὰ πλεονάζουσα, … οὕτω μὲν γὰρ εἰκασία γέγονεν καὶ ἀσφαλέστερος ὁ λόγος, ἐκείνως δὲ μεταφορὰ καὶ κινδυνωδέστερος. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἐπισφαλές τι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν μεταφοραῖς μᾶλλον χρώμενος ἢ εἰκασίαις, ὁ μέντοι Ξενοφῶν εἰκασίαις μᾶλλον.

When a metaphor seems bold, convert it into a simile for greater safety. A simile is an expanded metaphor…The result is a simile and a less risky form of expression, while the former was a metaphor and more dangerous. This is why Plato’s use of metaphor in preference to simile is thought risky. Xenophon by contrast prefers the simile.

Socrates’ superior state of mental agility and the process of acquiring it cannot be communicated and/or experienced precisely; this, however, as Halliwell pointed out, leads prospective students of philosophy to confusion and uncertainty about the nature of truth to which ecstasy is expected to lead.25 Thus, as Platonism came in for increasing criticism in the Hellenistic and early Imperial periods, the boundaries between metaphor, experience, diction, and reality in the metaphor of Socratic intoxication became a locus for satire.26

This wariness around philosophical discourse and its inspirational effect27 reflects a heated debate in the centuries after Plato,28 a debate that does not always differentiate between Plato, Socrates, and their followers. According to pseudo-Longinus, Caecilius Calactinus, who wrote at the time of Augustus,29 was among several later readers who were especially critical of Plato’s inebriation metaphor (Subl. 32.7; = Caec. Cal. fr. 150): 30

ὅτι μέντοι καὶ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν τρόπων, ὥσπερ τἆλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐν λόγοις, προαγωγὸν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄμετρον, δῆλον ἤδη, κἂν ἐγὼ μὴ λέγω. ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτοις καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα οὐχ ἥκιστα διασύρουσι, πολλάκις ὥσπερ ὑπὸ βακχείας τινὸς τῶν λόγων εἰς ἀκράτους καὶ ἀπηνεῖς μεταφορὰς καὶ εἰς ἀλληγορικὸν στόμφον ἐκφερόμενον. ῾οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἐπινοεῖν̓ φησὶν ῾ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκερασμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δ̓ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ, καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πόμα ϰαὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται.᾿ νήφοντα γάρ, φασί, θεὸν τὸ ὕδωρ λέγειν, κόλασιν δὲ τὴν κρᾶσιν, ποιητοῦ τινος τῷ ὄντι οὐχὶ νήφοντός ἐστι.

However, it is obvious without my stating it, that the use of metaphor, like all the other attractions of style, always tempts writers to excess. Indeed, it is for these passages in particular that critics pull Plato to pieces, on the ground that he is often carried away by a sort of Bacchic possession in his writing into harsh and intemperate metaphor and allegorical bombast. “It is by no means easy to see,” he says, “that a city needs mixing like a wine bowl,31 where the mad wine seethes as it is poured in, but is chastened by another and a sober god and finding good company makes an excellent and temperate drink.” To call water “a sober god” and mixing “chastisement,” say the critics, is the language of a poet who is far from sober.

Although ps.-Longinus defends Plato, using vocabulary that evokes the Platonic Symposium,32 evidently Plato did not avoid being misunderstood. His critics were particularly challenged by the contradiction of a philosophical mind overcome by frenzy and yet able to grasp transcendental truth(s) with remarkable alertness.33 Indeed, even if we allow for the typical exaggeration associated with comedy and its antagonistic relationship with philosophy, as already noted in the context of Aristophanes’ (alleged) attack on Socrates,34 and even if we try to counter the criticisms levelled at Plato with the Stoic emphasis on the usefulness of poetry,35 Plato’s style was nonetheless the target of ridicule. Lucian, one of his most vocal yet rather understudied critics, was especially preoccupied with Plato’s controversial description of philosophical trance as wine-fueled frenzy.

3. Lucian and “Platonic Inebriation”

Lucian epitomizes the satirical critique of Socratic inebriation as an image unsuitable to express and articulate philosophical progress because it is dangerously open to misinterpretation.36 In Lucian’s Lexiphanes, the eponymous character whose name etymologically points to a bombastic speaker, claims to have composed a Symposium to compete with Plato’s famous dialogue (Lex. 1):37

ἀντισυμποσιάζω38 τῷ Ἀρίστωνος ἐν αὐτῷ.

Πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ Ἀρίστωνες· σὺ δὲ ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ συμποσίου τὸν Πλάτωνά μοι ἔδοξας λέγειν.

Ὀρθῶς ἀνέγνως.

I am counter-banqueting the son of Aristo in it.

There are many “Aristos,” but to judge from your “banquet” I suppose you mean Plato.

You read me right.

When asked by Lycinus, Lucian’s alter ego,39 to recite part of his new work, an invitation expressed in notably sympotic terms (νέκταρος γάρ τινος ἔοικας οἰνοχοήσειν ἡμῖν ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ: I dare say you will properly “wine us with nectar” out of it), Lexiphanes embarks on an incoherent exhibition of utter verbalism, replete with Atticisms40 (Lex. 16), to which Lycinus replies:

Ἅλις, ὦ Λεξίφανες, καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ἀναγνώσεως. ἐγὼ γοῦν ἤδη μεθύω σοι καὶ ναυτιῶ καὶ ἢν μὴ τάχιστα ἐξεμέσω πάντα ταῦτα ὁπόσα διεξελήλυθας, εὖ ἴσθι, κορυβαντιάσειν μοι δοκῶ περιβομβούμενος ὑφ’ ὧν κατεσκέδασάς μου ὀνομάτων. καίτοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον γελᾶν ἐπῄει μοι ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅμοια ἦν, ἠλέουν σε τῆς κακοδαιμονίας ὁρῶν εἰς λαβύρινθον ἄφυκτον ἐμπεπτωκότα καὶ νοσοῦντα νόσον τὴν μεγίστην, μᾶλλον δὲ μελαγχολῶντα.

Enough, Lexiphanes, both of the drinking-party and of the reading. I am already drunk and nauseous, and if I do not very soon vomit all this gallimaufry of yours, know it well, I expect to go raving mad with the roaring in my ears from the words with which you have showered me. At first I was inclined to laugh at it all, but when it turned out to be such a quantity and all of a sort, I pitied you for your hard luck, seeing that you had fallen into an inescapable labyrinth and were afflicted with the most serious of all illnesses—likely suffering from melancholy.41

For Lucian, Plato’s refutation of rhetoric is but another form of it which can obscure the purpose of philosophical enlightenment when entrusted to the wrong people.42 In adopting this approach, Lucian responds to the widespread (certainly at the time) view that few people can grasp complex philosophical arguments and have the stamina to make the necessary lifestyle changes that accord with philosophical insight. This image, however, is in loud contrast with the hordes of young men that by Lucian’s time flocked to philosophers and oratory schools to improve themselves. The impetus for self-improvement, fuelled by aspirations of social advancement, led to a systematic misreading or misapplication of Plato’s dialogues that, according to Lucian, Plato had invited.

Lycinus’ informal diagnosis of Lexiphanes’ insanity is confirmed a couple of paragraphs later by Sopolis,43 a doctor who happens to approach (Lex. 18):

Ἀλλ’ εἰς καλὸν γὰρ τουτονὶ Σώπολιν ὁρῶ τὸν ἰατρὸν προσιόντα, φέρε τούτῳ ἐγχειρίσαντές σε καὶ διαλεχθέντες ὑπὲρ τῆς νόσου ἴασίν τινά σοι εὑρώμεθα· συνετὸς γὰρ ἁνὴρ καὶ πολλοὺς ἤδη παραλαβὼν ὥσπερ σὲ ἡμιμανεῖς καὶ κορυζῶντας ἀπήλλαξεν ἐγχέας φάρμακον. Χαῖρε, Σώπολι, καὶ τουτονὶ Λεξιφάνην παραλαβὼν ἑταῖρον, ὡς οἶσθα, ἡμῖν ὄντα, λήρῳ δὲ νῦν καὶ ξένῃ περὶ τὴν φωνὴν νόσῳ ξυνόντα καὶ κινδυνεύοντα ἤδη τελέως ἀπολωλέναι σῶσον ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ.

But what luck! Here I see Sopolis the physician drawing near. Come now, suppose we put you in his hands, have a consultation with him about your complaint, and find some cure for you. The man is clever, and often before now, taking charge of people like yourself, half crazed and full of drivel, he has relieved them with his doses of medicine.—Good-day to you, Sopolis. Do take charge of Lexiphanes here, who is my friend, as you know, and at present has on him a nonsensical, outlandish distemper affecting his speech which is likely to be the death of him outright. Do save him in one way or another.

Thus, pretentious, exaggerated speech is firmly identified as a symptom of a disorder bordering madness (par. 18: ὥσπερ σὲ ἡμιμανεῖς καὶ κορυζῶντας), similar to Corybantic frenzy (par. 16: κορυβαντιάσειν μοι δοκῶ) and drunkenness (μεθύω).44 By extension, Lucian criticizes Plato, Lexiphanes’ confessed model, both for his promotion of Socratic intoxication and for his metaphorical, florid language. Importantly, this condition is not to be confused with the insights of a true philosopher–with all his eloquence Lexiphanes is but a deluded impostor.

Lucian returns to the theme of the exaggerated and haphazard metaphors employed by philosophers in Hermotimus 59. In this dialogue, Lycinus attempts to dissuade his friend Hermotimus from his enthusiastic desire to be tutored in philosophy. Lycinus, after comparing philosophers to wine merchants keen to impress their prospective customers,45 asks of his new interlocuter, Hermotimus (Herm. 60):

Πῶς οὖν οἷόν τέ σοι ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου γεύματος εἰδέναι τὰ πάντα; οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτά γε, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ἕτερα καινὰ ἐπὶ καινοῖς ἐλέγετο, οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν. ὥστε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἢν μὴ ὅλον ἐκπίῃς τὸν πίθον, ἄλλως μεθύων περίει· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἐν τῷ πυθμένι δοκεῖ μοι ὁ θεὸς κατακρύψαι τὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀγαθὸν ὑπὸ τὴν τρύγα αὐτήν. δεήσει οὖν ὅλον ἐξαντλῆσαι ἐς τέλος, ἢ οὔποτ’ ἂν εὕροις τὸ νεκτάρεον ἐκεῖνο πόμα, οὗ πάλαι διψῆν μοι δοκεῖς. σὺ δὲ οἴει τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὡς εἰ μόνον γεύσαιο αὐτοῦ καὶ σπάσαις μικρὸν ὅσον, αὐτίκα σε πάνσοφον γενησόμενον ὥσπερ φασὶν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὴν πρόμαντιν, ἐπειδὰν πίῃ τοῦ ἱεροῦ νάματος, ἔνθεον εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ χρᾶν τοῖς προσιοῦσιν. ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ἔοικε· σύ γ’ οὖν ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ πίθου ἐκπεπωκὼς ἐνάρχεσθαι ἔτι ἔλεγες.

Then how could you have known everything from just the first taste? There were not the same, but always new things being said on new subjects, unlike wine, which is always the same. So, my friend, unless you drink the whole butt, your tipsiness has been to no purpose; god seems to me to have hidden the good of philosophy right down at the bottom beneath the very lees. You will have to drain it all to the end or you will never find that nectarous drink for which I think you have long thirsted. But you imagine it to be such that, if you were but to taste and draw just a drop, you would at once become all-wise, as, they say, the prophetess at Delphi becomes inspired as soon as she drinks of the sacred spring and gives her answers to those who consult the oracle. But it seems it is not so: you had drunk over half the butt, and you said that you were still at the beginning.

The condemnation of the intoxicating effect of philosophical rhetoric in this dialogue is, however, marked by ambiguity. Hermotimus starts the dialogue anxious to become a distinguished philosopher,46 but when he comes to his senses, as if recovering from a previous drunkenness (Herm. 83: νυνὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκ μέθης ἀνανήφων ὁρῶ οἷα μέν ἐστιν), he pledges to drop his study of philosophy in tandem with its accompanying apparel (Herm. 86): he will cut his long beard, refrain from his punitive lifestyle, maybe even wear purple.47 Lycinus introduces his attempt to sober Hermotimus up, however, with a reference to Symposium (215e1-2): ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥσπερ κορυβαντιῶντι μὴ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἔα ληρεῖν, “Take no notice of my corybantic frenzy, but let me speak nonsense” (par. 63).48 For Hermotimus to be swayed by Lycinus’ counter-arguments, he must thus have experienced another kind of intellectual illumination, similar in its description at least to the mesmerizing effect his teacher’s words used to have on him.49 Lycinus is a deft speaker, as Hermotimus protests repeatedly.50

In his Wisdom of Nigrinus,51 which also contains striking allusions to Plato’s Symposium,52 Lucian moves from attacking pretentious eloquence to targeting Socratic intoxication directly. As often reiterated so far, in the Symposium Plato is constantly aware of the shallowness and ineptness of the metaphors at his disposal to describe the Socratic effect; therefore, Alcibiades’ comic descriptions of experiencing philosophy do not undermine Socrates’ moderation, self-evident in his sobriety while in the company of his tipsy fellow-symposiasts. His is (presented as) a genuine phenomenon, not a desperate attempt to recreate it.53 In Nigrinus 38, we read a description of Socratic intoxication, based on both the Symposium and the Phaedrus (bold fonts in the quotation below indicate similarities with Plato’s descriptions), which nonetheless represents only heady enthusiasm:54

Ὡς σεμνὰ καὶ θαυμάσια55 καὶ θεῖά γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διελήλυθας,56 ἐλελήθεις δέ με πολλῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς τῆς ἀμβροσίας καὶ τοῦ λωτοῦ κεκορεσμένος· ὥστε καὶ μεταξὺ σοῦ λέγοντος ἔπασχόν τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ παυσαμένου ἄχθομαι57 καὶ ἵνα δὴ καὶ κατὰ σὲ εἴπω, τέτρωμαι·58 καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς· οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι καὶ οἱ πρὸς τῶν κυνῶν τῶν λυσσώντων δηχθέντες οὐκ αὐτοὶ μόνοι λυσσῶσιν, ἀλλὰ κἄν τινας ἑτέρους ἐν τῇ μανίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαθῶσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔκφρονες59 γίγνονται· συμμεταβαίνει γάρ τι τοῦ πάθους ἅμα τῷ δήγματι καὶ πολυγονεῖται ἡ νόσος καὶ πολλὴ γίγνεται τῆς μανίας διαδοχή.

What a grand, wonderful, and indeed divine tale you have told, my friend; I did not realize but you have been truly chock-full of ambrosia and lotus! So that while you spoke, I felt something in my soul, and now you have stopped Ι am vexed: to speak in your style, I am wounded. Additionally, no wonder! for you know that people bitten by rabid dogs not only go mad themselves, but if in their fury they give the same thing to others, they too go out of their minds. Something of the affection is transmitted with the bite; the disease multiplies, and there is a great run of madness.

The character Nigrinus, described as a Platonic philosopher (par. 2), praises philosophy and the freedom it bestows, while criticizing in a distinctly Socratic manner people’s preoccupation with wealth, money, and reputation (par. 4: αὐτήν τε φιλοσοφίαν ἐπαινέσαι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν…πλούτου τε καὶ ἀργυρίου καὶ δόξης).60 His words allegedly restore the “soul sight” of his zealous student who relates the story (par. 5: τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὀξυδερκέστερος κατὰ μικρὸν ἐγιγνόμην),61 and inspire him to offer an accurate (if ironic) interpretation of Plato’s Socrates in the Symposium couched in the language of medicine:62

γαῦρός63 τε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ μετέωρός64 εἰμι καὶ ὅλως μικρὸν οὐκέτι οὐδὲν ἐπινοῶ: δοκῶ γάρ μοι ὅμοιόν τι πεπονθέναι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, οἷόνπερ καὶ οἱ Ἰνδοὶ πρὸς τὸν οἶνον λέγονται παθεῖν, ὅτε πρῶτον ἔπιον αὐτοῦ: θερμότεροι γὰρ ὄντες φύσει πιόντες ἰσχυρὸν οὕτω ποτὸν αὐτίκα μάλα ἐξεβακχεύθησαν καὶ διπλασίως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκράτου ἐξεμάνησαν. Oὕτω σοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔνθεος καὶ διπλασίως ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων περιέρχομαι.

What he said has made me proud and exalted, and in short, I am no longer concerned with trifles. I suppose I have had a similar experience with philosophy that the Hindus are said to have had with wine when they first tasted it. As they are by nature warmer than we, on taking such strong drink they went into frenzy at once and became manic by the unmixed drink twice as much. There you have it! I am going about enraptured twice as much by his words.

Although the interlocutor of Lucian’s character protests that “this is not drunkenness but sobriety and temperance” (Nigr. 6: Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οὐ μεθύειν, ἀλλὰ νήφειν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν), Nigrinus’ student, like Hermotimus above, clings to the bombastic descriptions of his transformation and revels in the license to use this kind of language that he has secured on account of his engagement with philosophy; Nigrinus himself, trapped in his image, watches on in guilty awareness and unable to react.65

Finally, in Lucian’s Bis Accusatus, Drunkenness is portrayed as dragging Academy at court, because she was able to convert one of her dearest slaves, the bad-boy-turned-philosopher Polemon,66 whose description readily evokes Plato’s Alcibiades in the Symposium.67 Polemon’s physical drunkenness corresponds to his “inspirational” way of teaching.68 However, when Drunkenness is too intoxicated to defend her case,69 Academy offers to speak for her, an offer probably designed to allude to Socrates’ disconcerting practice of delivering arguments on behalf of his rhetorical opponents, which Cicero appreciated as a key feature of Socratic irony70 (which he describes as severe ludas in De Or. 2.269-270). As Lane has pointed out,71 Socrates employed his ironic, playful style both in the Aristophanic way, where it means “concealing by feigning” and in the Aristotelian way where emphasis is given to self-deprecation. His style caused confusion among ancient as much as modern readers;72 hence, in Lucian, Academy seizes the opportunity to discredit the arguments of Drunkenness even further rather than deliver a fair defence on her behalf, a hint to the criticism that Socratic rhetorical practices incurred.73 It seems then that, as an author of satiric dialogues, Lucian engages with Old Comedy74 and its potential for moralizing rhetoric, recognizing its affinity with philosophy and its equal claim to parrhesia.75 In this guise, he calls for a re-evaluation of the flow of wine and jokes76 in the post-Platonic era.

4. Conclusions

I have explored here a rather overlooked chapter of Plato’s reception that focuses on the problem of articulating philosophical conversion. Despite his well-documented objection to poetry and its ambiguous use of rhetoric, Plato resorted to culturally ingrained metaphors to defend Socrates’ philosophical insights. Among such metaphors, further developed in the writings of Neoplatonic thinkers and often adapted by theologians such as pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite to refer to the core dogmatic truths of Christianity, inebriation proved to be especially controversial. Although Plutarch promoted the educational value of sympotic conviviality (Teodorsson (1999); Roskam (2009)), Lucian used his sharp satire to point out the simmering intellectual crisis of his time which Plato had unwittingly fuelled with his passionate imagery: while “Platonic inebriation” was meant to express powerfully the interiorization of philosophy and its life-altering effect, an image already misrepresented by Socrates’ critics in his own time, the trope was now transformed in the hands of inept teachers and desperate students into a dangerous way of manipulating the students’ zeal for progress. Truth, it seems, was as highly prized and yet as elusive in Lucian’s time as during any time of humanity’s intellectual struggle to grapple with our purpose in this world.