J. Intell., Volume 9, Issue 1 (March 2021) – 16 articles

There has been considerable debate and interest regarding the factor structure of executive functioning (EF). Therefore, the aim of the current study was to delve into this issue differently, by investigating EF and other cognitive constructs, such as working memory capacity (WMC), relational integration, and divided attention, which may contribute to EF. Here, we examined whether it is possible to provide evidence for a definite model of EF containing the components of updating, shifting, and inhibition. For this purpose, 202 young adults completed a battery of EF, three WMC tests, three relational integration tests, and two divided attention tests. A confirmatory factor analysis on all the cognitive abilities produced a five-factor structure, which included one factor predominately containing shifting tasks, the next factor containing two updating tasks, the third one predominately representing WMC, the fourth factor consisting of relational integration and antisaccade tasks, and finally, the last factor consisting of the divided attention and stop signal tasks. Lastly, a subsequent hierarchical model supported a higher-order factor, thereby representing general cognitive ability. Full article

The late James Flynn, to whom this Special Issue is dedicated, suggested that what will matter most to the future of the world is not levels of intelligence but rather how intelligence is deployed. In this article, I argue that we can distinguish between transactional and transformational deployments of intelligence. Loosely following Flynn, I suggest that we need to pay much more attention to the latter rather than the former. Full article

Drawing upon multidimensional theories of intelligence, the current paper evaluates if the Geneva Emotional Competence Test (GECo) fits within a higher-order intelligence space and if emotional intelligence (EI) branches predict distinct criteria related to adjustment and motivation. Using a combination of classical and S-1 bifactor models, we find that (a) a first-order oblique and bifactor model provide excellent and comparably fitting representation of an EI structure with self-regulatory skills operating independent of general ability, (b) residualized EI abilities uniquely predict criteria over general cognitive ability as referenced by fluid intelligence, and (c) emotion recognition and regulation incrementally predict grade point average (GPA) and affective engagement in opposing directions, after controlling for fluid general ability and the Big Five personality traits. Results are qualified by psychometric analyses suggesting only emotion regulation has enough determinacy and reliable variance beyond a general ability factor to be treated as a manifest score in analyses and interpretation. Findings call for renewed, albeit tempered, research on EI as a multidimensional intelligence and highlight the need for refined assessment of emotional perception, understanding, and management to allow focused analyses of different EI abilities. Full article

Socio-emotional abilities have been proposed as an extension to models of intelligence, but earlier measurement approaches have either not fulfilled criteria of ability measurement or have covered only predominantly receptive abilities. We argue that faking ability—the ability to adjust responses on questionnaires to present oneself in a desired manner—is a socio-emotional ability that can broaden our understanding of these abilities and intelligence in general. To test this theory, we developed new instruments to measure the ability to fake bad (malingering) and administered them jointly with established tests of faking good ability in a general sample of n = 134. Participants also completed multiple tests of emotion perception along with tests of emotion expression posing, pain expression regulation, and working memory capacity. We found that individual differences in faking ability tests are best explained by a general factor that had a large correlation with receptive socio-emotional abilities and had a zero to medium-sized correlation with different productive socio-emotional abilities. All correlations were still small after controlling these effects for shared variance with general mental ability as indicated by tests of working memory capacity. We conclude that faking ability is indeed correlated meaningfully with other socio-emotional abilities and discuss the implications for intelligence research and applied ability assessment. Full article

Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to a set of competencies to process, understand, and reason with affective information. Recent studies suggest ability measures of experiential and strategic EI differentially predict performance on non-emotional and emotionally laden tasks. To explore cognitive processes underlying these abilities further, we varied the affective context of a traditional letter-based n-back working-memory task. In study 1, participants completed 0-, 2-, and 3-back tasks with flanking distractors that were either emotional (fearful or happy faces) or non-emotional (shapes or letters stimuli). Strategic EI, but not experiential EI, significantly influenced participants’ accuracy across all n-back levels, irrespective of flanker type. In Study 2, participants completed 1-, 2-, and 3-back levels. Experiential EI was positively associated with response times for emotional flankers at the 1-back level but not other levels or flanker types, suggesting those higher in experiential EI reacted slower on low-load trials with affective context. In Study 3, flankers were asynchronously presented either 300 ms or 1000 ms before probes. Results mirrored Study 1 for accuracy rates and Study 2 for response times. Our findings (a) provide experimental evidence for the distinctness of experiential and strategic EI and (b) suggest that each are related to different aspects of cognitive processes underlying working memory. Full article

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability understand that other people’s mental states may be different from one’s own. Psychometric models have shown that individual differences in ToM can largely be attributed to general intelligence (g) (Coyle et al. 2018). Most psychometric models specify g as a reflective latent variable, which is interpreted as a general ability that plays a causal role in a broad range of cognitive tasks, including ToM tasks. However, an alternative approach is to specify g as a formative latent variable, that is, an overall index of cognitive ability that does not represent a psychological attribute (Kovacs and Conway 2016). Here we consider a formative g approach to the relationship between ToM and intelligence. First, we conducted an SEM with reflective g to test the hypothesis that ToM is largely accounted for by a general ability. Next, we conducted a model with formative g to determine whether the relationship between ToM and intelligence is influenced by domain-specific tasks. Finally, we conducted a redundancy analysis to examine the contribution of each g variable. Results suggest that the relationship between ToM and intelligence in this study was influenced by language-based tasks, rather than solely a general ability. Full article

Mathematical creativity is perceived as an increasingly important aspect of everyday life and, consequently, research has increased over the past decade. However, mathematical creativity has mainly been investigated in children and adolescents so far. Therefore, the first goal of the current study was to develop a mathematical creativity measure for adults (MathCrea) and to evaluate its reliability and construct validity in a sample of 100 adults. The second goal was to investigate how mathematical creativity is related to intelligence, mathematical competence, and general creativity. The MathCrea showed good reliability, and confirmatory factor analysis confirmed that the data fitted the assumed theoretical model, in which fluency, flexibility, and originality constitute first order factors and mathematical creativity a second order factor. Even though intelligence, mathematical competence, and general creativity were positively related to mathematical creativity, only numerical intelligence and general creativity predicted unique variance of mathematical creativity. Additional analyses separating quantitative and qualitative aspects of mathematical creativity revealed differential relationships to intelligence components and general creativity. This exploratory study provides first evidence that intelligence and general creativity are important predictors for mathematical creativity in adults, whereas mathematical competence seems to be not as important for mathematical creativity in adults as in children. Full article

Despite decades of extensive research on creativity, the field still combats psychometric problems when measuring individual differences in creative ability and people’s potential to achieve real-world outcomes that are both original and useful. We think these seemingly technical issues have a conceptual origin. We therefore propose a minimal theory of creative ability (MTCA) to create a consistent conceptual theory to guide investigations of individual differences in creative ability. Building on robust theories and findings in creativity and individual differences research, our theory argues that creative ability, at a minimum, must include two facets: intelligence and expertise. So, the MTCA simply claims that whenever we do something creative, we use most of our cognitive abilities combined with relevant expertise to be creative. MTCA has important implications for creativity theory, measurement, and practice. However, the MTCA isn’t necessarily true; it is a minimal theory. We discuss and reject several objections to the MTCA. Full article

In a recent publication in the Journal of Intelligence, Dennis McFarland mischaracterized previous research using latent variable and psychometric network modeling to investigate the structure of intelligence. Misconceptions presented by McFarland are identified and discussed. We reiterate and clarify the goal of our previous research on network models, which is to improve compatibility between psychological theories and statistical models of intelligence. WAIS-IV data provided by McFarland were reanalyzed using latent variable and psychometric network modeling. The results are consistent with our previous study and show that a latent variable model and a network model both provide an adequate fit to the WAIS-IV. We therefore argue that model preference should be determined by theory compatibility. Theories of intelligence that posit a general mental ability (general intelligence) are compatible with latent variable models. More recent approaches, such as mutualism and process overlap theory, reject the notion of general mental ability and are therefore more compatible with network models, which depict the structure of intelligence as an interconnected network of cognitive processes sampled by a battery of tests. We emphasize the importance of compatibility between theories and models in scientific research on intelligence. Full article

Individuals encounter problems daily wherein varying numbers of constraints require delimitation of memory to target goal-satisfying information. Multiply-constrained problems, such as the compound remote associates, are commonly used to study this type of problem solving. Since their development, multiply-constrained problems have been theoretically and empirically related to creative thinking, analytical problem solving, insight problem solving, and a multitude of other cognitive abilities. In the present study, we empirically evaluated the range of cognitive abilities previously associated with multiply-constrained problem solving to assess common versus unique predictive variance (i.e., working memory, attention control, episodic and semantic memory, and fluid and crystallized intelligence). Additionally, we sought to determine whether problem-solving ability and self-reported strategy adoption (analytical or insightful) were task specific or task general through the use of novel multiply-constrained problem-solving tasks (TriBond and Location Bond). Performance across these tasks was shown to be domain general, solutions derived through insightful strategies were more often correct than those derived through analytical strategies, and crystallized intelligence was the sole cognitive ability that provided unique predictive value after accounting for all other abilities. Full article

In order to investigate the nature of complex problem solving (CPS) within the nomological network of cognitive abilities, few studies have simultantiously considered working memory and intelligence, and results are inconsistent. The Brunswik symmetry principle was recently discussed as a possible explanation for the inconsistent findings because the operationalizations differed greatly between the studies. Following this assumption, 16 different combinations of operationalizations of working memory and fluid reasoning were examined in the present study (N = 152). Based on structural equation modeling with single-indicator latent variables (i.e., corrected for measurement error), it was found that working memory incrementally explained CPS variance above and beyond fluid reasoning in only 2 of 16 conditions. However, according to the Brunswik symmetry principle, both conditions can be interpreted as an asymmetrical (unfair) comparison, in which working memory was artificially favored over fluid reasoning. We conclude that there is little evidence that working memory plays a unique role in solving complex problems independent of fluid reasoning. Furthermore, the impact of the Brunswik symmetry principle was clearly demonstrated as the explained variance in CPS varied between 4 and 31%, depending on which operationalizations of working memory and fluid reasoning were considered. We argue that future studies investigating the interplay of cognitive abilities will benefit if the Brunswik principle is taken into account. Full article

We used computer-based automatic expression analysis to investigate the impact of imitation on facial emotion recognition with a baseline-intervention-retest design. The participants: 55 young adults with varying degrees of autistic traits, completed an emotion recognition task with images of faces displaying one of six basic emotional expressions. This task was then repeated with instructions to imitate the expressions. During the experiment, a camera captured the participants’ faces for an automatic evaluation of their imitation performance. The instruction to imitate enhanced imitation performance as well as emotion recognition. Of relevance, emotion recognition improvements in the imitation block were larger in people with higher levels of autistic traits, whereas imitation enhancements were independent of autistic traits. The finding that an imitation instruction improves emotion recognition, and that imitation is a positive within-participant predictor of recognition accuracy in the imitation block supports the idea of a link between motor expression and perception in the processing of emotions, which might be mediated by the mirror neuron system. However, because there was no evidence that people with higher autistic traits differ in their imitative behavior per se, their disproportional emotion recognition benefits could have arisen from indirect effects of imitation instructions Full article

Up to now, support for the idea that a controlled component exists in creative thought has mainly been supported by correlational studies; to further shed light on this issue, we employed an experimental approach. We used four alternate uses tasks that differed in instruction type (“be fluent” vs. “be creative”) and concurrent secondary workload (load vs. no load). A total of 51 participants (39 female) went through all tasks and generated ideas for a total of 16 different objects; their responses were scored in terms of fluency (number of responses generated), creative quality, and flexibility. We did find, as expected, that the be-creative instruction resulted in fewer and more creative ideas, as well as more flexible idea sets, but neither of the expected interaction effects became significant. Specifically, fluency was not affected more strongly by secondary workload in the be-fluent instruction condition than in the be-creative instruction condition. Further, the performance drop evoked by the secondary workload was not stronger in the be-creative instruction condition compared to the be-fluent instruction condition when creative quality or flexibility were examined as dependent variable. Altogether, our results do not confirm that be-creative instructions involve more cognitive load than be-fluent instructions. Nevertheless, the analysis of the serial order effect and additional correlational examinations revealed some promising results. Methodological limitations which may have influenced the results are discussed in light of the inherent suspense between internal and external validity (i.e., most likely the applied self-paced dual-task approach increased external validity, but undermined internal validity) and potentially guide future research. Full article

The present research examined the varieties of poor metaphors to gain insight into the cognitive processes involved in generating creative ones. Drawing upon data from two published studies as well as a new sample, adults’ open-ended responses to different metaphor prompts were categorized. Poor metaphors fell into two broad clusters. Non-metaphors—responses that failed to meet the basic task requirements—consisted of “adjective slips” (describing the topic adjectivally instead of figuratively), “wayward attributes” (attributing the wrong property to the topic), and “off-topic idioms” (describing the wrong topic). Bad metaphors—real metaphors that were unanimously judged as uncreative—consisted of “exemplary exemplars” (vehicles that lacked semantic distance and thus seemed trite) and “retrieved clichés” (pulling a dead metaphor from memory). Overall, people higher in fluid intelligence (Gf) were more likely to generate a real metaphor, and their metaphor was less likely to be a bad one. People higher in Openness to Experience, in contrast, were more likely to generate real metaphors but not more or less likely to generate bad ones. Scraping the bottom of the response barrel suggests that creative metaphor production is a particularly complex form of creative thought. Full article

This theoretical article proposes a unified framework of analysis for the constructs of intelligence and creativity. General definitions for intelligence and creativity are provided, allowing fair comparisons between the two context-embedded constructs. A novel taxonomy is introduced to classify the contexts in which intelligent and/or creative behavior can be embedded, in terms of the tightness vs. looseness of the relevant conceptual space S and available time T. These two dimensions are used to form what is identified as the space-time continuum, containing four quadrants: tight space and tight time, loose space and tight time, tight space and loose time, loose space and loose time. The intelligence and creativity constructs can be mapped onto the four quadrants and found to overlap more or less, depending on the context characteristics. Measurement methodologies adapted to the four different quadrants are discussed. The article concludes with a discussion about future research directions based on the proposed theoretical framework, in terms of theories and hypotheses on intelligence and creativity, of eminent personalities and personality traits, as well as its consequences for developmental, educational, and professional environments. Full article