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Compensations of Top Executives and M&A Behaviors: An Empirical Study of Listed Companies

by 1,*, 2 and 1
1
School of Design, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
2
Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2020, 8(4), 64; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/ijfs8040064
Received: 22 September 2020 / Revised: 10 October 2020 / Accepted: 12 October 2020 / Published: 23 October 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Behavioural Finance and Economics)
This study empirically examines the relationship between executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) behaviors by identifying the influence of short- and long-term incentive on the propensity and scale of M&A. When the short-term incentive is insufficient, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial compensation mechanism. Thus, lack of executives’ incentive promotes the propensity to engage in M&A and significantly affects the scale of M&A. With regard to long-term incentives, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial creation mechanism. Shareholding of executives promotes M&A propensity, and does not significantly affect the scale of M&A. This study significantly contributes to research in M&A behaviors by revealing the beneficial distribution mechanisms of M&A behaviors. View Full-Text
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions behaviors; executive compensation incentive; beneficial distribution mechanisms; listed companies mergers and acquisitions behaviors; executive compensation incentive; beneficial distribution mechanisms; listed companies
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MDPI and ACS Style

Xue, J.; Fan, H.; Dong, Z. Compensations of Top Executives and M&A Behaviors: An Empirical Study of Listed Companies. Int. J. Financial Stud. 2020, 8, 64. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/ijfs8040064

AMA Style

Xue J, Fan H, Dong Z. Compensations of Top Executives and M&A Behaviors: An Empirical Study of Listed Companies. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2020; 8(4):64. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/ijfs8040064

Chicago/Turabian Style

Xue, Jiao, Heng Fan, and Zhanxun Dong. 2020. "Compensations of Top Executives and M&A Behaviors: An Empirical Study of Listed Companies" International Journal of Financial Studies 8, no. 4: 64. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/ijfs8040064

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