Next Article in Journal
Information-Theoretically Secure Data Origin Authentication with Quantum and Classical Resources
Next Article in Special Issue
Why Is Deep Learning Challenging for Printed Circuit Board (PCB) Component Recognition and How Can We Address It?
Previous Article in Journal
ESPADE: An Efficient and Semantically Secure Shortest Path Discovery for Outsourced Location-Based Services
Previous Article in Special Issue
Secure Boot for Reconfigurable Architectures
Article

Electromagnetic and Power Side-Channel Analysis: Advanced Attacks and Low-Overhead Generic Countermeasures through White-Box Approach

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 1 October 2020 / Revised: 28 October 2020 / Accepted: 29 October 2020 / Published: 31 October 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Feature Papers in Hardware Security)
Electromagnetic and power side-channel analysis (SCA) provides attackers a prominent tool to extract the secret key from the cryptographic engine. In this article, we present our cross-device deep learning (DL)-based side-channel attack (X-DeepSCA) which reduces the time to attack on embedded devices, thereby increasing the threat surface significantly. Consequently, with the knowledge of such advanced attacks, we performed a ground-up white-box analysis of the crypto IC to root-cause the source of the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage. Equipped with the understanding that the higher-level metals significantly contribute to the EM leakage, we present STELLAR, which proposes to route the crypto core within the lower metals and then embed it within a current-domain signature attenuation (CDSA) hardware to ensure that the critical correlated signature gets suppressed before it reaches the top-level metal layers. CDSA-AES256 with local lower metal routing was fabricated in a TSMC 65 nm process and evaluated against different profiled and non-profiled attacks, showing protection beyond 1B encryptions, compared to ∼10K for the unprotected AES. Overall, the presented countermeasure achieved a 100× improvement over the state-of-the-art countermeasures available, with comparable power/area overheads and without any performance degradation. Moreover, it is a generic countermeasure and can be used to protect any crypto cores while preserving the legacy of the existing implementations. View Full-Text
Keywords: power/EM side-channel analysis attack; current domain signature attenuation hardware; low-overhead; deep-learning attack; STELLAR; SCNIFFER; X-DeepSCA; generic countermeasure power/EM side-channel analysis attack; current domain signature attenuation hardware; low-overhead; deep-learning attack; STELLAR; SCNIFFER; X-DeepSCA; generic countermeasure
Show Figures

Figure 1

MDPI and ACS Style

Das, D.; Sen, S. Electromagnetic and Power Side-Channel Analysis: Advanced Attacks and Low-Overhead Generic Countermeasures through White-Box Approach. Cryptography 2020, 4, 30. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/cryptography4040030

AMA Style

Das D, Sen S. Electromagnetic and Power Side-Channel Analysis: Advanced Attacks and Low-Overhead Generic Countermeasures through White-Box Approach. Cryptography. 2020; 4(4):30. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/cryptography4040030

Chicago/Turabian Style

Das, Debayan, and Shreyas Sen. 2020. "Electromagnetic and Power Side-Channel Analysis: Advanced Attacks and Low-Overhead Generic Countermeasures through White-Box Approach" Cryptography 4, no. 4: 30. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/cryptography4040030

Find Other Styles
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map by Country/Region

1
Back to TopTop