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Article

Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model

1
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA
2
School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
This is an extended conference version that was presented at the 2020 Clemson University Power Systems Conference (PSC).
Academic Editor: Jim Plusquellic
Received: 30 December 2020 / Revised: 11 March 2021 / Accepted: 22 March 2021 / Published: 2 April 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Feature Papers in Hardware Security)
The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker′s average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations. View Full-Text
Keywords: periodic reset; attack graph; cyber-physical systems; cyber-physical security; moving target defenses periodic reset; attack graph; cyber-physical systems; cyber-physical security; moving target defenses
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MDPI and ACS Style

Chen, Y.-C.; Mooney, V.J., III; Grijalva, S. Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model. Cryptography 2021, 5, 12. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/cryptography5020012

AMA Style

Chen Y-C, Mooney VJ III, Grijalva S. Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model. Cryptography. 2021; 5(2):12. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/cryptography5020012

Chicago/Turabian Style

Chen, Yu-Cheng, Vincent J. Mooney III, and Santiago Grijalva. 2021. "Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model" Cryptography 5, no. 2: 12. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/cryptography5020012

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