Auctions: Theory, Applications and (Lab and Field) Experiments

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 June 2022) | Viewed by 2071

Special Issue Editors


E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Institute of Economics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
Interests: conomic theory; games; game theory and decision theory; environmental economics; game theory; microeconomics; experimental economics; mechanism design

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal
Interests: microeconomics; auction theory; game theory; experimental economics; regulation; competition policy

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

In 2020, Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences “started out with fundamental theory and later used their results in practical applications, which have spread globally; their discoveries are of great benefit to society.” This statement, as rightly claimed by Peter Fredriksson, Chair of the Prize Committee, perhaps summarizes well the motivation behind our proposed Special Issue, titled Auctions: Theory, Applications and (Lab and Field) Experiments, which welcomes the inclusion of topics related to the following keywords: common and private values; jump bidding; private information; signaling; discrete and continuous increments; online auctions; (lab and field) experiments.

Economic agents have always been assumed to sell things to the winning bidder or buy from them. In recent times, we have witnessed objects worth a wide range of money being auctioned (for example, the 3G, 4G and, more recently, 5G licenses for mobile networks). Theorists design different types of auctions; such game-theoretic modelling is important not just to understand a solution but also for practitioners to see how a real situation can be played out. As Paul Klemperer pointed out in his book, Auctions: Theory and Practice (2004), “when advising governments, auction designers (and economic policy-makers more generally) need to be sensitive to the dangers posed by political and administrative pressures.”

Real-world (physical or online such as eBay) auction sites use different variants of auction format that determine the outcomes based on the rules for bidding. It is thus important to analyze (both theoretically and from real datasets) the bidding strategies of bidders in a number of well-known auction formats, perhaps demonstrating that a specific format will satisfy a stated goal (such us to provide the seller the highest expected revenue, given the situation).

We also have a fairly broad body of literature on experiments on auctions. We thus encourage (both lab and field) experimentalists to submit their work for our Special Issue.

Prof. Dr. Indrajit Ray
Prof. Dr. Ricardo Gonçalves
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • value
  • bid
  • private information
  • signal
  • discrete and continuous
  • experiments

Published Papers (1 paper)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

7 pages, 230 KiB  
Article
Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices
by Fabio Michelucci
Games 2022, 13(4), 50; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g13040050 - 29 Jun 2022
Viewed by 1451
Abstract
Reserve prices are used by sellers to modify the allocation induced by standard auctions. The existing literature has shown that, if the number of bidders is fixed, a reserve price can be used to increase expected revenues. This comes at the expense of [...] Read more.
Reserve prices are used by sellers to modify the allocation induced by standard auctions. The existing literature has shown that, if the number of bidders is fixed, a reserve price can be used to increase expected revenues. This comes at the expense of efficiency when the auctioned good goes unsold. Instead, when the number of bidders is not fixed, a reserve price may discourage entry. The reduction in the number of bidders caused by the reserve price in this situation is detrimental for both revenues and efficiency. This work shows that a different conclusion may emerge when potential entrants arrive sequentially and face the risk of incurring losses conditional on winning the object on sale. In fact, we show that reserve prices may lead to more entry and raise the efficiency. Applications characterized by the presence of an incumbent who is better informed about some common characteristics of the object for sale may yield the type of features that are needed for our different conclusion to hold. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Auctions: Theory, Applications and (Lab and Field) Experiments)
Back to TopTop