Behavioral Contract Theory

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (25 March 2022) | Viewed by 3266

Special Issue Editors

Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University, 6-6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan
Interests: contract theory; organizational economics; information economics
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University, 1-31 Machikaneyamacho, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan
Interests: psychology and economics; industrial organization; microeconomic theory

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Despite many advances that have been made over the years, it has become increasingly clear that there are some behavioral anomalies and biases that cannot be easily reconciled within the standard paradigm of economics. The field of contract theory is no exception, where researchers have started to pay more attention to the potential role of various psychological factors in contracting environments, be it in organizations or in markets.

This Special Issue is devoted to contributions at the intersection of contract theory and behavioral economics, broadly defined. Possible topics of interest include, but are not limited to, contracting with non-standard risk and time preferences (e.g., loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, hyperbolic discounting), as well as social preferences (e.g., altruism, fairness, reciprocity); overconfidence and self-esteem concerns; contracting to consumers and exploitative contacting; behavioral foundations of incomplete contracts; among others. We aim to bring together the most recent contributions in this area and welcome theoretical (both pure and applied), experimental, and empirical/field studies on a broad range of topics.

Prof. Dr. Junichiro Ishida
Prof. Dr. Takeshi Murooka
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • contract design
  • incentive provision
  • non-standard preferences
  • social preferences
  • bounded rationality
  • self-esteem concerns

Published Papers (1 paper)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

22 pages, 414 KiB  
Article
Salience Bias and Overwork
by Fabio Römeis, Fabian Herweg and Daniel Müller
Games 2022, 13(1), 15; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g13010015 - 26 Jan 2022
Viewed by 2381
Abstract
In this study, we enrich a standard principal–agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent’s side. The agent’s misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent’s and the principal’s probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the [...] Read more.
In this study, we enrich a standard principal–agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent’s side. The agent’s misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent’s and the principal’s probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the agent focuses too much on obtaining a bonus, which facilitates incentive provision. Second, the principal may exploit the diverging probability assessments to relax participation. We show that salience bias can reverse the nature of the inefficiency arising from moral hazard; i.e., the principal does not necessarily provide insufficient incentives that result in inefficiently low effort but instead may well provide excessive incentives that result in inefficiently high effort. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Contract Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Back to TopTop