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Communication, Cartels and Collusion
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Communication, Cartels and Collusion

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Non-Cooperative Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (25 June 2021) | Viewed by 4592

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Vijay Krishna

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, Penn State University, United States
Interests: economic theory
Dr. Yu Awaya

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
University of Rochester, Rochester, United States
Interests: economic theory

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues, 

We invite submissions for a Special Issue that will be devoted to exploring the interplay between communication and cooperation/collusion. Apart from being of theoretical interest, this interplay is important as it affects antitrust policy—what kinds of inter-firm communication should be legal and what kinds not—as well as the design of organizations (i.e., how communication channels in a firm should be arranged). We invite submissions that study this interplay in a variety of settings, both theoretical and applied.

A partial list of suggested topics is as follows: 

  1. Communication to improve payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring. For instance, firms may communicate sales data to each other or to third parties that distribute this in aggregate form. The former runs up against antitrust law while the latter is legal. 
  2. Communication in games of incomplete information. Firms may communicate cost and/or demand information to each other. 
  3. Pre-play communication in one-shot games and how Nash equilibria of the game with pre-play communication relate to correlated and coarse correlated equilibria of the underlying game. 
  4. Other related topics.

Prof. Vijay Krishna
Dr. Yu Awaya
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • communication
  • collusion
  • cartels
  • correlated equilibrium

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

10 pages, 252 KiB  
Article
Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
by Yu Awaya
Games 2021, 12(4), 80; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12040080 - 25 Oct 2021
Viewed by 2008
Abstract
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a continuous time repeated prisoner’s dilemma game where [...] Read more.
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a continuous time repeated prisoner’s dilemma game where informative signals about another player’s past actions arrive following a Poisson process; actions have to be held fixed for a certain time. I assume that signals are privately observed by players. I consider an environment where signals are noisy, and the correlation of signals is higher if both players cooperate. We show that, provided that players can change their actions arbitrary frequently, there exists an equilibrium with communication that strictly Pareto-dominates all equilibria without communication. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Communication, Cartels and Collusion)
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18 pages, 309 KiB  
Article
Self-Enforcing Price Leadership
by Gustavo Gudino
Games 2021, 12(3), 59; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030059 - 29 Jul 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1697
Abstract
A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and are identical except for the [...] Read more.
A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and are identical except for the information they possess about demand. The market size follows a two-state Markov process. Market size realizations are observed by one of the firms but not the other. Without explicit communication, price leadership allows firms to jointly approximate monopolistic profits in equilibrium as the market size becomes more persistent provided that firms are patient. In the presence of persistent market dynamics, the informed firm’s price serves as a signal of current and therefore future market conditions. In the proposed price leadership equilibrium, the informed firm could cut prices without being detected, but it does not do so because it would lead the uninformed to also lower their price in the following period. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Communication, Cartels and Collusion)
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