Special Issue "Cooperation, Innovation and Safeguarding of the Environment"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 December 2020).

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Giovanna Bimonte
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II, 132, 84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy
Interests: cooperative game theory; environmental; externalities and core; public economics and regulation; general equilibrium model

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

We invite you to contribute to the Special Issue “Cooperation, Innovation and Safeguarding of the Environment”.
As the issue of global warming is becoming increasingly severe, new collective strategies are essential to develop a new global climate policy. Thus, the safeguarding of the environment can be significantly improved if important aspects such as cooperation and innovation are considered. The global and international dimension of environmental problems requires multiple and heterogeneous methods of analysis appropriate to the several implications of the environment. To some extent, commitments to respecting nature will motivate countries to stimulate investment in new technology. However, there are large externalities or technological spillovers associated with such investments. Models of game theory applied to this problem must take into account that the agents can build their strategies combining cooperation and/or innovation aspects.
This Special Issue aims to bring together researchers from various disciplines (including but not limited to economics and applied mathematics) to collect a series of papers that will contribute toward theoretical, empirical and experimental approaches to explain how all the actions for efficient international environmental regulation can be encouraged in order to reduce pollution and to implement investments in new technologies. The Special Issue is particularly devoted to gathering some new game theoretic solution concepts and correlated equilibrium that face the environmental problems in an original way and interesting contributions that detail novel instruments able to encourage more efficient policy decisions.

Dr. Giovanna BIMONTE
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Non-Cooperative Games
  • Cooperative Games
  • Innovation
  • Environment
  • Regulation

Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

Article
Green Innovation and Competition: R&D Incentives in a Circular Economy
Games 2021, 12(3), 68; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030068 - 16 Sep 2021
Viewed by 309
Abstract
The present paper provides theoretical insights regarding the determinants of firms’ incentives to invest in a Circular Economy. The analysis relies on a Cournot model disaggregating the disposal cost in the production function. In a non-simultaneous sequential game, two risk-neutral firms are endowed [...] Read more.
The present paper provides theoretical insights regarding the determinants of firms’ incentives to invest in a Circular Economy. The analysis relies on a Cournot model disaggregating the disposal cost in the production function. In a non-simultaneous sequential game, two risk-neutral firms are endowed with a green innovation project that, if successful, would reduce the overall production costs and implement a Circular Economy. Firms are plagued by asymmetric information about the exact value of the other firm’s innovation. In this setting, the R&D investment in a Circular Economy, by affecting the distribution of production and disposal costs, influences the production decisions of both the innovating and the rival firms. The sign of the impact depends on the firms’ strategy in the product market. Furthermore, the analysis points out that cooperation in R&D of firms competing in the product market reinforces incentives to invest in green innovation. This suggests that governments aimed to advance a Circular Economy should encourage firms’ cooperation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Innovation and Safeguarding of the Environment)
Article
Climate Change Sustainability: From Bargaining to Cooperative Balanced Approach
Games 2021, 12(2), 45; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020045 - 22 May 2021
Viewed by 1035
Abstract
This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to a [...] Read more.
This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to a competitive one. Furthermore, the dynamics of balanced and super-balanced games are exposed, with particular reference to coalitions. Some open problems are presented to aid future research in this area. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Innovation and Safeguarding of the Environment)
Article
The Role of Cultural Capital on the Voluntary Contributions to Cultural Goods: A Differential Game Approach
Games 2021, 12(1), 27; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010027 - 18 Mar 2021
Viewed by 652
Abstract
This study aims to offer a formal analysis which relates provision of cultural goods to the society’s level of cultural capital. Such a level is assumed to already exist in society and is increasable thanks to individual support for the offer of cultural [...] Read more.
This study aims to offer a formal analysis which relates provision of cultural goods to the society’s level of cultural capital. Such a level is assumed to already exist in society and is increasable thanks to individual support for the offer of cultural goods. The achievement of the highest levels of cultural capital increases satisfaction coming from cultural goods consumption, and then voluntary contributions. Social approval, deriving from donations, is positively related to society’s existing cultural capital and triggers a positive externality for donators, thus increasing contributions and generating a positive externality for the whole society. The dynamic analysis provided in this study requires the adoption of a differential game where individuals interact, making their choices on their voluntary contribution level. We find that, under certain conditions, the solution obtained for the Nash equilibrium with closed-loop strategies provides optimal level of cultural capital that exceed the Pareto efficient solution obtained through open-loop strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Innovation and Safeguarding of the Environment)
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Article
Coordinating Carbon Emissions via Production Quantities: A Differential Game Approach
Games 2021, 12(1), 15; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010015 - 03 Feb 2021
Viewed by 683
Abstract
Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies [...] Read more.
Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Innovation and Safeguarding of the Environment)
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