Special Issue "Social Coordination Games"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Learning and Evolution in Games".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 10 October 2021.

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Ennio Bilancini
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Lucca, Italy
Interests: game theory; behavioral economics; evolution; social economics
Prof. Dr. Leonardo Boncinelli
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Sciences for Economics and Business, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Via delle Pandette 32, 50127 Firenze, Italy
Interests: game theory; behavioural economics; evolutionary theories; social norms; institutions; social preferences; cooperation
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Special Issue Information

Dear colleagues,

Social and economic interactions often require participants to coordinate their actions. In this kind of situation, coordination is an inherently strategic issue, giving rise to games with a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, which are potentially rankable in terms of social desirability.

Coordination on an equilibrium, if achieved and maintained, may form a convention for a group or a society: Once a particular way of doing things becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because individuals prefer to conform to the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform. Conventions specifying how to collaborate in a joint project, on what side to drive, how to allocate tasks in a team, or how to share the product of joint work and standards such as software or hardware platforms are examples, among many, of successful coordination.

Both theoretical and experimental contributions are welcome. Relevant topics include (but are not limited to):

  • Selection among payoff-dominant, risk-dominant, and maximin conventions;
  • Nature and effectiveness of focal points;
  • Coevolution of conventions and interaction structure;
  • Learning social coordination;
  • Anti-coordination games;
  • Errors and the selection of conventions;
  • Rationality in social coordination;
  • Social preferences, social norms, and homophily as coordination devices;
  • Psychology of social coordination.

Prof. Ennio Bilancini
Prof. Leonardo Boncinelli
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

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Keywords

  • Conventions
  • Social norms
  • Focal points
  • Heuristics
  • Learning
  • Bounded rationality

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

Article
Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition
Games 2021, 12(3), 53; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030053 - 25 Jun 2021
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Abstract
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their [...] Read more.
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Coordination Games)
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Article
Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection
Games 2021, 12(2), 30; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020030 - 01 Apr 2021
Viewed by 794
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the [...] Read more.
In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Coordination Games)
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