Special Issue "Experiments on Communication in Games"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 December 2020).

Special Issue Editors

Dr. Caleb A. Cox
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA
Interests: behavioral game theory; experimental economics; public economics
Special Issues and Collections in MDPI journals
Dr. Brock Stoddard
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, United States
Interests: experimental economics; behavioral economics; applied game theory

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Communication can have a large impact on behavior in many games, and content analysis of communication in experiments is a powerful tool for understanding strategic thinking. This Special Issue focuses on experimental studies of communication in games. Potential topics include, but are not limited to, sender–receiver games, the impact of pre-play communication in games, communication in group identity tasks, and content analysis of communication. Any type of communication may be considered, including costly or costless, limited or free-form, and electronic or face-to-face. We welcome submissions using laboratory experiments, field experiments, or meta-analyses of experimental results.

Dr. Caleb A. Cox
Dr. Brock Stoddard
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Communication
  • Game theory
  • Strategic thinking
  • Laboratory experiments
  • Field experiments

Published Papers (5 papers)

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Editorial

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Editorial
Experiments on Communication in Games: Introduction to the Special Issue
Games 2021, 12(1), 19; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010019 - 24 Feb 2021
Viewed by 646
Abstract
Communication is an important topic in the experimental study of strategic behavior, both because of the vital role of communication in variety of strategic games, and because of the insights that can be gained through analyzing communication contents in experiments [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)

Research

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Article
Intention or Request: The Impact of Message Structures
Games 2021, 12(1), 12; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010012 - 01 Feb 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 744
Abstract
This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes self-signaling or [...] Read more.
This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes self-signaling or self-committing messages, the two message structures yield negligibly different results. However, when the messages of the game are neither self-signaling nor self-committing, we find that more subjects send messages suggesting cooperation with request than intention. Interestingly, subjects also deviate from their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in contributing to the differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)
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Article
Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media
Games 2020, 11(4), 48; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g11040048 - 28 Oct 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 813
Abstract
We studied how communication media affect trust game play. Three popular media were considered: traditional face-to-face, Facebook groups, and anonymous online chat. We considered post-communication changes in players’ expectations and preferences, and further analyzed the contents of group communications to understand the channels [...] Read more.
We studied how communication media affect trust game play. Three popular media were considered: traditional face-to-face, Facebook groups, and anonymous online chat. We considered post-communication changes in players’ expectations and preferences, and further analyzed the contents of group communications to understand the channels though which communication appears to improve trust and trustworthiness. For senders, the social, emotional, and game-relevant contents of communication all matter, significantly influencing both their expectations of fair return and preferences towards receivers. Receivers increased trustworthiness is mostly explained by their adherence to the norm of sending back a fair share of the amount received. These results do not qualitatively differ among the three communication media; while face-to-face had the largest volume of messages, all three media proved equally effective in enhancing trust and trustworthiness. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)
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Article
Against All Odds: Tentative Steps toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups
Games 2020, 11(3), 31; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g11030031 - 07 Aug 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1359
Abstract
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others’ contributions. We present results from a “naturally noisy” setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert’s voice was “lost” to such a degree that [...] Read more.
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others’ contributions. We present results from a “naturally noisy” setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert’s voice was “lost” to such a degree that bringing forward even more inferior information was optimal. A single individual had little chance to improve the outcome and coordinating with the whole group was impossible. In this setting, we examined the change in behavior before and after people could talk to their neighbors. We found that the number of people who reduced noise by holding back their information strongly and significantly increased. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)
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Article
Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication
Games 2020, 11(2), 18; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g11020018 - 09 Apr 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2246
Abstract
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The [...] Read more.
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the excessive trust of the receiver, our results are not distinguished from those in the one-sender model. Regarding the Choice Game, our logistic regressions on experimental results suggest that the receiver is more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the messages were nonconflicting. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)
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