Special Issue "Limited Attention"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 November 2020).

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Yusufcan Masatlioglu
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, United States
Interests: bounded rationality; decision theory; reference-dependent choice; time preference; limited attention; bounded rationality; willpower

Special Issue Information

Dear colleagues,

In recent years, limited attention has been a reoccurring theme across diverse fields such as finance, microeconomics, industrial organization, macroeconomics, experimental economics, and public economics. This Special Issue of Games aims to bring articles together on how people make a decision under limited attention. We are looking for theoretical contributions to limited attention as well as experimental papers (both lab- and field-based) that test theoretical models of limited attention. We are particularly interested in models (and tests of) of decision making under limited attention.

Prof. Yusufcan Masatlioglu
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Limited attention
  • Bounded rationality
  • Stochastic choice
  • Consumers
  • Revealed preference theory
  • Consideration sets
  • Rational inattention

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

Article
The (Non) Economic Properties of the Law
Games 2021, 12(1), 26; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010026 - 16 Mar 2021
Viewed by 628
Abstract
This paper shows that the logical properties of constraints imposed by law are fundamentally different from other constraints considered in economics such as budget constraints and bounded rationality constraints, such as the ones based on inattention or shortlisting. This suggests that to fully [...] Read more.
This paper shows that the logical properties of constraints imposed by law are fundamentally different from other constraints considered in economics such as budget constraints and bounded rationality constraints, such as the ones based on inattention or shortlisting. This suggests that to fully incorporate law into economics may require a revision of economic theory. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Limited Attention)
Article
Path-Independent Consideration
Games 2021, 12(1), 21; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010021 - 02 Mar 2021
Viewed by 716
Abstract
In the context of choice with limited consideration, where the decision-maker may not pay attention to all available options, the consideration function of a decision maker is path-independent if her choice cannot be manipulated by the presentation of the choice set. This paper [...] Read more.
In the context of choice with limited consideration, where the decision-maker may not pay attention to all available options, the consideration function of a decision maker is path-independent if her choice cannot be manipulated by the presentation of the choice set. This paper characterizes a model of choice with limited consideration with path independence, which is equivalent to a consideration function that satisfies both the attention filter and consideration filter properties from Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Lleras et al. (2017), respectively. Despite the equivalence of path-independent consideration with the consideration structures from these two papers, we show that, to have a choice with limited consideration that is path-independent, satisfying both axioms on the choice function that characterize choice limited consideration with attention and consideration filters unilaterally (from Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Lleras et al. (2017)) is necessary but not sufficient. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Limited Attention)
Article
A Generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium via Perturbed Utility
Games 2021, 12(1), 20; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010020 - 01 Mar 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 821
Abstract
We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable preference to [...] Read more.
We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable preference to randomize. The preference to randomize can be viewed as a reduced form of limited attention. Using concave perturbed utility games, we show how to enrich models based on logit best response that are common from quantal response equilibrium. First, the desire to randomize can depend on opponents’ strategies. Second, we show how to derive a nested logit best response function. Lastly, we present tractable quadratic perturbed utility games that allow complementarity. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Limited Attention)
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Article
Constrained versus Unconstrained Rational Inattention
Games 2021, 12(1), 3; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010003 - 05 Jan 2021
Viewed by 730
Abstract
The rational inattention literature is split between two versions of the model: in one, mutual information of states and signals are bounded by a hard constraint, while, in the other, it appears as an additive term in the decision maker’s utility function. The [...] Read more.
The rational inattention literature is split between two versions of the model: in one, mutual information of states and signals are bounded by a hard constraint, while, in the other, it appears as an additive term in the decision maker’s utility function. The resulting constrained and unconstrained maximization problems are closely related, but, nevertheless, their solutions differ in certain aspects. In particular, movements in the decision maker’s prior belief and utility function lead to opposite comparative statics conclusions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Limited Attention)
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Article
Nudge the Lunch: A Field Experiment Testing Menu-Primacy Effects on Lunch Choices
Games 2021, 12(1), 2; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12010002 - 05 Jan 2021
Viewed by 1268
Abstract
By way of a field experiment conducted at a university cafeteria this paper finds that placing a vegetarian option instead of a meat option at the top of a menu decreases the share of meat dishes sold by 11%. This translates to a [...] Read more.
By way of a field experiment conducted at a university cafeteria this paper finds that placing a vegetarian option instead of a meat option at the top of a menu decreases the share of meat dishes sold by 11%. This translates to a 6% decrease of daily emissions due to food sales. Using data on payment method, we find that the result is most likely driven by non-students responding to the nudge. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Limited Attention)
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Article
Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics
Games 2020, 11(4), 57; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g11040057 - 27 Nov 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1245
Abstract
The confirmation bias, unlike other decision biases, has been shown both empirically and in theory to be enhanced with deliberation. This suggests that limited attention, reduced deliberation, or limited available cognitive resources may moderate this bias. We aimed to test this hypothesis using [...] Read more.
The confirmation bias, unlike other decision biases, has been shown both empirically and in theory to be enhanced with deliberation. This suggests that limited attention, reduced deliberation, or limited available cognitive resources may moderate this bias. We aimed to test this hypothesis using a validated confirmation bias task in conjunction with a protocol that randomly assigned individuals to one week of at-home sleep restriction (SR) or well-rested (WR) sleep levels. We also used a measure of cognitive reflection as an additional proxy for deliberation in our analysis. We tested the hypotheses that the confirmation bias would be stronger for WR participants and those higher in cognitive reflection on a sample of 197 young adults. Our results replicated previous findings, and both males and females separately displayed the confirmation bias. Regarding our deliberation hypotheses, the confirmation bias results were most precisely estimated for those having thought relatively more about the issue of gun control. Additionally, for the subset of individuals having thought relatively more about gun control, we found evidence that the confirmation bias was stronger for those higher in cognitive reflection and, somewhat less robustly, for those participants who were (objectively) well-rested. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Limited Attention)
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