Special Issue "School Choice"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (28 February 2021).

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Isa Hafalir
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Interests: game theory; auction theory; matching theory; mechanism design; market design

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues, 

Matching and assignment theory models are largely motivated by real-world contexts such as office assignments, public school choice, organ exchanges and labor markets, and they typically offer centralized procedures designed to match the two sides of the market. A subfield of this area, that of "School Choice", is both an established and active research area that focuses on various aspects of student welfare and schools’ constraints. Controlled School Choice (where students have different socio-economic types, and schools use type-specific boundaries for different types of students,) experiments on school choice problems, issues with tie-breaking the rules of school choice mechanisms and dynamic school choice problems are some of the recent active areas within school choice. We welcome all theoretical, experimental and empirical papers within the area of school choice.

Prof. Dr. Isa Hafalir
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

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Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • school choice
  • two-sided matching
  • stability, fairness
  • Pareto efficiency
  • affirmative action
  • cooperative games
  • laboratory experiments

Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

Article
Quantile Stable Mechanisms
Games 2021, 12(2), 43; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020043 - 17 May 2021
Viewed by 650
Abstract
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all [...] Read more.
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
Article
School Choice with Hybrid Schedules
Games 2021, 12(2), 37; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020037 - 25 Apr 2021
Viewed by 730
Abstract
During the pandemic, school districts have adopted hybrid schedules to continue the education of the students while maintaining social distance. In a hybrid schedule, students in the same classroom are usually divided into two groups and students only in the same group can [...] Read more.
During the pandemic, school districts have adopted hybrid schedules to continue the education of the students while maintaining social distance. In a hybrid schedule, students in the same classroom are usually divided into two groups and students only in the same group can physically attend class together two days a week. School districts do not take preferences of the students/parents over the days they would like to come to school into account during this procedure. In this paper, we propose a solution that divides students into groups based on their preferences. Our solution respects the number of classrooms initially reserved for each grade and enables possible efficiency gains by swapping classrooms across grades. Moreover, when there are two alternative schedules provided for students, our solution is immune to preference manipulations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
Article
Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings
Games 2021, 12(2), 33; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020033 - 09 Apr 2021
Viewed by 737
Abstract
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data [...] Read more.
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
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Article
School Choice in Guangzhou: Why High-Scoring Students Are Protected?
Games 2021, 12(2), 31; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12020031 - 08 Apr 2021
Viewed by 1002
Abstract
Each year, millions of middle school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for high school positions. Unlike other cities, Guangzhou still uses the immediate acceptance mechanism but implements a policy that students in the high-scoring group receive their allocations before [...] Read more.
Each year, millions of middle school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for high school positions. Unlike other cities, Guangzhou still uses the immediate acceptance mechanism but implements a policy that students in the high-scoring group receive their allocations before those in the low-scoring group. In this paper, we study a class of the Guangzhou mechanisms, including the immediate acceptance (IA) and the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism. We show that, if a collection of groups is refined by splitting its groups into a larger number of smaller subgroups, then the Guangzhou mechanism will perform more stably and less manipulable than before. This result provides a tool for policy makers to improve the allocation outcome of the IA mechanism under homogeneous priorities and justifies the use of a high-scoring student protection policy in Guangzhou’s high school admission. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
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