Research

18 pages, 1543 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study

by Riccardo Pedersini, Rosemarie Nagel and Marc Le Menestrel

Games 2019, 10(3), 27; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g10030027 - 01 Jul 2019

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5392

In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ [...] Read more.

In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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32 pages, 737 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Signaling Value of Punishing Norm-Breakers and Rewarding Norm-Followers

by Fabrizio Adriani and Silvia Sonderegger

Games 2018, 9(4), 102; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040102 - 13 Dec 2018

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6928

Abstract

We formally explore the idea that punishment of norm-breakers may be a vehicle for the older generation to teach youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing behavior. People punish norm-breakers to pass information [...] Read more.

We formally explore the idea that punishment of norm-breakers may be a vehicle for the older generation to teach youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing behavior. People punish norm-breakers to pass information about past history to the younger generation. This creates a link between past, present, and future punishment. Information about the past is important for youngsters, because the past shapes the future. Reward-based mechanisms may also work and are welfare superior to punishment-based ones. However, reward-based mechanisms are fragile, since punishment is a more compelling signaling device (in a sense that we make precise). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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31 pages, 442 KiB

Open AccessArticle

This Is How We Do It: How Social Norms and Social Identity Shape Decision Making under Uncertainty

by Francesca Lipari

Games 2018, 9(4), 99; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040099 - 09 Dec 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 9104

Abstract

The current study aims to investigate how the presence of social norms defines belief formation on future changes in social identity (i.e., diachronic identity), and how those beliefs affect individual decisions under uncertainty. The paper proposes a theoretical model in which individuals have [...] Read more.

The current study aims to investigate how the presence of social norms defines belief formation on future changes in social identity (i.e., diachronic identity), and how those beliefs affect individual decisions under uncertainty. The paper proposes a theoretical model in which individuals have preferences over their own attributes and over specific information structures. The individual preferences are motivated by the presence of social norms. The norms, while establishing the socially acceptable attributes of an individual identity, also drive individuals’ preferences for information acquisition or avoidance. The model incorporates social norms as empirical expectations and provides a prior dependent theory that allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. Firstly, the model implies that decisions are mitigated by socially grounded behavioral and cognitive biases; and secondly, that it can create an incentive to avoid information, even when the latter is useful, free, and independent of strategic considerations. These biases bring out individual trade-offs between the accuracy of decision making and self-image motivated by social conformity. The two behavioral motivations are represented through a game of an intra-personal model of choice under uncertainty in which self-deception and memory manipulation mechanisms are used to overcome the individuals’ internal trade-off. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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12 pages, 403 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Prescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons

by Moti Michaeli and Daniel Spiro

Games 2018, 9(4), 97; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040097 - 05 Dec 2018

Viewed by 6502

Abstract

This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point [...] Read more.

This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which the comparison is being made; under the second, the median contribution is the reference point; and under the third the top contribution is the reference. The first method results in a unique equilibrium and the reference contribution is endogenously low. Each of the latter two methods allows for multiple equilibria differing in contributions made and thus in the strength of the norm to contribute. Comparing the methods we show that the median reference allows for the highest equilibrium contributions and welfare of all methods hence is the preferred method if, among the multiple equilibria, the best one can be selected. However, the bottom-reference is the maximin method, i.e., it provides safe minimal aggregate contribution and welfare that surpass the worst outcome in the other two methods. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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20 pages, 960 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Belief Heterogeneity and the Restart Effect in a Public Goods Game

by Ananish Chaudhuri

Games 2018, 9(4), 96; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040096 - 23 Nov 2018

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 6636

Abstract

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a “partners” or a “strangers” protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to [...] Read more.

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a “partners” or a “strangers” protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the outset and classify subjects into three groups—Top, Middle, and Bottom—depending on their prior beliefs about their peers’ contributions to the public good. Then, we look at how these three groups respond, in terms of their beliefs and contributions, before and after the restart. We replicate the restart effect, but find that (i) it is much more pronounced for partner matching than for stranger matching and (ii) it is less pronounced in treatments with belief elicitation compared to control treatments where beliefs are not elicited. We also find that the restart has the effect of regenerating a sense of optimism among the subjects, which is reflected in increased contributions subsequently. This increase in contribution is driven mostly by those subjects who started the game with relatively more optimistic beliefs. Our results have implications for sustaining cooperation in social dilemma games. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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24 pages, 352 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Call to Action: Intrinsic Motives and Material Interests

by Vasileios Kotsidis

Games 2018, 9(4), 92; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040092 - 14 Nov 2018

Viewed by 10987

Abstract

We provide a game-theoretic account of endogenous intrinsic motivation within a principal–agent framework. We explore the incentives of an altruistic principal who, by exerting costly effort, can intrinsically motivate a present-biased agent to exhibit a direct preference for more far-sighted behaviour. We characterize [...] Read more.

We provide a game-theoretic account of endogenous intrinsic motivation within a principal–agent framework. We explore the incentives of an altruistic principal who, by exerting costly effort, can intrinsically motivate a present-biased agent to exhibit a direct preference for more far-sighted behaviour. We characterize the conditions under which this happens. We show that allowing for endogenous intrinsic motivation generates interesting interplays between exogenous economic incentives and endogenous motivation, including the possibility of crowding out. Our model can be applied in a wide variety of contexts, including public policy, self-control, and cultural transmission. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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25 pages, 1394 KiB

Open AccessArticle

From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour

by Timo Goeschl, Sara Elisa Kettner, Johannes Lohse and Christiane Schwieren

Games 2018, 9(4), 91; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040091 - 04 Nov 2018

Cited by 23 | Viewed by 9542

Abstract

While preferences for conformity are commonly seen as an important driver of pro-social behaviour, only a small set of previous studies has explicitly tested the behavioural mechanisms underlying this proposition. In this paper, we report on two interconnected experimental studies that jointly provide [...] Read more.

While preferences for conformity are commonly seen as an important driver of pro-social behaviour, only a small set of previous studies has explicitly tested the behavioural mechanisms underlying this proposition. In this paper, we report on two interconnected experimental studies that jointly provide a more thorough and robust understanding of a causal mechanism that links social information (i.e., information about the generosity of others) to donations via changing the perception of a descriptive social norm. In a modified dictator game, Experiment 1 re-investigates this mechanism adding further robustness to prior results by eliciting choices from a non-student sample and by implementing an additional treatment that controls for potential anchoring effects implied by the methods used in previous investigations. Experiment 2 adds further robustness by investigating the link between social information, (descriptive) norm perception and giving at the individual, rather than the group average, level. We find that an exogenous variation of social information influences beliefs about others’ contributions (descriptive social norm) and, through this channel, actual giving. An exploratory analysis indicates that this causal relationship is differently pronounced among the two sexes. We rule out anchoring effects as a plausible confound in previous investigations. The key findings carry over to the individual level. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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17 pages, 235 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Do Economists Punish Less?

by Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser, Kasper Selmar Pedersen and Alexander K. Koch

Games 2018, 9(4), 75; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9040075 - 30 Sep 2018

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 7294

Abstract

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social [...] Read more.

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

18 pages, 982 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups

by Gerald Eisenkopf

Games 2018, 9(3), 71; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9030071 - 19 Sep 2018

Viewed by 5160

Abstract

Incentives shape how much people contribute to the welfare of a group. These incentives do not restrict the opportunities but they change the costs of contributions. This paper studies how the random assignment of such incentives affects perceived distributive justice among group members. [...] Read more.

Incentives shape how much people contribute to the welfare of a group. These incentives do not restrict the opportunities but they change the costs of contributions. This paper studies how the random assignment of such incentives affects perceived distributive justice among group members. Do people consider differences in incentives similar to unequal opportunities, that is, situations in which some people have a lower chance to make a high contribution? The results from a real effort experiment show that the economic framing of incentives matters in this context. If some people do not work for the common good because of rather large private costs, they appreciate these ‘negative incentives’ similarly to unequal opportunities. They do not do so, and become less egalitarian, if lower effort for the group increases the chance for private gains (‘positive incentives’). Interestingly, participants reward group members who do not limit their expected contributions to the group despite adverse incentives. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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15 pages, 766 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Favoritism and Fairness in Teams

by Lu Dong and Lingbo Huang

Games 2018, 9(3), 65; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9030065 - 06 Sep 2018

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6436

Abstract

We experimentally study how people resolve a tension between favoritism and fairness when allocating a profit in a team production setting. Past research shows that people tend to favor their ingroup at the cost of an outgroup when allocating a given amount of [...] Read more.

We experimentally study how people resolve a tension between favoritism and fairness when allocating a profit in a team production setting. Past research shows that people tend to favor their ingroup at the cost of an outgroup when allocating a given amount of money. However, when the money to be allocated depends on joint production, we find that most players allocate proportionally according to others’ relative contributions, irrespective of their social identity affiliations. We discuss the implications of our findings on how distributive norms could shape team cooperation. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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27 pages, 1321 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On the Spatial Diffusion of Cooperation with Endogenous Matching Institutions

by Emanuela Migliaccio and Thierry Verdier

Games 2018, 9(3), 58; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g9030058 - 13 Aug 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 5270

Abstract

This paper studies the spatial joint evolution of cooperative behavior and a partially assortative matching institution that protects cooperators. We consider cooperation as characterized by a cultural trait transmitted via an endogenous socialization mechanism and we assume that such trait can diffuse randomly [...] Read more.

This paper studies the spatial joint evolution of cooperative behavior and a partially assortative matching institution that protects cooperators. We consider cooperation as characterized by a cultural trait transmitted via an endogenous socialization mechanism and we assume that such trait can diffuse randomly in space due to some spatial noise in the socialization mechanism. Using mathematical techniques from reaction-diffusion equations theory, we show that, under some conditions, an initially localized domain of preferences for cooperation can invade the whole population and characterize the asymptotic speed of diffusion. We consider first the case with exogenous assortativeness, and then endogeneize the degree of social segmentation in matching, assuming that it is collectively set at each point of time and space by the local community. We show how relatively low cost segmenting institutions can appear in new places thanks to the spatial random diffusion of cooperation, helping a localized cultural cluster of cooperation to invade the whole population. The endogenous assortative matching institution follows a life cycle process: appearing, growing and then disappearing once a culture of cooperation is sufficiently established in the local population. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)

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