Self-Knowledge and Skepticism

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 April 2022) | Viewed by 3540

Special Issue Editor

Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Weber State University, Ogden, UT 84408, USA
Interests: epistemology (especially content externalism, content skepticism, Cartesian skepticism, and closure principles); pop culture; public philosophy; aesthetics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Descartes, who is arguably the father of modern forms of philosophical skepticism, held something akin to the thesis that one could not be skeptical about the content of one’s own thoughts. In Descartes’ view, even if one is dreaming or one is being deceived by an evil demon, such that one has reason to doubt the very existence of the external world and all that is in it, one can still always know what one is thinking. This claim, while once considered beyond reproach, has been under attack for decades, beginning with Hilary Putnam’s bold claim that “meaning just ain’t in the head.” Of course, the problem of knowing the content of one’s mental states is just one form of skepticism about self-knowledge. Recent decades have brought to light numerous others. For example, the ways in which one “knows” the contents of one’s own mental states may not be sufficiently reliable as to constitute actual knowledge, or we might be self-blind about certain matters—or possibly not, it is all very controversial. The goals of this Special Issue of Philosophies are to (1) bring to light the myriad skeptical arguments related specifically to self-knowledge, (2) highlight many of the proposed solutions to these problems, and (3) identify that which is distinctive about skepticism regarding self-knowledge, as compared to skepticism about the external world.

Prof. Dr. Richard V. Greene
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Philosophies is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • self-knowledge
  • skepticism
  • externalism
  • internalism
  • individualism
  • anti-individualism
  • doubt
  • Cartesian
  • first-person access
  • semantic solutions to skepticism

Published Papers (1 paper)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

8 pages, 189 KiB  
Article
Epistemology and Ethics in Zhuangzi
by S. Evan Kreider
Philosophies 2021, 6(3), 58; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/philosophies6030058 - 10 Jul 2021
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2616
Abstract
On a prima facia reading, Zhuangzi seems to endorse some form of skepticism or relativism. This seems at odds with Zhuangzi as one of the two main sources of classical Daoism, considering the ideals of virtue and self-development promoted by that philosophy. However, [...] Read more.
On a prima facia reading, Zhuangzi seems to endorse some form of skepticism or relativism. This seems at odds with Zhuangzi as one of the two main sources of classical Daoism, considering the ideals of virtue and self-development promoted by that philosophy. However, Zhuangzi’s metaphorical and allegorical style lends itself to a number of interpretations of his epistemology, as well as the kind of self-knowledge and ethical development it might allow. A survey of the relevant literature shows that the epistemological debate is not easily solvable, but by narrowing the range of interpretations, a coherent picture of his ethics begins to emerge, one in which some form of knowledge, especially self-knowledge, is still possible, as is an ethics of self-actualization. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Self-Knowledge and Skepticism)
Back to TopTop