Religions

34 pages, 315 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

by James P. Sterba

Religions 2023, 14(11), 1355; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14111355 - 26 Oct 2023

Viewed by 726

In July of 2021, I finished guest-editing a Special Issue for Religions on the topic of my book Is a Good God Logically Possible [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

30 pages, 605 KiB

Open AccessArticle

How Did Evil Come into the World? A Primordial Free-Will Theodicy

by Mark Johnston

Religions 2023, 14(3), 402; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14030402 - 16 Mar 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1959

Abstract

James P. Sterba has provided a compelling argument to the effect that given the extent of significant, and indeed even horrendous, evil that an all-good and all-powerful being could have prevented, there is no God. There is a hidden assumption in Sterba’s reasoning, [...] Read more.

James P. Sterba has provided a compelling argument to the effect that given the extent of significant, and indeed even horrendous, evil that an all-good and all-powerful being could have prevented, there is no God. There is a hidden assumption in Sterba’s reasoning, involving an inference from God being able to do anything metaphysically possible (omnipotence) to his being, after creation, able to prevent evil. As what follows shows, that isn’t a purely logical matter. It depends on ruling out a determinate theological account of how creation limits what is then metaphysically possible for God, an account set out in detail below. So Sterba’s argument is not deductively valid, unless that account is incoherent. Accordingly, we are back in the realm of total judgments of theoretical plausibility, and the effects of God-given grace on what then will strike one as the right view to live by. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

15 pages, 267 KiB

Open AccessArticle

In Answer to the Pauline Principle: Consent, Logical Constraints, and Free Will

by Marilie Coetsee

Religions 2023, 14(1), 28; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14010028 - 23 Dec 2022

Viewed by 1911

Abstract

James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God. The Pauline Principle states that (as a rule) one must never do evil so that good may come [...] Read more.

James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God. The Pauline Principle states that (as a rule) one must never do evil so that good may come from it, and according to Sterba, this principle implies that God may not permit significant evils even if that permission would be necessary to secure other, greater goods. By contrast, I argue that the occurrence of significant evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God because victims of significant evils may themselves reasonably consent to their suffering. In particular, I argue that they may be able to accept their suffering if it turns out that there was no way for God to secure relevant greater goods (or prevent other, greater evils) except by way of allowing their suffering, and God also provides them with other compensating, heavenly comforts. After using this consent-based argument to address Sterba’s logical problem from evil, I briefly consider how this argument may also help address a related evidential problem from evil, which suggests that while it is possible that victims of significant evils would consent to their suffering, it is unlikely that they would do so. While I do not provide a definitive solution to this evidential problem of evil, I highlight one important example of a trade-off that God may need to make that would—along with the provision of compensating, heavenly comforts—potentially persuade victims of significant evils to consent to their suffering. Specifically, I argue that there may be a necessary trade-off that God needs to make between permitting significant evils (on the one hand) and protecting a certain, morally significant form of free will (on the other hand). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

10 pages, 222 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Sterba’s Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas

by Erik J. Wielenberg

Religions 2022, 13(9), 782; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13090782 - 25 Aug 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1558

Abstract

The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba’s exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. [...] Read more.

The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba’s exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. Mackie’s argument uses what can now be seen to be overly simplistic principles to try to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and any evil at all, Sterba’s argument uses more sophisticated moral principles and seeks to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God (specifically, the God of Perfect Being Theology) and specific sorts of evil that our world contains. Here, I provide a brief exposition of Sterba’s argument and then sketch one possible theistic response to the argument. On the basis of that discussion, I conclude that Sterba’s argument is not decisive as it stands. However, I then develop a revised version of Sterba’s argument and argue that the Perfect Being Theist faces the following dilemma: she can answer the revised version of Sterba’s argument only by accepting a position that is deeply at odds with commonsense morality. Therefore, although Sterba’s argument does not quite succeed, it points us in the direction of a serious problem for Perfect Being Theism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

12 pages, 220 KiB

Open AccessEssay

A Dilemma for Sterba

by Bruce Russell

Religions 2022, 13(9), 783; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13090783 - 25 Aug 2022

Viewed by 977

Abstract

James Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible. He argues that what he calls the Pauline Principle, which says that we should never do evil that good may come of it, implies that a good God would prevent horrendous evil [...] Read more.

James Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible. He argues that what he calls the Pauline Principle, which says that we should never do evil that good may come of it, implies that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. However, there are plenty of examples of such actions in our world. So, a good God does not exist. I offer an example from Derek Parfit, and one of my own, that calls the Pauline Principle into question. Sterba believes that what he calls Moral Evil Prevention Requirements (MEPRs) follow from the Pauline Principle, and that they are necessary truths which imply that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. Whether these (MEPRs) follow from the Pauline Principle or do not, they may be necessary truths that could form the basis of Sterba’s argument. However, I argue that they are not necessary truths. If modified to become such, Sterba faces a challenge from the Skeptical Theists that can only be met by turning his argument into an evidential version of the problem of evil. I compare Sterba’s argument with my version of the evidential argument from evil that says that if God exists, there is not excessive, unnecessary suffering and whose second premise says there is. I argue that it is easier to establish that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering than to establish Sterba’s second premise (once his principles are modified). That second premise will say that there are no goods that logically require God to allow immoral actions that have horrendous evil consequences. Sterba faces a dilemma: either he has an unsound logical argument or a weak evidential argument for the non-existence of God. In either case, he does not have a good logical argument for atheism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

12 pages, 252 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Modified Free-Will Defense: A Structural and Theistic Free-Will Defense as a Response to James Sterba

by Elif Nur Balci

Religions 2022, 13(8), 700; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13080700 - 29 Jul 2022

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 1619

Abstract

In his book Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba argues that the Plantingian free-will defense, which reconciles the existence of a good and omnipotent God with the existence of evil, is a failed argument when it comes to the terrible [...] Read more.

In his book Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba argues that the Plantingian free-will defense, which reconciles the existence of a good and omnipotent God with the existence of evil, is a failed argument when it comes to the terrible evils in the world. This study discusses that Sterba’s claim is invalid when Plantinga’s free-will defense is modified with a structural perspective. In order to reconcile the structural and inevitable possibility of evil with God’s moral imperatives, a structural free-will defense was complemented by an Islamic moral theology that Mu’tazila and its great scholar Qādi Abd al-Jabbar advanced. Such a modified free-will defense can show that the existence of all evil, including terrible ones, is still compatible with a good and omnipotent God. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

18 pages, 255 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?

by Matthew Flannagan

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1050; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111050 - 02 Nov 2022

Viewed by 1479

Abstract

This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that [...] Read more.

This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

13 pages, 231 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Major Gaps in Sterba’s New Atheological Argument from Evil

by Robin Collins

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1069; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111069 - 07 Nov 2022

Viewed by 967

Abstract

In this essay, I first offer several scenarios where Sterba’s argument based on the Pauline Principle fails: specifically, one in which we all consent to living an earthly life in some prior existence (prior-consent scenario), one in which the victims would approve [...] Read more.

In this essay, I first offer several scenarios where Sterba’s argument based on the Pauline Principle fails: specifically, one in which we all consent to living an earthly life in some prior existence (prior-consent scenario), one in which the victims would approve of the evil being done to them for some greater good (would-approve scenario), and one that combines one of these two scenarios with the stipulation that the greater goods redound to the victims (victim-beneficiary scenario). Along the way, I claim that a version of the Kantian principle that persons should not be treated as mere means, but as ends in themselves, better captures the intuitions used in support of the Pauline Principle. After this, I present two further significant problems with Sterba’s arguments. First, I argue that his claim that God should prevent the serious evil consequences of our free choices fails to consider the degree to which such a policy would make us aware of God’s monitoring of our every move. This in turn would greatly diminish our ability to make morally significant choices. Second, I point out flaws with his argument for the applicability of the Pauline Principle to God’s choices, particularly objecting to his argument that any greater-good theodicy implies that God would desire that people sin so that good may come, something he claims is morally perverse. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

13 pages, 244 KiB

Open AccessArticle

God, Evil, and Meticulous Providence

by Bruce R. Reichenbach

Religions 2022, 13(10), 899; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13100899 - 26 Sep 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1314

Abstract

James Sterba has constructed a powerful argument for there being a conflict between the presence of evil in the world and the existence of God. I contend that Sterba’s argument depends on a crucial assumption, namely, that God has an obligation to act [...] Read more.

James Sterba has constructed a powerful argument for there being a conflict between the presence of evil in the world and the existence of God. I contend that Sterba’s argument depends on a crucial assumption, namely, that God has an obligation to act according to the principle of meticulous providence. I suggest that two of his analogies confirm his dependence on this requirement. Of course, his argument does not rest on either of these analogies, but they are illustrative of the role that meticulous providence plays in his argument. I then investigate the ethical principles Sterba invokes in his use of meticulous providence and suggest that not only do we often not predicate goodness of human persons based on these principles of obligation, but that these principles are much too stringent to function to determine moral obligations and moral goodness. From there, I contend that to think that God has a similar obligation regarding meticulous providence in order to be good encounters several serious problems, especially with respect to the soul-building Sterba wants to preserve. I conclude by considering Sterba’s reply in terms of a limited application of meticulous providence. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

6 pages, 168 KiB

Open AccessOpinion

Why God Cannot Do What Sterba Wants

by Stephen T. Davis

Religions 2022, 13(10), 943; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13100943 - 10 Oct 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 997

Abstract

Sterba argues that if God existed, God would allow lower-level evils and suffering but should and would prevent all significant and horrendous evils. Since such serious evils do exist, God does not exist. In reply, I argue that in creating a Sterba world, [...] Read more.

Sterba argues that if God existed, God would allow lower-level evils and suffering but should and would prevent all significant and horrendous evils. Since such serious evils do exist, God does not exist. In reply, I argue that in creating a Sterba world, God would be violating one of God’s central purposes for the world, viz., that human beings be rationally free to deny God’s existence and presence. Given the total absence of horrendous evils in Sterba worlds, despite human intentions to inflict them, it would be obvious that God exists and is at work. There might still be atheists, but atheism would be irrational. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

7 pages, 181 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Argument from Evil, the Argument from Hiddenness, and Supernaturalistic Alternatives to Theism

by Raphael Lataster

Religions 2022, 13(10), 938; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13100938 - 09 Oct 2022

Viewed by 956

Abstract

In this brief article, I consider James Sterba’s logical argument from evil, finding it to be ultimately unsuccessful. Not for the various issues Sterba raises, which do seem to be problematic if God exists, but for the logical approach itself. I encourage Sterba [...] Read more.

In this brief article, I consider James Sterba’s logical argument from evil, finding it to be ultimately unsuccessful. Not for the various issues Sterba raises, which do seem to be problematic if God exists, but for the logical approach itself. I encourage Sterba to shift tack, to embrace the evidential argument from evil, which is not at all concessionary, as he seems to think, and is an extremely powerful argument against the probability of theism, especially when we open the debate to the supernaturalistic alternatives to theism. I also encourage Sterba to reconsider his dismissive attitude towards the argument from hiddenness, which, in its evidential form, is also a very powerful argument against God’s existence, either employed independently or incorporated into the argument from evil. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

14 pages, 245 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Is There a Right to Hope That God Exists? Evil and the Principle of Non-Parity

by Jacqueline Mariña

Religions 2022, 13(10), 977; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13100977 - 17 Oct 2022

Viewed by 1193

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to James Sterba’s recent book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’ I show that Sterba concludes that God is not logically possible by ignoring three important issues: (a) the different functions of leeway indeterminism (and the [...] Read more.

In this paper, I respond to James Sterba’s recent book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’ I show that Sterba concludes that God is not logically possible by ignoring three important issues: (a) the different functions of leeway indeterminism (and the political freedom presupposed by it) and autonomy (the two are very different things, even though both go under the name of freedom), (b) the differences in the conditions of agency in God and in creatures, (there is non-parity in how each must apply the single moral law), and (c) the non-parity between our knowledge and God’s. I provide a brief summary of Sterba’s arguments, and I develop the following points: 1. Sterba’s argument against a Free-Will Defense hinges on his conflation of political freedom and autonomy; 2. Sterba’s crucial premise for his argument against soul-making theodicies (namely, that the “Pauline Principle” should be applied univocally across God and creatures) is false; 3. Sterba’s arguments against skeptical theism depend on his assumption that our knowledge is comparable to that of God. In each case, Sterba either does not recognize non-parity between God and creatures or does not recognize the difference between the profane (e.g., political matters) and the sacred, (e.g., spiritual matters having to do with the inner nature of the soul’s development). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

14 pages, 851 KiB

Open AccessArticle

“And You Became Mine” (Ezek 16:8): Good and Evil in a Narcissistic God

by Gili Kugler

Religions 2022, 13(10), 967; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13100967 - 12 Oct 2022

Viewed by 1711

Abstract

Scholars have defended the cruel behavior of the biblical god as being justified, due to the supposition of God being perfectly omnipotent and infallible. However, one cannot be obtuse to the depictions of Yhwh himself about his feelings and actions, as expressed through [...] Read more.

Scholars have defended the cruel behavior of the biblical god as being justified, due to the supposition of God being perfectly omnipotent and infallible. However, one cannot be obtuse to the depictions of Yhwh himself about his feelings and actions, as expressed through biblical narratives and brought forth by his emissaries, the prophets. When observing the prophecies of Ezekiel, for example, through a modern psychological lens, God’s relationship with his subjects, and especially with his offspring—the nation of Israel—reveals clear patterns of malignant narcissistic behavior. This study proposes that evil is an immanent part of God’s nature in the Hebrew Bible. The texts make no effort to disguise God’s narcissistic nature in his behavior towards his chosen one, a behavior that resonates with patterns one would define as evil. Moreover, the texts reflect the willingness of followers to acknowledge their situation as being trapped in an abusive relationship with a vicious patron. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

15 pages, 222 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The “Heaven Ab Initio” Argument from Evil

by Carlo Alvaro

Religions 2023, 14(2), 200; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14020200 - 02 Feb 2023

Viewed by 1531

Abstract

Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that God has morally sufficient reasons to permit evil and suffering in the world, either [...] Read more.

Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that God has morally sufficient reasons to permit evil and suffering in the world, either to preserve human freedom, for the sake of the moral growth of human souls, or to train humans to be able to act freely without sinning once in heaven. In this paper, I defend the heaven ab initio argument from evil (HAIAFE), which demonstrates that God could have accomplished all these goals, without the need for evil and suffering, by creating human beings directly as spiritual beings in a non-physical state of eternal bliss. Moreover, I will argue that the HAIAFE is both a logical argument from evil and a “deodicy”, i.e., a vindication of a deistic god. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

13 pages, 225 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Animal Suffering and the Laws of Nature

by Jeffrey Jordan

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1049; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111049 - 02 Nov 2022

Viewed by 982

Abstract

Two recent atheistic arguments from evil have made much of natural evil and the suffering of animals in their case contra theism. The first argument is that of James Sterba. Sterba’s argument is an incompatibility argument premised on the claim that there are [...] Read more.

Two recent atheistic arguments from evil have made much of natural evil and the suffering of animals in their case contra theism. The first argument is that of James Sterba. Sterba’s argument is an incompatibility argument premised on the claim that there are actual events logically incompatible with the existence of God. The second is that of Michael Tooley, who erects his argument in part on the claim that failing to prevent the suffering of animals cannot be justified by appeals to the great value of regular and predictable laws of nature, nor to the desirability of divine hiddenness. This article examines the arguments of Sterba and Tooley and contends that both are self-undermining. Each of the arguments employs premises that provide reason for thinking that other premises found in their arguments are false. Prior to a discussion of the two arguments, we explore the nature of incompatibility arguments, and examine three assumptions that lurk in the background of discussions of the problem of evil. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

7 pages, 182 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Limited Intervention and Moral Kindergartens

by Daniel Lim

Religions 2022, 13(8), 729; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13080729 - 11 Aug 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1313

Abstract

Recently, William Hasker and Cheryl Chen have argued that James Sterba’s argument for the non-existence of God based on the existence of horrendous evil consequences fails. Hasker, among other things, contends that eliminating horrendous evil consequences will result in a moral kindergarten. It [...] Read more.

Recently, William Hasker and Cheryl Chen have argued that James Sterba’s argument for the non-existence of God based on the existence of horrendous evil consequences fails. Hasker, among other things, contends that eliminating horrendous evil consequences will result in a moral kindergarten. It is unclear, however, whether the elimination of horrendous evil consequences will result in a moral kindergarten. Moreover, if Hasker is right, then it may be that most people in the actual world live in a moral kindergarten. Chen argues that eliminating horrendous evil consequences may lead to a morally worse world. While Chen is ultimately right about this, it is not fatal to the basic intuition at the heart of Sterba’s argument. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

15 pages, 250 KiB

Open AccessArticle

God’s Prime Directive: Non-Interference and Why There Is No (Viable) Free Will Defense

by David Kyle Johnson

Religions 2022, 13(9), 871; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13090871 - 16 Sep 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2109

Abstract

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will [...] Read more.

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will defense that can solve what Sterba (rightly) takes to be the most interesting and severe version of the logical problem of moral evil. However, I will also argue that, in effect (or, we might say, in practice), Sterba is correct. The only working version of the free will defense requires embracing a view that entails consequences theists traditionally have not and cannot accept. Consequently, the one and only free will solution is not viable. Unless some other solution can be found (Sterba argues there is none), the logical problem of evil, as Sterba understands it, either commits one to atheism, or a version of theism that practically all theists would regard as a heresy. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

9 pages, 207 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Creator Theology and Sterba’s Argument from Evil

by Joe Milburn

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1083; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111083 - 10 Nov 2022

Viewed by 972

Abstract

In this paper, I reformulate Sterba’s argument from evil and consider the various ways theists might respond to it. There are two basic families of responses. On the one hand, theists can deny that God, as a perfect being, needs to act in [...] Read more.

In this paper, I reformulate Sterba’s argument from evil and consider the various ways theists might respond to it. There are two basic families of responses. On the one hand, theists can deny that God, as a perfect being, needs to act in accordance with Sterba’s moral evil prevention requirements (MEPRs). We can call these responses exceptionalist responses. On the other hand, the theist can deny that God’s acting in accordance with the MEPRs would imply an absence of significant and especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions in the world. We can call these responses compatibilist responses. I argue that the availability of both sorts of responses shows that Sterba’s argument should not be taken as a logical argument from evil. A good God is logically possible. However, this does not show that Sterba’s argument fails as an evidential argument from evil. In the second section, I argue that if we work within the framework of what Jonathan Kvanvig calls Creator Theology (CT), the force of Sterba’s argument as an evidential argument is greatly weakened. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

12 pages, 242 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Human Sovereignty and the Logical Problem of Evil

by Daniel Molto

Religions 2022, 13(8), 766; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13080766 - 22 Aug 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1767

Abstract

In this paper, I provide a defence of theism against James Sterba’s version of the logical problem of evil, at least where the focus is on moral evil (I do not have much to say about natural evil in this paper). After giving [...] Read more.

In this paper, I provide a defence of theism against James Sterba’s version of the logical problem of evil, at least where the focus is on moral evil (I do not have much to say about natural evil in this paper). After giving my own account of the distinction between the logical and evidential problems of evil, I set out to argue that Sterba fails to prove atheism. The problem lies with this third premise. I think that there is a possible defence according to which the three ‘Evil Prevention Requirements’ that Sterba endorse are all true but do not support atheism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

8 pages, 205 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Problem of Evil and God’s Moral Standing: A Rejoinder to James Sterba

by J. Brian Huffling

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1031; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111031 - 28 Oct 2022

Viewed by 1490

Abstract

This article is a rejoinder to James Sterba’s response to my previous article on the topic of his book, Is a Good God Logically Possible? Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible given the amount of horrendous evil in the [...] Read more.

This article is a rejoinder to James Sterba’s response to my previous article on the topic of his book, Is a Good God Logically Possible? Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible given the amount of horrendous evil in the world. If God did exist, Sterba asserts, then he would be able to prevent such evils from happening while not losing any goods. My original article was a response to the notion that God is morally obligated to prevent such evil. The main points considered here are whether there really is a logical problem of evil and how God can have moral virtues ascribed to him while not being morally obligated in the sense that Sterba’s position requires. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

9 pages, 217 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil

by Jonathan C. Rutledge

Religions 2023, 14(2), 157; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14020157 - 28 Jan 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1234

Abstract

In his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he [...] Read more.

In his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue against this assumption by appealing to recent work by Mark Murphy before, secondly, suggesting an alternative way to frame Sterba’s argument in terms of divine love. One can distinguish God’s motivation to promote creaturely welfare on the basis of love from a motivation grounded in morality, and I claim that doing so results in a stronger form of the logical argument. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

13 pages, 312 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Does the Analogy of an Ideal State Disprove God’s Existence? James Sterba’s Argument and a Thomistic Response

by Patrik Hrmo

Religions 2022, 13(10), 931; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13100931 - 09 Oct 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1151

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba’s argument from evil in the world and the author’s Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of “horrendous evils”, which is a representative name for pointless evil and suffering [...] Read more.

This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba’s argument from evil in the world and the author’s Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of “horrendous evils”, which is a representative name for pointless evil and suffering in the world. Sterba claims that the existence of such evil is not logically compatible with the existence of the all-good theistic God. If such a God existed, according to Sterba, he would have intervened in time and prevented and not permitted horrendous evil consequences; in other words, he would have acted as an ideal state. The author of this paper argues that the analogy of an ideal state does not disprove the existence of God of theism. Furthermore, people would prefer if God was not like an ideal state. Applying the characteristics of an ideal state to a theistic God is not reasonable because it relies on anthropomorphism. Such anthropomorphism is incoherent with some basic theistic beliefs. The author of this paper applies Thomistic concepts to the problem of horrendous evils. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

7 pages, 217 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Sterba’s Problem of Evil vs. Sterba’s Problem of Specificity: Which Is the Real Problem?

by Michael S. Jones

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1073; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111073 - 09 Nov 2022

Viewed by 900

Abstract

In 2019 the noted ethicist and political philosopher James Sterba published a new deductive version of the argument from the problem of evil to the conclusion that an Anselmian God does not exist. In this article I will argue that Sterba’s argument involves [...] Read more.

In 2019 the noted ethicist and political philosopher James Sterba published a new deductive version of the argument from the problem of evil to the conclusion that an Anselmian God does not exist. In this article I will argue that Sterba’s argument involves a problematic sorites-type paradox that, in order to be consistent, he should view as undermining his argument, since in his previous work on ethics he viewed this same sort of problem as counting as a significant objection to moral cultural relativism. I show how his arguments involve a sorites-like paradox, explain how this is damaging to the argument from evil, and conclude by offering suggestions for how Sterba might address this weakness. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

9 pages, 213 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Logical Argument from Evil and Theism

by Andrea Aguti

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1007; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111007 - 22 Oct 2022

Viewed by 1160

Abstract

The article argues that the logical argument from evil is dead, and the new version presented by James Sterba cannot resurrect it. In the first part, I say that the logical argument from evil is dead either because, in the version given by [...] Read more.

The article argues that the logical argument from evil is dead, and the new version presented by James Sterba cannot resurrect it. In the first part, I say that the logical argument from evil is dead either because, in the version given by Mackie, it was successfully refuted by Plantinga and other theists or because, by inviting a reformulation of theistic doctrines, it was nevertheless superseded by contemporary versions of theism, such as open theism. In the second part, I argue that the two significant moves made by Sterba to resurrect the logical argument from evil fail in their intent either because the premise they start does not necessarily give rise to an atheistic conclusion or because the premise is unacceptable for the theist. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

6 pages, 190 KiB

Open AccessOpinion

Has James Sterba Established a Logical Argument from Evil or Just a Very Good Evidential One?

by Richard Carrier

Religions 2023, 14(3), 307; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14030307 - 24 Feb 2023

Viewed by 1314

Abstract

James Sterba’s new treatise advancing a logical argument from evil against the existence of God fails in one respect and succeeds in another. As with all claimants to having found such a thing before him, Sterba fails in properly achieving a logical argument [...] Read more.

James Sterba’s new treatise advancing a logical argument from evil against the existence of God fails in one respect and succeeds in another. As with all claimants to having found such a thing before him, Sterba fails in properly achieving a logical argument from evil. But he succeeds in producing one of the most undefeatable evidential arguments from evil yet published. Elegantly dispatching all the common defenses, Sterba shows that there is no way to avoid the force of his argument against the existence of God without adopting extraordinarily improbable hypotheses that theists can’t even intelligibly articulate. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

10 pages, 256 KiB

Open AccessArticle

God and Evil—Systematic-Theological Reflections on the Doctrine of God

by Christian Danz

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1075; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111075 - 09 Nov 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1763

Abstract

Against the background of the current debates about God and evil, the article elaborates in three stages of argumentation the thesis that statements about God must not be understood as factual or representational statements, but as descriptive elements of the reflexive structure of [...] Read more.

Against the background of the current debates about God and evil, the article elaborates in three stages of argumentation the thesis that statements about God must not be understood as factual or representational statements, but as descriptive elements of the reflexive structure of the Christian religious communication. On this basis, a new perspective on God’s relationship to evil in the world emerges, which, in contrast to the so-called theodicy debates, includes the self-view of the religious practitioners. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

13 pages, 240 KiB

Open AccessEssay

Evil Prevention Requirements and the God of Theism

by Adam Noel Wood

Religions 2022, 13(12), 1164; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13121164 - 01 Dec 2022

Viewed by 1096

Abstract

The central argument of James Sterba’s “Is a Good God Logically Possible?” relies crucially on the notion that a good God would have to abide by various evil prevention requirements. Because it appears that God has not done so, Sterba concludes that God [...] Read more.

The central argument of James Sterba’s “Is a Good God Logically Possible?” relies crucially on the notion that a good God would have to abide by various evil prevention requirements. Because it appears that God has not done so, Sterba concludes that God does not exist. I challenge the notion that theists must accept the notion that God is bound by the particular set of evil prevention requirements Sterba’s argument presupposes. However, I argue that investigating ways God may in fact be required to prevent evils may serve as a helpful heuristic for theists as they seek further to understand God’s nature and purposes. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

9 pages, 217 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Causal Connections, Logical Connections, and Skeptical Theism: There Is No Logical Problem of Evil

by Perry Hendricks

Religions 2022, 13(7), 668; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13070668 - 21 Jul 2022

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1367

Abstract

In this paper, I consider Sterba’s recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba’s criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due [...] Read more.

In this paper, I consider Sterba’s recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba’s criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due to his focus on causal connections and his neglect of logical connections. Because of this, his argument remains vulnerable to skeptical theism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

9 pages, 197 KiB

Open AccessArticle

What Can God Do? What Should God Do?

by Amir Horowitz

Religions 2022, 13(12), 1178; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13121178 - 02 Dec 2022

Viewed by 902

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral [...] Read more.

The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba’s argument from evil to the effect that God does not exist. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

17 pages, 253 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Compensatory Response to the Problem of Evil: Revisited

by Michael Douglas Beaty

Religions 2023, 14(1), 35; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14010035 - 26 Dec 2022

Viewed by 1263

Abstract

In this essay, I revisit the univocity thesis, Sterba’s analogy between God and a leader of a politically liberal society, and, most fundamentally, whether the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God. I concede that the [...] Read more.

In this essay, I revisit the univocity thesis, Sterba’s analogy between God and a leader of a politically liberal society, and, most fundamentally, whether the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God. I concede that the typical appeals to free will and greater goods defenses to block the logical problem of evil are not sufficient because they do not adequately address the horrendous evils that are all too much a feature of human existence. While acknowledging that a compensatory response to the problem of evil is suggested by several important philosophers, I rely most centrally on the work of Marilyn McCord Adams. In so doing, I defend the thesis that the existence of a good God is logically compatible with the existence of horrendous evils, given God’s capacity to absorb, defeat, or engulf it. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

17 pages, 230 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Divine Omnipotence, Divine Sovereignty and Moral Constraints on the Prevention of Evil: A Reply to Sterba

by Eric Reitan

Religions 2022, 13(9), 813; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13090813 - 31 Aug 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1249

Abstract

In Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba uses the analogy of a just political state to develop evil-prevention principles he thinks a good God would follow. With the assumption that God is omnipotent, these principles entail that God would never [...] Read more.

In Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba uses the analogy of a just political state to develop evil-prevention principles he thinks a good God would follow. With the assumption that God is omnipotent, these principles entail that God would never permit free agents to bring about horrendous evil. But free agents routinely succeed in doing so: entailing a logical incompatibility between the world’s evils and the existence of a good, omnipotent God. I challenge this conclusion by sketching two ways divine omnipotence arguably entails that God would face moral constraints on the prevention of moral evil that human agents and political states do not. If my account is sound, God would be morally precluded from functioning as a sovereign governing authority in the manner of just political states. If this is correct, Sterba’s arguments might be taken to show, not that there is a contradiction between the world’s evil and the existence of a good, almighty God, but that there is a contradiction between the world’s evil and the common theistic belief that such a God is the sovereign ruler of the world. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

15 pages, 254 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Kantian Response to the Problem of Evil: Living in the Moral World

by Christopher J. Insole

Religions 2023, 14(2), 227; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14020227 - 08 Feb 2023

Viewed by 1174

Abstract

James Sterba has presented a powerful and existentially sincere form of the problem of evil, arguing that it is logically impossible for God to exist, given that there are powerful moral requirements to prevent evil, where one can, and that these requirements would [...] Read more.

James Sterba has presented a powerful and existentially sincere form of the problem of evil, arguing that it is logically impossible for God to exist, given that there are powerful moral requirements to prevent evil, where one can, and that these requirements would bind an all-powerful and good God, who would indeed be able to prevent such evil. The ‘Kantian’ argument that I set out, if accepted, would undermine the following stage of Sterba’s argument: Significant and especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions do obtain all around us, which, if God exists, would have to be through his permission. The Kantian argument will hold that we are able to believe that, in some sense, such horrendous evil consequences do not really obtain, although they appear to. The claim is not that the Kantian argument is ‘persuasive’, but that if some Kantian assumptions are granted, we do have a response to Sterba, which throws open a different way of looking at things. I conclude with some more informal reflections on what we might take away from the Kantian argument, even if we do not accept the deep assumptions, or the progression of the argument. I will not worry too much about demonstrating that this is a ‘correct reading’ of Kant, although I think it is. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

5 pages, 180 KiB

Open AccessOpinion

Locating the Problem of Evil

by Charles Champe Taliaferro

Religions 2023, 14(2), 228; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14020228 - 08 Feb 2023

Viewed by 880

Abstract

I argue that James Sterba’s argument from evil involves a category mistake. He applies moral principles that pertain to ethical requirements that apply within creation to what may be called the ethics or axiology of creating and sustaining creation. The paper includes reflection [...] Read more.

I argue that James Sterba’s argument from evil involves a category mistake. He applies moral principles that pertain to ethical requirements that apply within creation to what may be called the ethics or axiology of creating and sustaining creation. The paper includes reflection on the relationship between justification and redemption, justice and mercy. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

12 pages, 227 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Brief Remarks on Sterba’s Moral Argument from Evil

by Marco Hausmann and Amit Kravitz

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1038; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111038 - 01 Nov 2022

Viewed by 966

Abstract

We pose two challenges to Sterba’s position. First, we show that Sterba fails to consider alternative historical positions such as Leibniz’s (who argues that God knows that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds) or Kant’s (who suggests that God [...] Read more.

We pose two challenges to Sterba’s position. First, we show that Sterba fails to consider alternative historical positions such as Leibniz’s (who argues that God knows that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds) or Kant’s (who suggests that God does not necessarily know what free agents would choose or would have chosen, had God not intervened), both of which bear direct relevance to some major aspects of Sterba’s argument. Second, we show that Sterba neither rules out the possibility that God has always intervened in history when his not intervening would have led to significant and horrendous evils, nor the possibility that every immoral action (and its consequences) might have led to significant and horrendous evils. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

10 pages, 230 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Against the New Logical Argument from Evil

by Daniel Rubio

Religions 2023, 14(2), 159; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14020159 - 28 Jan 2023

Viewed by 993

Abstract

Jim Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? looks to resurrect J. L. Mackie’s logical argument from evil. Sterba accepts the general framework that theists seeking to give a theodicy have favored since Leibniz invented the term: the search for some greater good [...] Read more.

Jim Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? looks to resurrect J. L. Mackie’s logical argument from evil. Sterba accepts the general framework that theists seeking to give a theodicy have favored since Leibniz invented the term: the search for some greater good provided or greater evil averted that would justify God in permitting the type and variety of evil we actually observe. However, Sterba introduces a deontic twist, drawing on the Pauline Principle (let us not do evil that good may come) to introduce three deontic side constraints on God’s choice of action. He then splits the possible goods into four categories: first- vs. second-order goods, goods to which we have a right, and goods to which we do not have a right. He argues that his deontic constraints rule out each combination, thereby showing that no God-justifying good is on offer. To defuse the argument, I draw on a pair of ideas from Marilyn McCord Adams: (i) God is outside the bounds of morality, and (ii) God can defeat evils by incorporating them into an incommensurately valuable friendship with each human. Properly appreciated, these show that the new logical argument relies on a false premise that is not easily repaired. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

14 pages, 270 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Wittgensteinian Antitheodicy

by Timo Koistinen

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1113; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111113 - 17 Nov 2022

Viewed by 1193

Abstract

Contrary to the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers of religion, James Sterba argues in his book Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) that Alvin Plantinga with his famous free will defense has not succeeded in solving the logical problem of evil. However, [...] Read more.

Contrary to the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers of religion, James Sterba argues in his book Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) that Alvin Plantinga with his famous free will defense has not succeeded in solving the logical problem of evil. However, Sterba is not alone in disputing this generally accepted view in analytic philosophy of religion. D. Z. Phillips (1934–2006) has argued that the logical problem of evil has not been solved and he further holds that it has not even got off the ground. The aim of this article is to explore Phillips’ criticism of the free-will defense and mainstream theodicies. His critique is relevant for Sterba’s atheistic stance because Phillips’ arguments are partly applicable to forms of philosophical atheism that share the same assumptions with philosophical theism. In the first part of the article, I will briefly describe the starting points of the best-known solutions to the problem of evil in analytic philosophy of religion and refer to some aspects of Sterba’s arguments. After that I will explore Phillips’ ethical and conceptual criticism against frameworks used in the discussion of theodicy. Finally, I will pay attention to Phillips’ Wittgensteinian view of the task and the aim of philosophy in order to clarify some problematic aspects of his thought. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

10 pages, 192 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Sterba’s Problem of Evil and a Penal Colony Theodicy

by Gerald Harrison

Religions 2023, 14(9), 1196; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14091196 - 19 Sep 2023

Viewed by 584

Abstract

Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does [...] Read more.

Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God’s implementation of such evil prevention requirements. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

12 pages, 230 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Defending the Free Will Defense: A Reply to Sterba

by Luis R. G. Oliveira

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1126; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13111126 - 21 Nov 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1243

Abstract

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the [...] Read more.

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

17 pages, 273 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Can Heaven Justify Horrendous Moral Evils? A Postmortem Autopsy

by Asha Lancaster-Thomas

Religions 2023, 14(3), 296; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel14030296 - 22 Feb 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1320

Abstract

James Sterba has recently constructed a new and compelling logical problem of evil that rejects Plantinga’s free-will defense and employs the concept of significant freedom and the Pauline Principle to demonstrate an incompatibility between the existence of horrendous evil and the God of [...] Read more.

James Sterba has recently constructed a new and compelling logical problem of evil that rejects Plantinga’s free-will defense and employs the concept of significant freedom and the Pauline Principle to demonstrate an incompatibility between the existence of horrendous evil and the God of classical monotheism. In response, Jerry L. Walls, among others, has claimed that the doctrine of heaven can explain why God is justified in permitting horrendous evils in the world—an argument known as the afterlife theodicy. In this article, I explore this line of defense against Sterba’s logical problem of evil. I suggest that if the afterlife theodicy is to be effective, it must accept non-speciesist, strong universalism; deny or explicate divinely informed prior consent; reject an elective model of forgiveness; discard postmortem libertarian free will; and explain why God values libertarian free will in earthly life but not in the afterlife. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

18 pages, 299 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Isaac Qatraya and the Logical Problem of Evil

by James Henry Collin

Religions 2022, 13(12), 1171; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/rel13121171 - 01 Dec 2022

Viewed by 996

Abstract

Sterba has recently produced a searching and significant version of the argument from evil. Here, I set out aspects of the view of God, suffering, and the afterlife articulated by Isaac Qatraya (also known as Isaac of Nineveh and Isaac the Syrian), and [...] Read more.

Sterba has recently produced a searching and significant version of the argument from evil. Here, I set out aspects of the view of God, suffering, and the afterlife articulated by Isaac Qatraya (also known as Isaac of Nineveh and Isaac the Syrian), and argue both that Isaac’s view is not undermined by this version of the argument from evil, and that it is not subject to at least some of the objections Sterba raises to soul-making or saint-making theodicies. I end with some remarks on the relevance of the discussion to ’sceptical theist’ approaches to the problem of evil. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

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