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Selected Papers from the IEEE International Conference of Cyber Security...
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Selected Papers from the IEEE International Conference of Cyber Security and Resilience 2021

A special issue of Sensors (ISSN 1424-8220). This special issue belongs to the section "Sensor Networks".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 April 2022) | Viewed by 10294

Special Issue Editors

Dr. Emanuele Bellini

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Assistant Professor, Department of Mathematics and Physics, University of Campania, 81100 Caserta, Italy
Interests: human-cyber-physical systems resilience; self-adaptive systems; smart city; critical infrastructure protection; trust computing; blockchain; mixed reality; data quality; digital preservation; persistent identifers (NBN)
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Dr. Stavros Shiaeles

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Cyber Security Research Group, School of Computing University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 2UP, UK
Interests: AI cybersecurity; intrusion detection and response; botnets; malware analysis; forensics
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Prof. Dr. Nicholas Kolokotronis

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of the Peloponnese, 221 31 Tripoli, Greece
Interests: cyber-security; game-theoretic security; autonomous security; privacy; risk management; cryptography; blockchain; post-quantum cryptography; coding theory; IoT
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The 2021 IEEE International Conference of Cyber Security and Resilience 2021 (IEEE CSR), First Edition was held from 26 to 28 July in a virtual mode (http://www.ieee-csr.org/).

The IEEE CSR brought together members from academic and industry communities to present their achievements in cyber security and resiliance in the context of cyber-physical systems. The conference is organized every year for the exchange of information on the progress of research and development in the field.

The authors of selected high-quality papers that fit the Sensors scope of the conference are invited to submit extended versions of their original papers (50% extensions of contents of the conference paper). In addition to the IEEE CSR 2021 papers, other independent submissions are also welcome. The subject of these contributions should cover the same research topics as those addressed in the conference:

  • Cyber security and ML/AI;
  • Cyber-threat intelligence;
  • Game-theoretic security;
  • Attack detection and mitigation;
  • Critical infrastrucutre security;
  • Cyber range;
  • Cyber-resilience;
  • Privacy and data protection;
  • Quantum and post-quantum security;
  • Security-as-a-service solutions;
  • Mobile applications security;
  • Fault tolerant architectures;
  • Trusted execution environments;
  • Cryptography;
  • Sensor network security;
  • Forensics;
  • Blockchain and DLT security;
  • Software defined network security.

Dr. Emanuele Bellini
Dr. Stavros Shiaeles
Dr. Nicholas Kolokotronis
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Sensors is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 2600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

21 pages, 2303 KiB  
Article
Modeling Threats to AI-ML Systems Using STRIDE
by Lara Mauri and Ernesto Damiani
Sensors 2022, 22(17), 6662; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/s22176662 - 03 Sep 2022
Cited by 13 | Viewed by 5159
Abstract
The application of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), entails risks that need to be addressed to ensure secure and trustworthy socio-technical infrastructures. Machine Learning (ML), the most developed subfield of AI, allows for improved decision-making processes. However, ML models exhibit specific [...] Read more.
The application of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), entails risks that need to be addressed to ensure secure and trustworthy socio-technical infrastructures. Machine Learning (ML), the most developed subfield of AI, allows for improved decision-making processes. However, ML models exhibit specific vulnerabilities that conventional IT systems are not subject to. As systems incorporating ML components become increasingly pervasive, the need to provide security practitioners with threat modeling tailored to the specific AI-ML pipeline is of paramount importance. Currently, there exist no well-established approach accounting for the entire ML life-cycle in the identification and analysis of threats targeting ML techniques. In this paper, we propose an asset-centered methodology—STRIDE-AI—for assessing the security of AI-ML-based systems. We discuss how to apply the FMEA process to identify how assets generated and used at different stages of the ML life-cycle may fail. By adapting Microsoft’s STRIDE approach to the AI-ML domain, we map potential ML failure modes to threats and security properties these threats may endanger. The proposed methodology can assist ML practitioners in choosing the most effective security controls to protect ML assets. We illustrate STRIDE-AI with the help of a real-world use case selected from the TOREADOR H2020 project. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Selected Papers from the IEEE International Conference of Cyber Security and Resilience 2021)
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28 pages, 2605 KiB  
Article
Memory Offloading for Remote Attestation of Multi-Service IoT Devices
by Edlira Dushku, Jeppe Hagelskjær Østergaard and Nicola Dragoni
Sensors 2022, 22(12), 4340; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/s22124340 - 08 Jun 2022
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1632
Abstract
Remote attestation (RA) is an effective malware detection mechanism that allows a trusted entity (Verifier) to detect a potentially compromised remote device (Prover). The recent research works are proposing advanced Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) protocols that are able to trace the Prover’s execution flow [...] Read more.
Remote attestation (RA) is an effective malware detection mechanism that allows a trusted entity (Verifier) to detect a potentially compromised remote device (Prover). The recent research works are proposing advanced Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) protocols that are able to trace the Prover’s execution flow to detect runtime attacks. Nevertheless, several memory regions remain unattested, leaving the Prover vulnerable to data memory and mobile adversaries. Multi-service devices, whose integrity is also dependent on the integrity of any attached external peripheral devices, are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. This paper extends the state-of-the-art RA schemes by presenting ERAMO, a protocol that attests larger memory regions by adopting the memory offloading approach. We validate and evaluate ERAMO with a hardware proof-of-concept implementation using a TrustZone-capable LPC55S69 running two sensor nodes. We enhance the protocol by providing extensive memory analysis insights for multi-service devices, demonstrating that it is possible to analyze and attest the memory of the attached peripherals. Experiments confirm the feasibility and effectiveness of ERAMO in attesting dynamic memory regions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Selected Papers from the IEEE International Conference of Cyber Security and Resilience 2021)
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24 pages, 7651 KiB  
Article
Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks
by Ievgen Kabin, Zoya Dyka and Peter Langendoerfer
Sensors 2022, 22(8), 3083; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/s22083083 - 18 Apr 2022
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 1804
Abstract
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the commonly used standard methods for encrypting and signing messages which is especially applicable to resource-constrained devices such as sensor nodes that are networked in the Internet of Things. The same holds true for wearable sensors. [...] Read more.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the commonly used standard methods for encrypting and signing messages which is especially applicable to resource-constrained devices such as sensor nodes that are networked in the Internet of Things. The same holds true for wearable sensors. In these fields of application, confidentiality and data integrity are of utmost importance as human lives depend on them. In this paper, we discuss the resistance of our fast dual-field ECDSA accelerator against side-channel analysis attacks. We present our implementation of a design supporting four different NIST elliptic curves to allow the reader to understand the discussion of the resistance aspects. For two different target platforms—ASIC and FPGA—we show that the application of atomic patterns, which is considered to ensure resistance against simple side-channel analysis attacks in the literature, is not sufficient to prevent either simple SCA or horizontal address-bit DPA attacks. We also evaluated an approach which is based on the activity of the field multiplier to increase the inherent resistance of the design against attacks performed. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Selected Papers from the IEEE International Conference of Cyber Security and Resilience 2021)
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