Time in Responding to Terrorist Attacks in Cities

Abstract

Terrorism is one of the most serious threats today. The perpetrators of the attacks use newer and newer tools and apply new methods of operation. Their goal is to cause fear; therefore, for the media message to be more and more attractive, the terrorists began to attack even more spectacularly. Considering the above, cities conducive to forming clusters of people are attractive places to carry out an attack. To meet the emerging challenges, cities increasingly use modern information and communication technologies, transforming into smart cities. One of the basic assumptions for this is to ensure high safety and public order. Antiterrorist protection is a particular challenge for city authorities. Considering the above, the aim of the research, the effects of which are presented in the article, was to identify and describe the basic features distinguishing selected categories of terrorist attacks carried out in cities. In the course of the research, the duration of the terrorist event was analyzed and the critical relationships between the time and the effectiveness of neutralization and rescue operations at the scene were identified. The research method used, in addition to the observation and analysis of the literature, was a descriptive case study.

1. Introduction

Contemporary terrorism remains a real and serious national, regional and global threat. Despite declining statistics related to the number of terrorist incidents in recent years, the security environment is replete with symptoms that may indicate that terrorist threats are developing. According to the latest European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2022 (TE-SAT), the number (388) of persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities in 2021 was still high [1]. It is a fact that there were significantly fewer such individuals than in previous years (2018-783; 2019-723; 2020-449), but Europol experts believe this may be due to the effects of pandemic restrictions rather than a continued trend of decreasing terrorist activity. Other recurring features of the development of terrorism are also relevant, consisting of a steady increase in the proportion of attacks carried out by individual perpetrators, the use of increasingly less sophisticated tools (white weapons, cars, arson) and the involvement of jihadists in the reconstruction of online propaganda tools [2].

Regarding the background of the attacks, no ideology could be considered as permanently leading for several years. Of the total 15 attacks carried out in 2021 on EU soil, jihadists accounted for the largest percentage (11), with three right-wing and one left-wing attack (in the previous year, the leading motivation was anarchist attacks). This demonstrated diversity of motivations for terrorist activity has been in place since time immemorial and the specificity of this trend has been brilliantly described by Sebastian Wojciechowski, who compared terrorism to a hydra with many heads—symbolizing the diverse backgrounds of the perpetrators [3].

Current statistical reports [4] and published case study results [5] indicate the leading methods and tools of terrorist attacks in correlation to the places where they are carried out. The trends noted are not coincidental and result from European countries’ evolution and strengthening of counter-terrorism systems. Among other things, due to the increasingly solid structures and powers of the secret services in the individual states [6], the possibility of preventing attacks organized by complex personal structures has increased. Monitoring radical and extremist circles have yielded certain results, eliminating some terrorist activity at the preparatory stage of attacks [2,3]. In most cases, the services are more effective against perpetrators making attempts to communicate and prepare attacks by obtaining materials to carry them out. Any activity by members of such an organization is vulnerable to detection and increases the risk of failure. Terrorist groups perfectly understand the mechanisms of the operational work of the services and adapt dynamically to the increasingly difficult conditions for carrying out clandestine conspiracy activities. In an asymmetric conflict, terrorists look for weaknesses in the opponent and opportunities to attack an organized and orderly country [7]. Hence the increasing number of attacks carried out by individual perpetrators operating with methods and tools that are widely available (knives, machetes, crossbows, vehicles, etc.). In order to keep the media message ever more attractive, terrorists have started to attack even more spectacularly.

The aircraft went from being an assassination target to being a tool (WTC, 2001) and an icon of democracy and economic development disappeared forever from the image of modern New York. Examples of coordinated attacks in Beslan (2004), Madrid (2006), London (2005), Paris (2015) and many other places point to directional and non-accidental attacks on targets located in cities. Examples of agglomerations that have realistically and permanently faced the threat of terrorist attacks are Delhi and Mumbai. Between 1997 and 2012, Delhi reported a total of 32 terrorist-related incidents, in which 134 people lost their lives and 884 were injured. Between 1993 and 2011, Mumbai saw 14 terrorist-related incidents, resulting in 719 fatalities and 2393 injured [8]. From the terrorists’ perspective, attacking cities is profitable and immediately rewarded with high casualties, an international character, significant material and environmental damage, often using the ‘domino effect’ and assured media appeal. These and many other attributes of urban crime encourage further perpetrators who often carry out horrific crimes with the simplest of tools (NICE, 2016).

Urbanisation is currently one of the major megatrends of the modern world. The world’s population is projected to reach 8 billion on 15 November 2022 [9], of which approximately 55% live in cities. According to estimates, by 2030, the population will grow to 8.5 billion, by 2050 to 9.7 billion and in 2100 to 10.3 billion [9,10]. The proportion of people living in cities will also increase to 60% in 2030 (of which 2/3 in cities with a population of over half a million) [11], by 2050 around 70% of the total population [12] and by 2075 up to 75% of the population [13]. In the developed countries of Western Europe, the Americas, Australia, Japan or the developed countries of the Middle East, more than 80% of the population already lives in urban areas. Modern cities are centres for networks of economic links. However, they are not just spaces for living or working but acquire an interactive and global dimension [14]. A special feature of the city is also the presence of public spaces, i.e., places for public (social) use, attracting users and therefore fostering concentrations of people who can become targets of terrorist attacks.

The dynamics of civilisational development in all its aspects are reflected in the transformation of modern cities. In order to meet emerging challenges in economic and social areas, as well as to meet environmental protection requirements, cities are increasingly making use of modern information and communication technologies. In this way, the idea of the smart city is gradually being implemented in cities.

The development of the smart city was guided by the idea of the widest possible access to information about the city and its development plans, as well as creating favourable conditions for investment, developing efficient communication, caring for the environment, attractively creating opportunities for leisure activities, but also ensuring the safety of residents [15].

Interest in smart city solutions is growing rapidly due to increasing urbanization and the digitalization of more and more aspects of citizens’ lives. This raises many new challenges, hence the need for smart solutions in areas such as security. A smart city is a tempting future vision, but such cities can be more vulnerable.

On the other hand, using new technologies in the city can help improve safety. Smart city systems monitor many phenomena taking place in urban spaces. Among other factors, these systems measure traffic levels, energy consumption and pollution in water or air. At the same time, these systems, such as GPS, record the location and movement of people and things. Going even further, we can imagine that security protocols, such as facial recognition technology, can help make buildings in cities more secure [16].

Ensuring a safe urban space is a condition for the life and work of a city’s inhabitants, protecting their rights and freedoms and the effective functioning of the economy, urban space, transport and communications. All the key city stakeholders (police, fire/medical emergency services, city government, homeland security, transit and utilities) should provide an effective safety or security response to any situation affecting their citizens or organizations [17].

One of the basic principles of the smart city is to ensure that public safety and order is at the highest level, using multi-area structural, organizational and technical solutions. This is only possible with the effective cooperation of all stakeholders in the security system. It is essential that local governments, in cooperation with national and regional authorities, fully integrate and mainstream safety and security in their strategic urban planning, decision-making processes and service delivery. It is also necessary to increase the involvement of citizens in these processes. This requires establishing cooperation at different levels of government and between NGOs, entrepreneurs and residents [15].

City authorities face a particular challenge in the context of counter-terrorism protection. As mentioned in the introduction, the prevention of asymmetric attacks is not fully effective and a terrorist adversary will always find a soft target that is able to be attacked and cause increased casualties and material damage. In this case, security managers are left to respond effectively and minimize the impact of attacks. The crucial factor in these counter-terrorism activities is time, both as a variable on the part of the perpetrators and as a domain that determines the speed with which the threat is neutralized and rescue operations are undertaken.

Terrorist attacks in cities cause more damage than the same methods and tools used in non-urbanized areas. The cascade and domino effect of terrorist incidents in the facilities and spaces of modern cities determine the higher number of dead and injured and the significant scale of damage to property and the environment. For this reason, responding to terrorist attacks should become one of the key issues to be addressed during the preparedness phase. State and local government security managers, national security institutions and the private sector operating in selected urban areas will be involved in this process. Several task areas are to be considered, which will require agreement, cooperation and securing personnel and material [18]. These include, but are not limited to, the command of operations in the context of the preparation of structures, site and logistical security; the warning, alert and evacuation system; the preparation of a system of neutralization and rescue operations; the coordination of operations on the scene and the management of emergency notification—especially in the first minutes after the crisis situation is established; the provision of stable and reliable communication between the forces involved in the operations; the logistical support of operations and the preparation of a system of crisis communication with the public [19]. These aspects are crucial because counter-terrorism operations will be carried out in a complex urban environment, with a deficit of time and information and under high levels of terror and panic.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Literature Review

The research area of terrorism and terrorist attacks carried out in cities has been explored in recent years by many researchers and experts representing a variety of scientific and expert centres. Regarding terrorist methods, researchers highlight a significant increase in the number of incidents carried out by individual perpetrators using simple tools that are widely available and do not require special permits or group coordination [20]. These include ‘homemade’ explosive devices, firearms, knives, machetes and vehicles [2,4]. In their media messages, terrorist organizations encourage perpetrators to carry out attacks using such tools, as they result in a low probability of detection during the preparation of the attack and high effectiveness in the first minutes after the attack has started (until the arrival of police forces). In this case, the aspect of time is not coincidentally emphasized, as the elapsing minutes guarantee the attacker’s ability to continue the mass killing and provide an opportunity for escape. Current statistics and trends in the perpetrators’ choice of attack sites indicate an increased targeting of soft targets in urban areas. This causes real difficulties in preventing incidents (with the need to maintain the public nature of the site and public space) and makes it more difficult to respond in populated spaces and buildings [21].

Much less popular than research into terrorist attacks are the research areas of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism (particularly in on-site operations). The reasons for this phenomenon were subjected to a scientific analysis, the results of which were published in Perspectives on Terrorism in 2021 [22]. According to the researchers, the low number of studies and publications in this area may be due to several reasons, including the objective difficulty of obtaining overt and reliable information on the performance of tasks both by special services at the stage of preventing attacks and by special forces at the stage of responding to incidents or during the detention of persons suspected of terrorist activities.

The indicated deficit of scientific publications in attack response is filled by numerous reports, analyses and manuals issued by national and international expert institutions. A comprehensive source of knowledge in this area is the manual published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency entitled Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents [23]. The document addresses the specifics of terrorist attacks and the conceptual aspects of response planning and lists and describes several specific solutions for conducting on-scene operations. The document is intended for US public safety institution’s use, but many of the proposed solutions can be successfully implemented into most urban attack response systems. Similar in nature is London’s Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident [24], which identifies and describes the preparedness of London’s public safety institutions to respond to terrorist incidents. The examples of good practice described in it, but also of shortcomings in action planning, can serve the wider urban community. The report’s author points to the need for emergency management planners to pay attention to response preparedness, particularly in the preparedness of key on-scene institutions such as the police, fire service and emergency medical services. These actors will play a leading role in minimizing the impact of attacks, so their preparedness needs to address challenges such as time scarcity, coordination of attacks over time, the multitude of possible attack tools and the unimaginable determination of perpetrators to carry them out.

In addition to the documents mentioned above, there exist several reports and analyses of specific assaults or review materials on the chosen assassination tool or guidelines for responding in specific categories of facilities. Such detailed case studies are an excellent source of knowledge, although they should undergo a process of robust verification and induction each time in order to become reliable sources of scientific knowledge.

Time as a research area in responding to terrorist attacks does not often appear in the academic literature. It is addressed episodically by the already mentioned reports and analyses of expert institutions, most often as a factor determining the need for rapid and organized action. A measurable contribution to the scientific approach to the study of time in crisis situations is made by Romuald Grocki, who, in several publications, has taken up the subject of time as a factor influencing the implementation of tasks in the field of crisis management [25]. He describes the functions of time both on the side of the crisis situation and on the side of entities carrying out activities minimizing the effects of the crisis. The basis of his considerations is the separation of the three phases of a crisis situation, taking into account the concept of crisis, which he considers to be the moment of breakthrough and the climax of a crisis situation. The author based his research on the experience he gained while managing the flood control activities in Wroclaw (Poland) in 1997 as an armed forces officer. The observed features of the flood crisis were verified and compared with other threats that may occur today. His research results in the proposed escalation and de-escalation curves of a crisis situation, which, depending on the nature of the threat and time, can take place in various ways.

The phases of a crisis situation shown in the Figure 1 have the following characteristics:

• Calm phase—includes the concept of a crisis state in which there is no significant threat to the life and health of the population and there are no specific threats to high-priority targets from the point of view of the operation of the administrative structures. This state is already characterized by certain prerequisites for the emergence of a crisis situation. The essential activity of crisis management in this phase is routine monitoring of the situation and collection of information.
• Escalation phase—depicted in the diagram as a typical crisis intensity curve, it starts at the point of occurrence of the event but already with indications signalling the possibility of a crisis. Depending on the nature of the possible crisis (military, economic, social or caused by forces of nature), the increase in the threat over time may necessitate the mobilization of forces and resources appropriate to the nature of the threat. This phase of a crisis situation is one of insecurity and motivates appropriate action. A state of heightened tension and uncertainty characterizes this phase. Detecting the build-up of a crisis situation and planning an appropriate response are the main activities of crisis management, with activities focused on gathering information to better understand and define the situation:

  ◦

  according to the actual state of affairs,

  ◦

  in terms of the causes of the crisis,

  ◦

  in terms of possible strategies that would need to be employed to remove or minimize the threat. As the severity of the threat increases, whether as a result of its magnitude or the ineffectiveness of action, the curve can then rise to a point described as a crisis and therefore a point of maximum action. The slope of this curve can vary and the steeper it is the greater the intensity of action.

• De-escalation phase—the intensity of the crisis situation begins to decrease, signifying a gradual containment of the situation. This may mean, for example, that the use of force is being withdrawn or that the threat to priority objectives is diminishing, which does not necessarily mean that the crisis situation is over or has been successfully resolved. It is a state of growing conviction that the worst is over and there is a possibility of achieving a stable post-crisis situation. The curve falls to a relatively low level of intensity denoting a state of ‘new stability’ (the beginning of the recovery phase), whose state of intensity may be lower or higher than the initial state but is already a relatively secure and stable state. Very often the intensity of the crisis associated with this new status quo will be higher than that associated with the initial state of “calm”. “New stability” means the removal, disappearance or “dormancy” of a threat to the life and health of the population or other priority targets. The main crisis management activities refer to actions directed towards achieving a stable situation. It is clear that the “parties” to the crisis do not always have to be individuals, legal entities, but our “adversary” may be nature (e.g., floods, hurricanes) or another phenomenon, related to human activity or civilizational development (e.g., failures of technical equipment).

Time is a key factor in all three phases of an emergency situation identified above. It exerts a kind of pressure on the actors involved in the event, causing positive or negative effects. Time pressure can have an impact in three basic areas: it can limit or increase the scope of activities, e.g., it can complicate the decision-making process or facilitate it in the case of a longer developing crisis situation, and it can affect the extent of the vulnerability of the participants in the event and the scale and scope of the crisis situation [26]. The above concept of the phases of a crisis situation was implemented by the authors to propose original models of the course of the intensity of terrorist attacks as a function of time. The results of these efforts are presented in the following pages of the publication.

The time deficit aspect of responding at the scene of a terrorist incident is also highlighted by N. Power and L. Alison. The authors emphasize that, during multi-institutional operations at the scene of an attack, there may be different interpretations of the objectives of the individual services [27]. They surveyed commanders from the police, fire service and medical teams. It turned out that one overarching and common goal of saving lives was interpreted differently at the task level of the specific formations and corresponded to their roles at the scene. For police officers, the priority was to neutralize the threat and minimize the impact among third parties. Fire fighters were focused on ensuring the safety of rescue operations and rescuing the injured as quickly as possible. Medics, on the other hand, acting in the face of an unfolding crisis, opted to undertake immediate rescue operations. The overarching goal of all the above-mentioned formations was identical, but its overly generalized scope resulted in a variety of approaches to action in the face of a high degree of threat to life and limb and a significant shortage of time. According to the authors of the publication, in order to avoid such differences in the prioritization of the response to terrorist attacks, it is recommended in such actions to work out key decisions by response teams composed of commanders of various formations, rather than by commanders of individual types of services, within their areas of competence. This is a real challenge for the organization of on-scene operations, where one of the decisive factors influencing the scale of losses is time. It is also a request for those responsible for the organization of counter-terrorism operations to carry out conceptual, legislative and planning activities for the organization of on-scene command at the preparation stage.

2.2. Research Methods and Tools

The aim of the research, the results of which are presented in this publication, was to identify and describe the basic distinguishing features of selected categories of urban terrorist attacks. The distinguishing and typologizing factor of the attacks studied was time, in terms of the duration of the terrorist event. An additional aim of the research effort was to isolate the critical relationships between time and the effectiveness of neutralization and rescue operations at the scene of an incident. On this basis, conclusions were proposed for crisis management in the response phase of selected perpetrator methods. A diagnostic research strategy was adopted to realize the stated objective and the developed diagnosis in the present research subject is intended to play a discursive-evaluative role.

Combined research approaches were used in the preparation of this article. Desk research, case studies and participant observation were used to investigate the issue. The use of triangulation of research methods provided an opportunity to understand the issue under investigation and eliminate potential cognitive errors [28].

The authors, during their many years of service and work in police and military structures, had the opportunity to participate many times in anti-terrorist exercises, scientific research and expert projects on anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities in urban environments. They prepared procedures for the response and interaction of public security institutions in the event of a terrorist attack, familiarizing themselves with a broad spectrum of reports, analyses, legislation and internal instructions nationally and internationally. This active observation and practical experience resulted in the identification of a research problem in the form of the question of the impact of the time function on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in modern cities. An in-depth analysis of the literature identified a deficit in this area of research and confirmed the possibility of conducting exploration.

The research methods used, in addition to the observation and analysis of the literature, were comparative analysis and descriptive case studies. In the first stage of the research process, 20 diverse terrorist attacks were selected and subjected to a fairly general analysis in terms of selected factors (method, form and tools of the attack, location, duration, manner of completion of the incident and consequences). The sample selection was based on preserving the greatest possible variety of methods and forms of the described incidents. The comparative material collected in the

Table 1. Selected terrorist attacks in relation of method, instrument and time.

The Name and Date of the Attack	Duration and Tool of the Attack	Type of Attack in Terms of Time	Direct Effects of the Attack
Manchester City bombing 15.06.1996	1 h; car bomb	With anticipatory information	200 injured 75 000 evacuees
Bombing Bali, 12.10.2002	A dozen or so seconds; Explosives (suicide attack, backpack and car bomb)	Coordinated attack	204 killed 209 injured
Hostage situation Moscow, 23.10.2002	3 days; firearms, explosives	Long-term	173 killed 700 injured
Madrid bombings, 11.03.2004	Approximately 40 min; explosives (explosion of 10 bombs on commuter rail trains)	Coordinated attack	191 killed 1858 injured
Hostage situation Beslan, 1.09.2004	2 days; firearms, explosives	Long-term	334 killed 785 injured
London bombings, 7.07.2005	A dozen or so seconds; explosives	Coordinated attack	56 killed 700 injured
Bombing and mass murder Norway, 22.07.2011	Oslo: bomb explosion (car with bomb) Utoya: approx. 1 h; firearms	Coordinated attack	Oslo: 8 killed 209 injured Utoya: 69 killed 110 injured
Bombing Boston, 15.04.2013	A dozen or so seconds; explosives	Coordinated attack	3 killed 264 injured
Mass murder and hostage situation Nairobia, 21.09.2013	3 days; firearms, explosives	Long-term	71 killed 175 injured
Mass murder, bombing and hostage situation Paris, 13.11.2015	1 h; explosives, firearms	Coordinated attack	137 killed 416 injured
Brussels bombings, 22.03.2016	Several hours explosives	Coordinated attack	35 killed 316 injured
Mass murder Istanbul bombing, 28.06.2016	Several minutes; explosives, firearms	Coordinated attack	48 killed 239 injured
Ramming with the vehicle Nice, 14.07.2016	Several minutes; truck	Long-term	87 killed 202 injured
Ramming with the vehicle Berlin, 19.12.2016	Several minutes; truck	Long-term	12 killed 50 injured
Manchester bombing, 22.05.2017	Several seconds; explosives	Immediate	23 killed 800 injured
Shooting and hostage situation Carcassonne and Trèbes, 23.03.2018	5 h knife and firearm	Coordinated attack	5 killed 15 injured
Christchurch mass murder, 15.03.2019	Several minutes; firearm	Coordinated attack	51 killed 40 injured
Bombing Colombo and other cities Sri Lanka, 21.04.2019	1 h; explosives	Coordinated attack	258 killed 500 injured
Mass murder Vienna, 2.11.2020	Several minutes; firearms, machete	Long-term	5 killed 23 injured
Bombing Kabul, 26.08.2021	Several seconds; explosives	Immediate	183 killed 150 injured

Source: in-house elaboration, based on: [30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49].

and conclusions from reports and analyses of scientific and expert institutions became the basis for an inductive search for regularities in the isolated and qualitatively diverse examples of terrorist events. They also became the basis for deriving logical generalizations and proposing a typology of terrorist attacks in the context of the time factor. The postulate carried out this process was that, in generalizing and discovering the rules and principles of selected social phenomena and actions, one should strive to examine the diverse circumstances and conditions of their emergence. Then, with such a variety of starting conditions, it is certain that the conclusions obtained in the research will not be subject to the error of unauthorized generalization or illogical reasoning [29].

The second part of the research process involved a detailed verification of the information collected on the selected attacks to acquire specific knowledge of the multi-area aspect of the time. At this stage, official and authorized government reports and analyses, supplemented by scientific publications, were primarily used. The qualitative data thus extracted became the basis for an inductive search for regularities in the isolated and diverse examples of terrorist events. From these regularities, universal conclusions about the nature and specificity of terrorist attacks in terms of time were developed using synthetic comparison and generalization. According to the authors, thanks to such a multi-stage construction of the research process, the results of the research inquiries were able to meet the postulate of objectivity and reliability in science to a greater extent.

3. Results

Recent terrorist attacks are carried out according to various tactical concepts, using multiple methods and tools of attack and involving various perpetrators. European TE-SAT reports highlight the trend over the last few years of terrorist attacks being carried out in an increasingly straightforward manner, although it is stressed that this is not a permanent trend and excludes coordinated modes of terrorist action [4].

Comparing the above data on selected attacks, supplemented by information from reports and analyses of expert centres [4], allows the following several conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the methods and tools of contemporary terrorists are diverse, being a result of their operational and tactical capabilities [50]. Due to the increased effectiveness of the detection activities of the special services, terrorist organizations recommend using the most straightforward possible tools in attacks and encourage the execution of crimes in the formula of single perpetrators in populated and symbolic places (urban spaces meet these conditions perfectly). Adopting such a strategy of action ensures a greater frequency and effectiveness of attacks and increases the scope of the impact of fear on the communities attacked. The figures cited above for the number of dead and injured confirm the validity of these assumptions. Today’s terrorist attacks are bloody and heavy, with significant casualties. Regardless of the type of weapon used, the numbers killed and injured are high. Moreover, the terrorists’ use of freely available assassination tools, such as vehicles or small arms, increases the sense of helplessness in communities. The knowledge that anyone can resort to such an assassination method at any time is not conducive to fostering an atmosphere of lack of threat.

The analysis of the methods of terrorist activity compared with the duration of terrorist attacks allowed the authors to develop practical conclusions, which became the basis for proposing the division of terrorist attacks into five categories. The above division is presented in Figure 2, and the basic factor differentiating the following categories of attacks is time. The aspect of time can be a factor describing the duration of the attack (sudden and continuous attacks) and a tool affecting the tactical dimension of the execution of the crime (attacks with anticipatory information, cascade and coordinated attacks). The choice of time, method and tools of attacks is planned and used deliberately by terrorists. In many cases, timing is sufficient to increase the number of victims and the scale of destruction. Modern terrorists are aware of this and increasingly use this factor as a leading one in planning their actions [51]. In the opinion of the authors, the aspect of time in terrorist attacks is critical, and the results of the study of the proposed categories of attacks presented below can contribute to increasing the understanding of their nature, fostering the construction of more effective anti-terrorist solutions.

Attacks with anticipatory information are crisis events announced by the perpetrators (e.g., a telephone notification that an explosive device has been planted) or those for which information is known as a result of operational work or international cooperation. These may be specific (the target, location and time of the attack are known) or general (only the increased likelihood, wide time range and significant area where the attack may occur is known) [52]. An example of a response to general information about an attack may be the heightened levels of anti-terrorism preparedness being introduced by states. A characteristic of an attack ‘with advance information’ category is that response actions and those minimizing the consequences of an attack can already be taken after the information has been received—i.e., before the event. An excellent example of using the time to respond to news of an attack is the action of the UK services in Manchester City in 1996. Having been informed that an explosive device had been planted in a vehicle parked in the city centre, the services launched a coordinated warning, alert and evacuation system, leading to a measurable minimization of the impact of the attack. Within an hour or so, some 75,000 people were moved to a safe zone several kilometres from where the booby-trapped car was parked. It should be emphasized that despite the perpetrators’ detonation of 1500 kg of explosives in this attack, no one was killed [53]. This example demonstrates that time as a response factor is of the essence and that public safety institutions operating in metropolitan areas have the potential to respond at an extraordinarily effective level in the face of extraordinary threats.

As seen in Figure 3 the increased the increased effectiveness of the response of security institutions in the category of attacks with pre-emptive information is because the news of the attack moves the moment of the start of the emergency to a time before the attack. This allows a much larger number of response activities to be carried out before the attack occurs. The basic tasks to be carried out in the event of a bombing with pre-emptive information will include but are not limited to verification and analysis of information, warning, alerting and evacuation, securing the scene, organizing command and cooperation, crisis communication, preparing rescue operations, attempting neutralization operations. Performing these activities before the attack will ‘flatten’ the severity curve of the crisis situation and reduce the impact of the crisis that will inevitably occur. The scale of this minimization will depend on several factors, among which it is necessary to emphasize the preparation of structures and the organization of anti-terrorist activities, the efficiency of security actors and the degree of social mobilization, particularly important in the case of evacuation activities in urban agglomerations.

The second category of terrorist attack, separated by the time factor, is that of sudden attacks. These are events about which there is no prior information and are a complete surprise to the attacked communities and security institutions. In addition, the primary impact of the attack tool is immediate and short-lived, although it may have secondary consequences. In this case, the moment of arrival of information about the attack is most often equal to the moment the attack begins (although information about the attack can be received sometime after its occurrence). This category of attacks will primarily include attacks using explosive material in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) and shipments of explosive devices [54]. Another example of a sudden attack can be the assassination of a very important person (VIP) or a small number of people. These attacks often target protected individuals important to the security of the State, community or organization. In this type of terrorist act, the tools may be explosives, firearms, small arms or improvised weapons. The attack comes as a surprise to the victim and his or her surroundings, including security forces, security institutions and bystanders. The event takes place in a very short period and the perpetrator usually does not attack other people [55].

In sudden attacks, whose changing intensity and phases are presented in Figure 4, the severity of the crisis situation curve increases sharply with the onset of the attack. In the case of a bombing, this will be the moment of the explosion and in the case of firearms, the crisis situation will be initiated by firing the first shot. This will be followed by a period of rapid escalation of the scale of the crisis, caused by the materialization of the effects of the crime in terms of the multiplicity of dead and wounded and the risks of secondary threats. On top of this, pervasive information chaos, panic and acting under the pressure of emotion and time deficit will not be conducive to organized counter-terrorism operations. As the examples of the incidents in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), London (2005), Boston (2013), Brussels (2016), Sri Lanka (2019) and Kabul (2021) show, the first minutes after the blasts were critical, when fatalities (victims of massive haemorrhage) were maximized and chaos, panic and the likelihood of additional secondary effects increased rapidly. Only after time, as first responders arrived on the scene, did the emergency severity level begin to decrease. It is important to emphasize that, in the case of emergency attacks, where the direct impact of the perpetrator has already ended, counter-terrorism activities will focus on verification of the terrorist threat that has occurred, rescue operations and protection against further attacks. All these activities will require time and proper organization, as several actors with different competencies, structures and equipment, such as communication means, will be involved.

In the case of sudden-onset attacks, the outcome of the effectiveness of minimizing the immediate impact will be influenced by the readiness time of the various forces involved in rescue operations. The time when the first rescue teams arrive will determine the scale of the final losses. On top of this, other areas of crisis management in the response phase, such as command and coordination of operations, crisis communication, including communication between services and securing operations with medical transport and the availability of hospital emergency departments, are crucial in such cases. The problem areas above become real challenges for security managers in today’s smart cities, necessitating organized preparatory measures before the real threat of a terrorist attack emerges [27].

The third category of terrorist attacks, which differs significantly from the others already discussed, is that of continuous attacks. The essence of this type of event is its duration over a certain period and a certain dynamic of the attack, which depends on the modus operandi of the perpetrator, the behaviour of the victims of the attack and the actions of public security institutions. The most characteristic attacks in this category are mass killings, hostage situations and the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. In all of these cases, the severity of the emergency curve will already be high when the event occurs and its shape as a function of time will depend on several factors. As presented in Figure 5 below, critical to lowering the crisis will be neutralization efforts aimed at eliminating the factor that has a destructive effect on security. In the case of a mass murder attack and hostage situation, this impact factor will be the perpetrator of the attack and the tools he uses. In the case of CBRN attacks, the neutralization of the threat will be directed at eliminating from the environment the harmful agents used by the perpetrator (for example, biological substances from contaminated water). In all types of continuous attacks, the response time of the services taking neutralization and rescue action will be important. Due to the permanent impact of the threat over time, clear priority will be given to actions aimed at eliminating it.

In mass murder attacks, time plays a significant role. Reducing the period during which the perpetrator can kill his victims without restraint is an absolute priority for the services. In this case, three critical moments of response are important from the perspective of the police or other formations that can realistically neutralise an armed perpetrator. Firstly, the timing of transmitting information about the attack to the emergency call centre is important. At this point, neutralisation and rescue operations carried out in parallel by several public security actors begin. The second variable is the time of readiness at the scene, which depends on several factors, including the arrival time of first responders, their adequate equipment and training and their initial securing of the scene and decision to enter and intervene. The above areas are very complex and should be undertaken immediately and automatically. In the dynamic attack of a mass killer, officers are operating in a permanent shortage of time, which limits their ability to carry out complex reconnaissance, risk analysis, variant actions or practically work out the most effective way to apprehend the perpetrator forcibly.

Furthermore, first responders are not the most dedicated subject to conduct high-risk kinetic operations against an offender armed with a firearm (often automatic), with the real possibility of using explosives. Despite these limitations, in conducting counter-terrorism operations against mass killers, it is recommended to neutralise the perpetrator as soon as possible, without waiting for counter-terrorism forces to arrive [56]. The decisive factor in this case is time. With every minute the perpetrator acts, the number of deaths and injuries increases and the most effective way to interrupt this increase is to apprehend the terrorist. In such a case, the risk of diverting forces with less than dedicated preparedness is acceptable, as this may translate into minimising the attack’s immediate impact. The third critical moment in the course of a crisis situation is the neutralisation of the perpetrator. When the threat is eliminated is crucial for the overall action and opens up the possibility of full-scale rescue operations [57]. It is still worth emphasising the importance of the people (victims) who are at the scene of a mass murder attack. Their attitude and behaviour may depend on the scale of the losses suffered and the timing of the end of the incident. In the first minutes of the incident, they remain the only ones present at the scene of the tragedy, with various personal response options (e.g., Flee, Hide, Fight) [58]. Their undertaking of the fight can effectively stop the perpetrator of the attack, shortening the time of the incident and reducing the number of casualties in real terms.

When analysing the time function in mass murderer assaults, attention should still be paid to the relationship of the duration of the attack to the number of victims and the tools of the attack. The case studies of the attacks in Table 1 indicate their proportional nature. The elapse of the duration of assassinations with similar tools increases the number of victims. A comparison of attacks carried out with firearms from Vienna (duration several minutes—5 killed, 23 injured) and Utoya (duration several dozen minutes—69 killed, 110 injured) and with a vehicle from Berlin (duration several minutes—12 killed, 50 injured) and Nice (duration a dozen or so minutes—87 killed, 202 injured) convinces the accuracy of the thesis. Moreover, additional variables will be relevant in the case of attacks involving a vehicle, such as the length of the route travelled during the ramming, the speed and size of the vehicle and the number (density) of people gathered at the scene of the attack [59]. Regardless of the variables adopted or the relationships between the types of assassination tools, the essence of the impact of the time factor in instantaneous attacks in the form of mass killers remains the same. It directly impacts the number of casualties and losses sustained, so it is recommended to reduce the response time and neutralise the threat as quickly as possible.

The second category of continuous attacks is hostage situations. In this case, too, the crisis situation starts with a high level of escalation, but the escalation is not as rapid as in the case of a mass killing and may even decrease over time. Much depends on the perpetrator’s profile, the attack’s background and the crisis resolution strategy adopted. The most common strategy for resolving hostage situations is based on applying different options for ending the incident in parallel. It involves securing the scene of the incident as quickly as possible, undertaking crisis negotiations and preparing an assault by dedicated counter-terrorist forces or other force solutions (for example, using a sharpshooter or chemical incapacitating agents) [60]. The passage of time in the case of such operations is, in principle, an ally of the police, allowing, among other things, to organise operations on the scene, collect and analyse information, lower the emotions of the perpetrator and prepare and rehearse the assault.

On the other hand, the negative impact of time is evident in the form of increased media coverage of the event, depletion of own resources and a greater possibility of Stockholm syndrome in hostages. The need for a direct assault is also possible at any time, particularly in a rapidly escalating crisis situation, such as when the perpetrator starts killing hostages. In selected terrorist events, it will not be possible to negotiate for technical reasons or because the perpetrator is unwilling to do so. In responding to hostage situations, a task of particular importance to the intervening services is to carefully observe the event’s course, analyse the risks and manage the priorities between negotiation options and a violent solution [61]. Considering the examples of terrorist attacks with hostages, one observes a desire on the part of those in command to extend the time of the negotiators’ talks with the perpetrator so as to resolve the crisis situation or prepare the most effective assault through negotiation. This thesis is confirmed by the examples of hostage situations referenced in Table 1 (Beslan 2002, Moscow 2004, Trèbes 2018) and examples of other incidents historically. In the vast majority of cases, they played out for several hours to several days, taking the form of parallel actions using the options of negotiation and assault by special forces.

The fourth category of terrorist attacks is that of cascading attacks. These are events where certain primary effects of the perpetrators’ actions will spontaneously and without their active participation trigger additional secondary effects (domino effect). This could be, for example, an immediate attack in the form of the blowing up of a hydro-engineering structure, which, in addition to the effects in terms of the destruction of the structure, the number of dead and injured, will cause flooding and thus the rapid flooding of a large area of land and will thus have a cascading effect on the severity of the emergency. As presented in Figure 6 below, in cascading events, the emergency severity curve can rise several times. The first time is during the onset of the attack and its subsequent increases will depend on the number of secondary events generating additional difficulties and real losses.

An example of a spectacular cascade attack was the impact of aircraft on the two WTC towers in 2001 (it was also a continuous attack in Phase I, as the hijacking of the planes took place for several dozen minutes). The result of explosion of jet fuel on the facility’s upper floors was a fire and, ultimately, the collapse of the attacked structure. In this case, a new type of crisis was manifested with a different and much higher intensity. The overlap in time of curved crises is always an undesirable phenomenon and causes additional losses. It should be borne in mind that, in such a case, in addition to the victims already affected by the primary effects of the incident, the responding officers become the victims, thus increasing the magnitude of the losses and reducing the possibility of rescue operations [62].

The final category of terrorist attacks in the context of time is that of coordinated attacks, which include sequential attacks, simultaneous attacks and various arrangements of attacks of the categories indicated above. In this case, the perpetrators’ management of attacks over time is intentional and used to increase the magnitude of the direct effects. In the case of sequential assaults, the perpetrators attack using different or the same assassination methods, the same target or in the same place, but at specific intervals. In the case of simultaneous attacks, terrorists attack targets in different locations and their methods may also vary [63]. Simultaneous actions are often undertaken by the same task force within the same urban agglomeration and play out over a short time (almost simultaneously). In the case of coordinated attacks, there is a parallel overlap of crises and emergencies, causing them to increase significantly, often beyond the capacity to respond effectively.

A noticeable trend in recent years [4] is the deliberate increase in coordinated attacks by terrorist organizations. These attacks are carried out by task forces (simultaneous attacks) and individual perpetrators (sequential attacks and the use of different attack methods and tools in continuous attacks). There are several reasons why terrorists so readily choose this category of attacks. First and foremost, coordinated attacks produce more casualties than single attacks in either immediate or continuous form. This is due to the arithmetic calculus of the multiplicity of events and the lower effectiveness of rescue efforts, which have to be concentrated in multiple locations and time relationships. This multiplicity of locations and, thus, of victims generates more problems on the part of urban safety managers. The first problems arise when receiving and verifying information at emergency call centres. The multiplicity of information concerning different incidents, methods and locations increase the chaos in the operation of the services. On top of this, their number very often exceeds the technical capacity of the limited resources of emergency number operators to carry out crisis communications. These limitations are also crucial in the case of rescue teams, police forces and counter-terrorist units being sent to the scene of attacks. Multiple incidents represent multiple courses of action in the response area, for which many more forces and resources need to be deployed to secure them. In coordinated attacks, perpetrators may attack sequentially, using the specifics of rescue operations to increase the scale of direct losses. This may be done by attacking people at assembly points for evacuation or in hospitals during the increased chaos of receiving casualties. A spectacular example of a coordinated attack was the attack in Paris in November 2015. The combination of several assassination methods and tools, with various locations and a time frame of several hours, had a tangible effect in terms of increased numbers of dead and injured [64]. In this case, the perpetrators used bombings, including suicide bombings, a method of mass murder with firearms and a hostage situation, all in different locations and at specific time intervals. They attacked not only a stadium, restaurants and a music club but, above all, the whole of Paris with its international community. From a tactical perspective, this attack exhausted all the hallmarks of coordinated action, subordinated to increasing the immediate impact and maximizing the impact of fear on the city attacked. The overlap of crisis intensity curves characteristic of coordinated attacks is presented in Figure 7 below.

4. Discussion

The area of time in responding to terrorist attacks in smart cities is a complex issue and one that evolves with the changing public safety environment. The presented examples of incidents, the conclusions of the literature review and the observations made by the authors do not exhaust the scientific and practical exploration of this topic. The described range of research results is limited and only provides a foundation for further and more in-depth investigations. Several issues remain to be addressed, such as, for example, verification of the accuracy of the typology of assaults according to the time factor adopted in the text and a detailed examination of the curves of the intensity of the crisis situation in different categories of events. These scientific activities should be theoretical and practical at the same time. This is because they will provide a real leaven for scientific exploration of the effectiveness of the response to assaults, which is affected by the time factor. This topic assumes particular importance in urban areas due to the increased likelihood of an attack occurring there and the complex structure of the organizational and institutional dimensions of the response to terrorist attacks.

5. Conclusions

The research findings presented in this text indicate that contemporary cities are vulnerable to various categories of terrorist attacks. The type of attacks in terms of time proposed in the text can help city managers and public safety institutions plan more effective response activities. The examples of problems, challenges and additional threats described above, which may surface in the context of time during a response, can provide a capital leaven for building response scenarios to the various concepts of time used by perpetrators of attacks.

The issue of timing in attacks is important from both an academic and practical perspective. Successive terrorist attacks using various perpetrators’ methods highlight real and recurring problems in the response of institutions responsible for public security. An analysis of the literature in the area of anti-terrorism indicates a research deficit in this area, which means that the considerations undertaken were creative and innovative at the same time. The publication’s authors believe that time in responding to urban attacks will soon become the subject of in-depth scientific inquiry, translating into developing innovative and utilitarian conclusions.