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Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

Department of Economics, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road East, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada
Received: 28 December 2018 / Revised: 18 March 2019 / Accepted: 4 April 2019 / Published: 15 April 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory)
Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more mathematically-complicated limitations on permitted beliefs. A simpler approach is taken here, where the whole idea of beliefs is dispensed with, and a new equilibrium concept, called the ideal reactive equilibrium, that builds on some pioneering work by Amershi, Sadanand and Sadanand on thought process dynamics, is developed. View Full-Text
Keywords: refinements of Nash equilibrium; dynamic games; imperfect information; beliefs refinements of Nash equilibrium; dynamic games; imperfect information; beliefs
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Sadanand, A. Ideal Reactive Equilibrium. Games 2019, 10, 19.

AMA Style

Sadanand A. Ideal Reactive Equilibrium. Games. 2019; 10(2):19.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sadanand, Asha. 2019. "Ideal Reactive Equilibrium" Games 10, no. 2: 19.

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