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Cooperative Game for Fish Harvesting and Pollution Control

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Département de Mathématiques, UFR des Sciences et Technologies, Université Assane Seck de Ziguinchor, Ziguinchor BP 523, Senegal
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College of Petroleum Engineering and Geosciences (CPG), King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Dhahran 31261, Saudi Arabia
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Département de Mathématiques, UFR des Sciences et Technologies, Université de Thiés, Thiés BP 967, Senegal
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Learning & Game Theory Laboratory (L&G-Lab), Division of Engineering, Saadiyat Campus, New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), Abu Dhabi P.O. Box 129188, United Arab Emirates
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Ulrich Berger and Richard McLean
Received: 5 July 2021 / Revised: 1 August 2021 / Accepted: 16 August 2021 / Published: 19 August 2021
(This article belongs to the Section Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining)
This paper studies fishery strategies in lakes, seas, and shallow rivers subject to agricultural and industrial pollution. The flowing pollutants are modeled by a nonlinear differential equation in a general manner. The logistic growth model for the fish population is modified to cover the pollution impact on the fish growth rate. We start by presenting the stability analysis of the dynamical system to discern the different types of the evolution of the fish population according to human actions. A cooperative game is formulated to design strategies for preserving the fish population by controlling the pollution as well as the fish stock for harvesting. The sufficient conditions for implementing the cooperative strategy are investigated through an incentive design approach with an adaptive taxation policy for the players. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the benefit of the cooperative for fish population preservation but also for the players’ rewards. View Full-Text
Keywords: biodiversity preservation; stability analysis; optimal control; cooperative game biodiversity preservation; stability analysis; optimal control; cooperative game
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MDPI and ACS Style

Goudiaby, M.S.; Dia, B.M.; Diagne, M.L.; Tembine, H. Cooperative Game for Fish Harvesting and Pollution Control. Games 2021, 12, 65. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030065

AMA Style

Goudiaby MS, Dia BM, Diagne ML, Tembine H. Cooperative Game for Fish Harvesting and Pollution Control. Games. 2021; 12(3):65. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030065

Chicago/Turabian Style

Goudiaby, Mouhamadou S., Ben M. Dia, Mamadou L. Diagne, and Hamidou Tembine. 2021. "Cooperative Game for Fish Harvesting and Pollution Control" Games 12, no. 3: 65. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g12030065

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