Explanation of the Phenomenon “Different Prices on the Same Land” in the Farmland Transfer Market—Evidence from China’s Farmland Transfer Market
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Theoretical Mechanism
2.2. Data and Variables
- The object of farmland transfer. In the CHFS questionnaire of 2017, the question “whom is the farmland transferred to?” was designed, the options of which included ordinary farmers in the village, ordinary farmers outside of the village, leading specialized households, etc. Considering that leading specialized households, etc., may also exist in the local villages, we only retained the samples of “ordinary farmers in the village” and “ordinary farmers outside the village” to define the objects of transfer transactions more clearly. Drawing on the existing studies, we set the object of farmland transfer as a binary variable, which had a value of 1 if the local farmers transferred into farmland, and 0 if transferees were from outside of the village.
- The rent price of farmland transfer. The average rent price per mu of transferring farmland was used to measure “the rent price of farmland transfer” [25]. Since crops are taken as rent in some areas, we converted all of them to specific amounts, to ensure the consistency of the analysis.
- Other explanatory variables. To improve the accuracy in the estimates, some control variables were introduced into the model, including the characteristics of household head and family, farmland status, transaction costs of transferring farmland, and village-level fixed effects [11,14,26,27,28]. The characteristics of the household head included demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and education level. As for the characteristics of the family level, social capital and physical capital may influence the object of farmland transfer and rent at the same time. We used “whether family members have village cadres” to measure the social capital of farmers’ families, and “whether the family has a car and the number of family deposits” to measure physical capital. Referring to Ma et al. (2015), “whether the farmland contract is signed” and “whether the farmland is expropriated” were adopted to describe the situation of farmland property rights [22]. Meanwhile, the transaction cost of farmland transfer was chosen as a control variable. If it takes a long time to reach the circulation or if there is a dispute over the circulation, the two sides will negotiate on it, which eventually affects the rent prices. The definition and description of variables are presented in Table 1.
2.3. Estimation Strategy
3. Results
3.1. Benchmark Regression
3.2. Robustness Tests
- 1.
- Robustness test 1: removing the sample of cash crops. In the process of data processing, the samples using transferred farmland for planting food and cash crops are retained in the whole sample. However, according to classical land rent theory, the crop varieties on the land can have a critical impact on the rent. In general, grain prices are relatively close, so the sample of non-grain cultivation is removed. The TEM is still adopted for regression, the results of which are shown in column 1 of Table 3. The results present that the rent of farmland transferred out to the local transferees is still significantly lower than that transferred out to the out-of-village transferees after excluding the samples of cash crops. Therefore, the result of benchmark regression is robust.
- 2.
- Robustness test 2: increasing control variables. In light of the great influence of the quality of land parcels on the transfer rent, according to the classical land rent theory, the transfer rent is affected by the heterogeneity of farmland in location and fertility [6]. Unfortunately, the survey data of CHFS in 2017 failed to refine the quality of specific plots and so this paper further controls the quality characteristics of the largest cultivated land of households based on the setting of the benchmark model. Although the specific quality of different plots may be different, the quality of farmland in the same area is generally similar, promising the reasonability of our method. The results in column 2 of Table 3 indicate that the coefficient of the transferees decreases slightly after controlling the characteristics of farmland quality, but it still negatively affects the transfer price. This further verifies the reliability of the conclusions of this paper.
- 3.
- Robustness test 3: adopting conditional mixed process (CMP) to re-estimate. As the endogenous variable, the transfer object is a binary dummy variable; this paper further employs CMP to test the endogenous problem. Firstly, “the transfer rate in the village where the transferor is located” is still used as the instrumental variable, and its correlation with the endogenous variable is estimated, the results of which are brought into the benchmark model for regression. It is found from the CMP regression that the coefficient of the instrumental variable and atanhrho_12 are both significant, inferring that the results of the CMP are credible. The regression results in column 3 of Table 3 infer that the benchmark regression results are still robust after changing the estimation method.
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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Variable | Definition | Mean | SD |
---|---|---|---|
Rent per mu | Ln(farmland transfer price) (Yuan) | 3.465 | 2.976 |
Object of farmland transfer | Local transferee = 1; Out-of-village transferee = 0 | 0.712 | 0.453 |
Age of household head | Actual age | 51.048 | 9.384 |
Education of household head | Illiteracy = 1; primary = 2; middle = 3; high = 4; college = 5 | 2.889 | 0.644 |
Does the family have village cadres? | Yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.017 | 0.127 |
Number of family deposits | Ln(family deposits) (Yuan) | 1.538 | 3.591 |
Does the family have a car? | Yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.089 | 0.282 |
Is the farmland contract signed? | Yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.645 | 0.479 |
Is the farmland expropriated? | Yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.112 | 0.315 |
Who gets the farmland subsidy? | Transferor = 1; transferee = 0 | 0.769 | 0.421 |
Is there a dispute in circulation? | Yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.040 | 0.196 |
Time to achieve circulation | Number of months to achieve circulation | 1.292 | 0.883 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
OLS | TEM: Two-Step Method | TEM: MLE | |||
Object Selection Equation | Rent Determination Equation | Object Selection Equation | Rent Determination Equation | ||
Object of farmland transfer | −2.500 *** | −5.327 *** | −8.304 *** | ||
(0.124) | (0.474) | (0.082) | |||
Age of household head | 0.016 * | −0.000 | 0.012 | 0.001 | 0.010 |
(0.008) | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.003) | (0.011) | |
Education of household head | −0.036 | −0.029 | −0.012 | −0.025 | 0.033 |
(0.114) | (0.058) | (0.122) | (0.045) | (0.152) | |
Does the family have village cadres? | 0.282 | 0.074 | 0.309 | 0.157 | 0.337 |
(0.408) | (0.233) | (0.508) | (0.194) | (0.635) | |
Number of family deposits | 0.013 | −0.015 * | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.018 |
(0.018) | (0.009) | (0.019) | (0.007) | (0.024) | |
Does the family have a car? | 0.620 *** | −0.102 | 0.410 * | −0.021 | 0.213 |
(0.231) | (0.112) | (0.245) | (0.089) | (0.304) | |
Is the farmland contract signed? | −0.027 | −0.386 *** | 0.165 | −0.038 | −0.085 |
(0.118) | (0.067) | (0.148) | (0.048) | (0.163) | |
Is the farmland expropriated? | −0.452 ** | −0.250 *** | −0.683 *** | −0.285 *** | −0.905 *** |
(0.183) | (0.095) | (0.208) | (0.074) | (0.257) | |
Who gets the farmland subsidy? | 0.652 *** | 0.020 | 0.674 *** | 0.143 ** | 0.713 *** |
(0.137) | (0.073) | (0.154) | (0.057) | (0.192) | |
Is there a dispute in circulation? | −0.628 ** | 0.299 ** | −0.248 | 0.136 | 0.119 |
(0.285) | (0.149) | (0.337) | (0.122) | (0.416) | |
Time to achieve circulation | 0.141 ** | −0.234 *** | −0.122 | −0.139 *** | −0.388 *** |
(0.068) | (0.033) | (0.085) | (0.027) | (0.093) | |
Circulation rate of the village | −2.105 *** (0.163) | −0.387 *** (0.066) | |||
Village fixed effect | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
cons | 5.377 *** (0.871) | 1.166 *** (0.447) | 6.982 *** (1.000) | 0.490 (0.352) | 8.799 *** (1.195) |
R2 | 0.202 | ||||
F value | 61.619 | ||||
Wald test | 391.6 *** | 10,382 *** | |||
N | 2118 | 2118 | 2118 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
---|---|---|---|
Excluding Cash Crops Samples | Increasing Control Variables | CMP Re-Estimation | |
Transfer object | −8.002 *** | −7.935 *** | −8.287 *** |
(0.094) | (0.096) | (0.084) | |
Control variable | YES | YES | YES |
Village fixed effect | YES | YES | YES |
observed value | 1387 | 2118 | 2118 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
The Transfer Involved by Intermediary or Ganizations | Spontaneous Transfer by Both Parties | |||
TEM | CMP | TEM | CMP | |
Circulation object | −2.280 * (1.280) | −1.862 *** (1.110) | −8.176 *** (0.080) | −8.194 *** (0.080) |
Control variable | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Village fixed effect | YES | YES | YES | YES |
constant term | 7.228 *** (2.309) | 6.974 *** (2.320) | 8.020 *** (1.245) | 9.301 *** (0.476) |
Residual covariance (σ) | 0.312 (0.482) | 2.694 *** (0.058) | ||
Residual correlation sysTEM (ρ) | 0.738 *** (0.087) | 1.299 *** (0.017) | ||
Wald test | 19.75 ** | 10,508.55 *** | ||
atanhrho_12 | 0.085 (0.327) | 2.714 *** (0.057) | ||
N | 158 | 158 | 1960 | 1960 |
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Chen, J.; Xu, J.; Zhang, H. Explanation of the Phenomenon “Different Prices on the Same Land” in the Farmland Transfer Market—Evidence from China’s Farmland Transfer Market. Agriculture 2022, 12, 2087. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/agriculture12122087
Chen J, Xu J, Zhang H. Explanation of the Phenomenon “Different Prices on the Same Land” in the Farmland Transfer Market—Evidence from China’s Farmland Transfer Market. Agriculture. 2022; 12(12):2087. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/agriculture12122087
Chicago/Turabian StyleChen, Jia, Jingwen Xu, and Hongxiao Zhang. 2022. "Explanation of the Phenomenon “Different Prices on the Same Land” in the Farmland Transfer Market—Evidence from China’s Farmland Transfer Market" Agriculture 12, no. 12: 2087. https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/agriculture12122087