From Theism to Spirit Beliefs

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Please see the attached word doc.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

I added more information on background knowledge that must be established for each of the arguments to work. This meets the concern that only the existence of an omnibenevolent God aids the likelihood of NTSAs.

(1): I added an extra qualification to the sentence.

(2): I rephrased the sentence.

(3): I moved the discussion of 'Agent' up to confine the defining to persons or agents.

(4): I added omnipotence to the list.

(5): I removed the mention of Sikhs.

(6): The list of criteria is not so much a family-resemblance but rather a group that jointly yields sufficient conditions. I added a paragraph to make this clear.

(7): I added a paragraph on NTSAs being causally efficacious. I believe agency goes beyond this notion and tried to explain why.

(8): I opted to keep the formal statement and added it for other arguments because I believe it makes the argument more clear.

(9): I added more on the background knowledge that needs to be established. I also added extra examples to indicate that the argument can also work for non-Abrahamic gods.

(10): I elaborated on the argument and incorporated some of the comments by the reviewer.

(11): My aim is to show that revelations are restricted to a very few number of people in both Christianity and Islam. I added a sentence making this more clear.

(12): I added more examples from more sacred scriptures.

(13): the word 'pluralism'  was replaced by ' diversity'.

Reviewer 2 Report

Here are my thoughts parsed out in terms of Major comments and Minor comments. Overall, the paper augurs well as a way to bring a consciousness to the subject and the import of natural theology. However, much needs to be considered and retooled before moving forward.

Major
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Lines 64-68: Concerning whether "Being nonphysical, however, cannot be regarded as a necessary condition for being supernatural," it seems to me the author needs to clarify that while "being nonphysical" itself is not a necessary condition for being supernatural, that there should even *be* a nonphysical constituent (i.e., component, etc.) surely would be. For, when we speak of a demonic possession or an embodied angel, there remains a nonphysical ontology that underlies the physical nature.

Lines 79-85: Being atemporal and nonspatial would not be sufficient conditions much less necessary conditions for being supernatural, for abstract objects (if they exist) would surely not be supernatural as one would understand that term (this is introduced later in Section 2.3; perhaps that needs to be moved/intimated to the present Section). Moreover, there are theistic philosophers who believe God is temporal (Swinburne) and yet still regarded as a supernatural being. (The same I think goes for the other two. Abstracta are nonphysical and are invisible, too.) I think a better strategy for this understanding is to either disqualify abstract objects up front (by referring to, say, entities capable of moving--i.e. causing--or being moved upon) or to narrow your focus to *persons* (or, as you have later, *agents*) instead of the more broad referent of *entities* wherein defining *persons* as being nonphysical, invisible, etc. would be sufficient for identifying them as supernatural without having to take on an entire taxonomy of supernatural things. Line 97 would seem to imply that this was the intent all along anyway, but it wasn't clear. But do consider moving the contents of Section 2.3 to the current one.

Section 2.2: So, some (e.g., Michael Heiser) are happy to identify demons and angels as "gods." I wonder if something other than "non-theistic" might be more suitable and would not saddle the author with having to navigate what a "god" is in contradistinction to what a "God" (capital "G") is. Perhaps something more like "non-Yahwist" or "not-God" (capital "G") or "not fully divine" or "non-Divine" or ...? It really isn't important to the overall thesis whether angels, demons, and other subdivines are "gods" or not; it only matters that the existence of a God in any way raises the (prior?) probability of the existence of other gods/spirits.

Lines 222-223: The author writes, "Therefore, it seems as if the ontological argument is of little help or relevance in assessing the likely existence of NTSA’s." It seems wrong to shift the thesis here. The original thesis wasn't that any particular *argument* for God renders the existence of NTSAs more probably, only that God *Godself* raises the probability of the existence of NTSAs.

The concluding remark to the third Section on natural theology says, "Despite these initial problems in arguing for the existence of NTSA’s, ...." Wait! This section dealt with some arguments for the existence of God and that these arguments didn't themselves lend anything to NTSAs. That's hardly to say that the author has just surveyed (some) arguments attempting to show that NTSAs exist (!). This Section needs a better objective here--it seems like it should be focusing on what natural theology is supposed to be and how that confirms/justifies theism in particular. On the other hand, that would make the section a bit useless. Perhaps the author wants to focus instead on the notion that a supreme God (regardless of tradition) is too species-distinct to offer any such initial probability to the existence of other spirits. Then again, that seems to be the focus of Section 4. I think it might flow better if these two Sections (3 and 4) were combined so that one could begin with a sampling of arguments for God's existence and then segue right into how that would impact the probability of other spirits.

Lines 264-266: The author says that Apuleius's argument "hinges on 2 claims" (btw, change "2" to "two"). I don't know if this is what Apuleius himself says, but perhaps that needs to be made clearer--especially since they're called "*central* claims" later on. If it's merely what the author infers from Apuleius's undisclosed argument (we're told about an argument but one hasn't been given yet, only that Apuleius finds intermediaries to be indispensable), more needs to be said about that because, as discussed on page 7, the claims seem to be in tension with each other as written. We want to be charitable with Apuleius. If it is a faithful inference or claim, then it needs to be spelled out. Also, shouldn't claim (2) be about a bidirectional "movement" and not just that human beings unilaterally "move" on God with their pleas?

Lines 363-367: The conclusion of defending (a) doesn't adequately parse out the distinct arguments offered: one from divine motive, namely to avert fear in humans; two, from God's omnibenevolence, and three, from the Scriptures. The last one doesn't seemed to be captured here. The second one--from omnibenevolence--is perhaps implied but not stated ("God is moved to intervene in human lives" should probably be followed with "from his omnibenevolence" just to be clear). Incidentally, choosing "fear" as an argument for why God would utilize intermediaries supposes that God could not just act through visions or apparitions. Why create a race of perpetual beings (particularly if some will rebel and bring fear in other ways) when minimizing fear could be accomplished through other means?

Lines 369-405: At this point I'm wondering if this is in any way a distinct factor from the previous. That there is a supernatural realm is only argued for on the basis of arguments for God's existence. Why introduce (b) as a separate argument? In reality, it is an extension/auxiliary factor on the basis of the previous argument only. I was actually anticipating something different than the same reliance on theistic arguments. Here would have been a good opportunity to incorporate the works of Stephen Braude and David Lund and their defenses of survivalism as independent evidence for a supernatural realm (i.e., an afterlife). Otherwise, best to just note that a supernatural realm (or environment) is directly implied by God's existence.

The Bayesian expressions you have, when discussing the background information, should be expressed with | and not with /. For example (from Line 414), you should have: P(RST | God) > P(RST | not-God). The slash / you have signals a numerator-denomenator separation, which is not what you mean here. You're *not* expressing, for example, an inverse probability that the greater the probability of "God" the lesser the probability of RST. You mean to say that given God's existence, RST's likelihood is increased.

Lines 482-487: The author has missed the point of the Bultmannian objection. What Bultmann and others that follow suppose is that we are to *redefine* what demons are in the light of modern science. That the Gerasene "demons" were "driven out" is just another way of saying that Jesus healed the men of their affliction (similar to how we today might talk about "getting rid of our demons"). This would not be an assault on biblical reliability, it would be an assault on a particular *interpretation* of the biblical record (or so one could argue). The author will need to do some extra work here to show that the spirits mentioned in Scripture are not metaphors or some such linguistic narrative device.

Now, there are some other works out there on this subject that are not intimated. The author may want to consider checking out Peter Williams' _The Case for Angels_ (Paternoster) and to some extent Phillip H. Wiebe's _God and Other Spirits_ (Oxford). Similar and more-developed versions of the author's arguments are discussed therein.

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Minor
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Line 14: Place a comma after "spirits"

Lines 19, 29: The author should determine consistency with the hyphen for "non theistic" vs. "non-theistic." I think the latter is preferable.

Line 34: Capitalize "witnesses."

Line 39: No 's' for "accept."

Line 72: There is a spelling error here--a floating "y" in the sentence.

Line 92 needs an "a" before "supernatural."

Line 156: "deva's" should be "devas."

Line 191: "platonic" should be capitalized.

Lines 218-220: The sentence ("...argument concludes to the existence of...") needs to be recast for clarity.

There is frequent reference to "NTSA's." Grammatically, this should not be cast as possessive but as a plural, hance "NTSAs."

Line 267 (and 318): Did you instead mean "ancient"?

Page 6 has some formatting (=indenting) issues.

Lines 342 and 350: Change "3" to "three." Typically, such numeric designations should be spelled out if less than 10.

Line 389: Again, saying "concludes to the existence of God" seems awkward. It makes it would like the argument is personal and consciously draws a conclusion. Better to say something like "If any argument concludes that God exists ..." That's far less awkward.

Line 404: Are we talking here about a specific naturalistic context for one's background knowledge? For, surely one with background knowledge about the supernatural will not find such a fact "surprising." Maybe that should be clarified here.

Lines 409-410 need to be cleaned up a bit or retooled for clarity.

Author Response

(1): I added a section on the non-physical component. I argue that there are also counterarguments against regarding this as a necessary condition.

(2): I moved the discussion on 'Agent' to the front to solve this issue.

(3): While the term 'god' is not required for the arguments, I opted to continue using the term since it is used in the same way by most people (at least it seems so). I mentioned the author handed by the reviewer as an example of someone who uses the term differently.

(4): I retailored the section to make it less about natural theology in general but more on how establishing the existence of God at first glance does not seem to aid in establishing NTSAs. Thereby natural theology paints an image that one can have a high probability of God existing without a high probability of NTSAs existing. I argue below that this is not the case.

(5): I retailored the section. The general idea is now that establishing God apparently does not aid a case for NTSAs. Below I argue it does.

(6): I made more clear where I diverge from Apuleius and where I rephrase his argument.

(7): I added a paragraph on divine omnibenevolence. I also added a footnote where I discuss the point on demons inducing fear (31).

(8): I moved the second argument in front. This way makes more clear that the argument aims to support NTSAs in a different (less strong) way than the argument drawn from Apuleius.

(9): I replaced the symbols.

(10): I rephrased the paragraph on Bultmann. I highlighted that the argument does not undermine the reliability of the Bible but can allow for reliability that does not support NTSAs. I also expanded the paragraph.

(11): I chekced the Williams and Wiebe books but did not find similar arguments to mine. I added references to both works.

Reviewer 3 Report

The article discusses three arguments to support the conclusion P(NTSA|God) > P(NTSA|~God). The overall arguments are somewhat sloopy. Therefore, I do not recommend publication in its current form. I summarise my comments on the three arguments as follows:

1. The first arugment is weak. An omnibenevolent God would reveal Himself to humans. Even though the distance between God and humans is very large, it does not entail that messengers exist for communications. If God is omnipotent, He can use His direct way to communicate with humans. The author should address why the omnipotent God requires any messengers for communications. The persuasion made by the messengers is more effective?
2. The existence of a supernatural realm does not necessarily make the existence of NTSA's more probable. For example, we know intelligent human beings exist. The existence of the intelligent human realm does not imply that it is more likely to have other intelligent humans in other worlds. This argument requires one more logical connection: the mechanism of the evolution of intelligent humans. We believe that other intelligent beings exist because we know how we were evolved.  As we do not know how NTSA's were created, such an argument is weak. Moreover, how about the theory of Panentheism? Does the argument also work for Panentheism?
3. If there is a God, whether scared scriptures are reliable depends on which God is confirmed to be true. For example, if the Christian God exists, the Bible would be more reliable. The second counter-argument mentioned by the author has some force in this point. The problem of the conflicting sacred scriptures should be discussed more thoroughly. This problem might suggest that not the entire scriptures are all correct. It is probable that the parts about NTSA's are wrong but other parts are correct. If this is the case, the argument is not valid. Moreover, the argument of the existence of God mentioned by the author does not imply which God is more likely to be true. The ontological argument and the fine-tuning argument are consistent with many reglious beliefs. 

Author Response

(1): I provide plausible reasons for why an omnibenevolent might still make use of intermediary messengers. I argue that encounters with such beings may be less awe-inspiring or trigger less fearful responses.

(2): I toned the conclusions of the second argument down a bit. The argument now concludes that the existence of NTSAs is rendered only somewhat more likely by the existence of a supernatural realm. I also added a note on pantheism.

(3): I added a prargaph addressing the point of pluralism in more detail. Assessing arguments for the reliability of one set of sacred scriptures lies beyond the scope of this paper. I added a section discussing the problem in more detail.

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

This revised version of the paper is a major improvement. There is now a much broader set of traditions engaged with and the author makes clear that the argument hinges on the acceptance of certain background beliefs about the god whose existence might be proven. The author has done a lot of work to improve the overall strength of the argument, and has done so very successfully.

I have only one tiny suggestion. The author uses the word "pluralism" again in the sentence between lines 576 and 577. This word really needs changed to "diversity". This is especially the case in this particular sentence as it follows on from a citation of Hick, who is famous for his theory of religious pluralism. The reader might think the sentence is referring to Hick's theory. It would, at the very least, cause the reader to do a double-take. In any case, it could be a source of confusion.

Author Response

I changed the term to 'diversity'.

Reviewer 2 Report

The paper is well on its way, but a number of things do need to be worked out. Here are my comments separated into "major" and "minor" categories.

Major: 

I'm trying to figure out the relevance of the section, "The initial outlook: Arguing for God alone," beginning on Line 255. It seems unnecessary to devote three paragraphs to how the usual arguments of natural theology do not themselves show that NTSAs exist (does anyone dispute this?). This brief romp through ontological and design arguments interrupts the flow of the essay; and it's not directly relevant to advancing the principle thesis: If God exists, the existence of NTSAs is more probable. Whether natural theology ends up being successful or not is irrelevant. Presumably, even an atheist can get on board with the essay's contingent conclusions here.

Subsection 'a' ("The existence of NTSAs is more likely if there is a supernatural realm") seems to undermine itself. In order to have a supernatural realm to raise the probability of NTSAs, the author punts to arguments for the existence of God. It's a wonder how the supernatural realm does any work in raising the probability of NTSAs without depending on God's existence. Accordingly, one could retort, "Well, God *just is* the supernatural realm then." Along the lines of my previous comments about Braude and Lund, one can establish that there are spiritual beings that are neither God nor embodied creatures. The author could use this opportunity to better raise the probability of NTSAs given the supernatural realm by noting that there is evidence for NTSA-like *kinds,* i.e. disembodied human spirits. This eliminates concerns about any would-be qualitative simplicity and shows that the supernatural realm involves the finite and is something other than God.
And at the cost of telegraphing that this section may be irrelevant, I would change the last sentence from "The arguments I will discuss next can provide a stronger case" to saying something about a cumulative case where the present section is, in part, relevant: something like, "The arguments I will discuss next, when coinjoined with the modest one presented here, will collectively increase the probability of NTSAs" or something like that.
 
Lines 561-571: I take it that the point of this part of the section is to show how both (1) and (2), which collectively imply the employment of intermediary beings, are true in a post-Apuleius world (i.e., "I discuss how Apuleius’ two central claims can be updated for this purpose"). But (1) isn't garnering any support. Instead, the author transitions to direct scriptural support for intermediary beings being used for other purposes. But that's a *different* argument (same goes for Lines 592-604). What about supporting (1), or has the author just moved on? In fact, Lines 553-560 seem to mitigate against (1): that if God self-discloses through incarnation and apparition on occasion, then God is *not* too far removed from the human sphere to interact with humans (as far as Western religions are concerned at least). The argument in Lines 592-604 certainly provides a motive for God's preference on occasion to use messengers, but it has no currency for supporting (1). It must be that the author has returned to (i) and (ii) without any in-text indication to that effect.

Lines 629-630: Change the last sentence ("The argument discussed in this section can therefore be joined with the ontological argument to establish the existence of NTSAs") to something like "The argument discussed in this section when joined with the arguments of natural theology raise the probability NTSAs exist." The overarching Bayesian argument does not "establish" that if God exists and the corollaries are probable, then NTSAs themselves are established to be probable. To say P(NTSAs | God & B) > P(~NTSAs | God & B) is only to establish that NTSAs are more likely than not if God exists. It's the difference between confirming evidence for NTSAs and evidence for the probability of NTSAs. Consider: If God exists, it is more probable that a multiverse would exist than on the background information that there is no God. But showing that God probably exists on the basis of the universe having an origin, fine-tuning, etc., is not transitive to establish the probability that, therefore, a multiverse probably exists. This universe may still be the only universe we have. Indeed, P(NTSAs | God & B) might just be .3 and P(~NTSAs | God & B) might be .0001. This is enough to show that P(NTSAs | God & B) > P(~NTSAs | God & B). But a probability of .3 is hardly enough to show that P(NTSAs) > 1/2. 
Furthermore, the concluding remarks on this (specifically Lines 903-905) should also be corrected. As a suggestion, perhaps say instead: "Individually, each reason increases the probability of NTSAs if God exists. If all them are true, then we have a stronger, cumulative case for NTSAs if God exists."

Lines 860-883: I'm not sure why the last two sentences of this paragraph were added. It repeats Lines 856-857. Maybe it would be better to end this with something like: "Therefore, it is statistically likely that the Scripture that ends up being the reliable one is one that affirms NTSAs. That there are many Scriptures does nothing to reduce which ones are reliable, only that they all cannot be reliable together."

The very last sentence (Lines 909-911) should be deleted. The point actually isn't whether the arguments suffice to show that NTSAs do not stem from a primitive religiosity (because it wouldn't otherwise matter if they did given that it would be the genetic fallacy). While some kind of modesty of the conclusion is on point, this one supposes a contention that has not been otherwise raised in this paper. Who cares if it came from a "primitive form of religiosity" if it's true? For beliefs about sin and salvation likewise do, too.

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Minor: 

Footnote 5 should have "church of latter-day saints" capitalized.

Footnote 8: Pluralize "root" there.

Line 217: change "suggest" to "suggests."

Lines 217-218: I do take minor issue that the referent "gods" is a matter of "ranking" and only used by a minority in referring to subdivines. An obvious case in point would be how most understand the scriptural passage of 2 Corinthians 4.4: "In their case the god of this world [=Satan] has blinded the minds of the unbelievers ...." The term "gods" is rarely used theologically as a term of rank (though heroes and magistrates are sometimes deified in service to their politics). Heiser, for example, is clear to explain that "God" is ontologically unparalleled and that the lesser "gods" are lesser in terms of their not being omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc.

It's unclear why the sections are no longer numbered. Perhaps this was requested by the journal? Anyway, there are a number of references to "section 2" and "section 3," but none are numbered. A different referent should perhaps be used for ease of reading.

Line 287: Not "seemingly," they do! Still, Lines 287-376 don't seem relevant.

Line 377: Not "Contrary to this" but something else (that natural theology does not directly support NTSAs is not contrary to the notion that natural theology provides indirect support for NTSAs). Better to say something like "Regardless of this" or "Aside from this" or "Despite this" ... ?

Line 381: Consider some consistency in the formulation here. Elsewhere the individual elements that comprise the background information in portraying intrinsic probability are all spelled out. But not here. Consider changing the Bayesian presentation here to (where M=use of/preference for messengers, SN=supernatural realm, and R=reliability of Scriptures) P(NTSAs | God & M & SN & R) > P(~NTSAs | God & M & SN & R).

Lines 388-389: This one seems weird to me: "All required background beliefs can be established by rational argumentation and therefore do not require other sources of justification." It sounds like, "The beliefs are supported by a form of justification (=argumentation); therefore, no other source of justification is needed." Well, of course not. Furthermore, does the author mean to say that these are *required* beliefs or that these are *relevant* beliefs? The former notion would have them necessary conditions for increasing the probability of NTSA. That seems an unnecessary commitment.

Lines 392-393: Clarify this sentence.

Footnote 21: The first sentence should have "distinguished into" changed; perhaps "distinguished by" (?).

Line 451: "micro-animal" should be plural.

Line 456: Should be "negligible" not "negligeable."

Line 483: I think "agent" should be pluralized.

Line 552: Make "Christian" plural, too.

Line 627: Rephrase "make little more conclusions about God’s nature."

Lines 781-782: Simplify "... the reports provide a reasonably accurate report" to "... the reports are reasonably accurate." 

Line 839: There is an inconsistent spelling for "counter argument" as opposed to "counter-argument" as in Line 837.

Line 848: "... many mutually conflilcting sacred scriptures are around" seems awkward. Perhaps "many mutually conflilcting sacred scriptures abound"?

Line 849: "Hindu's" should be a plural, not a possessive.

Line 896: I think the author meant "solid" not "sold." Also, it doesn't serve the conclusion here to add in Line 897 "like in the form of a sound ontological argument." Rhetorically, it gives the misimpression that one would have to rely on the ontological argument to believe God is omnibenevolent even though this isn't what was said. In the reader's mind, it highlights what the author sees as important. Better to conclude with something more forceful such as: "Like the previous argument, the third argument relies on God’s omnibenevolence. And this is a divine property which is already supported by a number of independent arguments."

Line 901: "being" should be plural.

Author Response

(1): My main goal in this section was raising the point that arguments for the existence of God can lend justification or probability to the existence of NTSAs (by joining them to the arguments discussed below). I added sentences to make this more clear.

(2): I've added more on rasing the probability by pointing to the existence of similar beings. I used the example of afterlife beliefs in the added paragraph.

(3): I added clarifying sentences and changed the intermediary conclusion of the section.

(4): I added a sentence indicating that I move from the claim defended by Apuleius to a similar though related claim.

(5): I changed the sentence in accordance with the suggestion.

(6):  I changed the sentence in accordance with the suggestion.

(7): I deleted the sentences.

Minor

I made textual changes in accordance to the reviewer's comments. Some sentences were rewritten or replaced.

I chose to stand by the elevated status point. Influential Christian theologians like Augustine and Aquinas usually refer the term 'God' to the Trinitarian God. Most contemporary theologians do likewise. I can make this explicit if needed.

Reviewer 3 Report

The author has taken my comments into consideration. The revised article is much better now. I can now recommend publication. There is a minor typo in the article:

p7 line 399: p -> P and NTASs -> NTSAs

Author Response

I fixed the typo.

Round 3

Reviewer 2 Report

Everything seems to look pretty good. Here are just some minor English/grammatical notes for a final draft:

Line 49: Consider rewriting "Above NTSAs were defined negatively in opposition to God"--this seems awkward. How about, "Above, NTSAs have been defined negatively as beings that oppose God"? 

Lines 131-132: Change "These are bound by the same spatial and temporal conditions as humans as well" to "These are also bound by the same spatial and temporal conditions as humans."

Line 134: Change "3" to "three."

Line 224: I'm not sure who "Stan" is, but he sounds like a powerful guy. Ha! I think you meant "Satan."

Line 392: "being" should be plural.

Below Line 458, there's a problem with a missing footnote (25) which is crossed out in the body. #26 should, thus, become #25 and #26 should become #25, etc.

Footnote 28: Don't forget to mention who "XXX" is, unless it's omitted because it is a reference to the author (?).

Line 591: Don't strike out "to" since it is needed for where the sentence resumes at "raise."

Line 690: The hyphen after "spirit" is unnecessary.

Author Response

Thank you for the helpful comments.

I made the textual changes suggested. The issue with the footnote was because of unaccepted revisions. This is now fixed (at least in my version).

Best regards,