3.1.1. Modeling Actors’ Behavior in the Absence of Policy Supports
Using the example of the wind turbine control system enterprise (A) and blade manufacturing enterprise (B) discussed in
Section 2 above, we can establish a model in which they cooperate using their existing technologies as inputs. These technologies have value, both now and in the future.
The present value of the technical resources to the two enterprises is denoted as
and the future value as
. Since the value of new technology comes from the input of existing technology, the value of new technology is:
where
represents the non-linear cooperation output [
57]; and
represents the value of the new technology to the two companies in the future.
The absorptive capacity of the two businesses is represented by
is the probability of successful open innovation, and
is a stochastic variable that produces a random fluctuation in open innovation performance. The expected net output of the two firms’ open innovation (hereinafter referred to as “open innovation gain”) is:
(1) Occasional cooperation model
In this model, companies A and B both prioritize their own interests in the cooperation. The business strategy space is set as
represents positive cooperation and
denotes negative cooperation. Technical input is
the future value is
. The business strategy portfolios and their returns are illustrated in
Table 1.
When both enterprises engage in positive cooperation behaviors
, the future value of the new technology obtained is higher, which is denoted as
. When both engage in passive cooperation behaviors
, the future value of the new technology obtained is lower, which is denoted as
. When the two enterprises engage in different behaviors
, the future value of the new technology obtained is between the former two values, which is denoted as
. Thus, the matrixes for the two enterprises’ OI benefits are:
Proposition 1. If,, thenis the dominant strategy of enterprise.
Proposition 1 is demonstrated in
Appendix A. This proposition relates to hypothesis H1 and illustrates that the weaker the absorptive capacity of the partners during occasional cooperation, the more willing the enterprises are to adopt an active cooperation strategy. Thus, the mode of cooperation between large core enterprises and small-scale suppliers in the industrial chain, compared with that between large enterprises, is simpler but more capable of generating technical cooperation. Although there are complicated business models among enterprises of similar sizes, it is often difficult for them to cooperate in practice, as noted by Diestre and Rajagopalan [
58]. This phenomenon stems from the self-interest of enterprises as well as fears that the absorption of technology by partners will affect the exclusiveness of their technical value and reduce their market competitiveness.
(2) Multiple cooperation model
We use an infinite repeated game G (∞, δ) to model a situation in which both enterprises seek to maximize their own interests. Suppose that firms have the same time preference, and the discount rate for the future value is common to all firms, defined as δ (0 < δ < 1). Also, suppose that at any given game stage t, all firms can see the result of the previous stage t − 1. The system relies on the initial decisions made by each company, and the returns of the two companies are symmetrical. This is discussed below using two different initial decisions by Enterprise A as examples.
If both companies adopt a positive cooperation strategy, then Enterprise A’s income from the game will be:
If Enterprise A does not cooperate in the first stage, then Enterprise B will adopt a non-active cooperation strategy during the second and subsequent stages. However, this will only happen if it is profitable for Enterprise A to adopt a non-cooperative strategy and for Enterprise B to adopt a cooperative strategy; , thus . At the same time, it must also be profitable for Enterprise B to retaliate, i.e., , thus .
In this case, Enterprise A’s unlimited game income is .
Proposition 2. If , and, Enterprisewill adopt .
If,andEnterprise will adopt.
This proposition, which relates to hypothesis H2, is demonstrated in
Appendix A. Proposition 2 argues that in occasional cooperation without regulation, positive cooperation is possible only when there is a large gap between the absorptive capacity of the enterprises involved, as in the case of core enterprises and enterprises supplying supporting components. Proposition 2 argues that in frequent cooperation, enterprises with strong absorptive capacity are only willing to engage in active, sustained cooperation when the technology involved in the cooperation is insignificant to their competitive advantage. Frequent cooperation is found to effectively inhibit the moral hazards of both partners. The two parties must cooperate for a certain period of time. As long as the future value of the technology is relatively small, each enterprise is likely to exhibit positive cooperative behavior. Open innovation, however, requires deep cooperation among enterprises, especially in the case of large enterprises for whom technological innovation is crucial.
3.1.2. Modeling Actors’ Behavior with Policy Support
(1) Subsidies Before Cooperation
The net output of the two enterprises is
Government funding policy is incorporated as an external variable (H).
When funding is offered before cooperation, the expected net outputs from open innovation for the two firms are:
In such a case, R&D subsidies cannot promote positive cooperation between enterprises; the decisions made by the two companies will be the same as the decisions they would make in the absence of subsidies. This article thus focuses on R&D assistance to enterprises after cooperation and incorporates policy variables (funding) as an incentive for cooperative innovation into an open innovation system.
(2) Subsidies After Cooperation
The expected net outputs from open innovation for the two firms are:
indicates that the government grants subsidies based on the results of innovation.
Given that the probability Enterprise A will make a decision
is
, then the probability of adoption of
is 1 −
x; likewise, if the probability Enterprise B will make a decision of
is
y, the probability of adoption of
is 1 −
y, where
x,
y ∈ 0, 1. The resulting mixed strategy portfolio of enterprises and their returns is indicated in
Table 2.
In this scenario, decision-making behaviors can be modeled according to mixed game theory as below (take Enterprise A as an example):
Proposition 3. Ifand, the relationship between x andcan be described as a monotone increasing function.
Proposition 4. Ifand, the relationship between x andcan be described as a monotone decreasing function.
Propositions 3 and 4 relate to hypothesis H3, and show that if an enterprise has good absorptive capacity, then the new technological value it can obtain using different cooperation strategies will become the key factor affecting its decision making. Demonstrations of these propositions are shown in
Appendix A. If the value of new technology acquired by a single enterprise using the same strategies as its partners is less than the value it would acquire using different cooperation strategies, the enterprise will choose active cooperation behavior. If the additional value acquired by both parties through active cooperation (over and above the value which would be acquired under any other combination of cooperation strategies) is more than double the difference between the value obtained where both parties collaborate negatively and that obtained where one party collaborates negatively and one positively, subsidy funding will aggravate the focal party’s negative cooperation behavior.
Enterprises’ behaviors are not stable under existing subsidy policy, and the impact of subsidies is limited by the value of the new technology generated by cooperation. Subsidies thus do not always promote open innovation because they only affect micro-actors’ cooperative actions as an external factor. Therefore, policy effects will be distorted in the process of cooperation in an open innovation system.
The above four propositions are summarized in
Table 3.