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Open AccessArticle

Side-Channel Evaluation Methodology on Software

Secure-IC S.A.S., Tour Montparnasse, 75015 Paris, France
Telecom-ParisTech, 91120 Palaiseau, France
Secure-IC K.K., Hirakawa-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0093, Japan
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 2 August 2020 / Revised: 11 September 2020 / Accepted: 21 September 2020 / Published: 25 September 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Side Channel and Fault Injection Attacks and Countermeasures)
Cryptographic implementations need to be robust amidst the widespread use of crypto-libraries and attacks targeting their implementation, such as side-channel attacks (SCA). Many certification schemes, such as Common Criteria and FIPS 140, continue without addressing side-channel flaws. Research works mostly tackle sophisticated attacks with simple use-cases, which is not the reality where end-to-end evaluation is not trivial. In this study we used all due diligence to assess the invulnerability of a given implementation from the shoes of an evaluator. In this work we underline that there are two kinds of SCA: horizontal and vertical. In terms of quotation, measurement and exploitation, horizontal SCA is easier. If traces are constant-time, then vertical attacks become convenient, since there is no need for specific alignment (“value based analysis”). We introduce our new methodology: Vary the key to select sensitive samples, where the values depend upon the key, and subsequently vary the mask to uncover unmasked key-dependent leakage, i.e., the flaws. This can be done in the source code (pre-silicon) for the designer or on the actual traces (post-silicon) for the test-lab. We also propose a methodology for quotations regarding SCA unlike standards that focus on only one aspect (like number of traces) and forgets about other aspects (such as equipment; cf. ISO/IEC 20085-1. View Full-Text
Keywords: side-channel evaluation; cryptographic implementation; cybersecurity; AES; RSA side-channel evaluation; cryptographic implementation; cybersecurity; AES; RSA
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MDPI and ACS Style

Guilley, S.; Karray, K.; Perianin, T.; Shrivastwa, R.-R.; Souissi, Y.; Takarabt, S. Side-Channel Evaluation Methodology on Software. Cryptography 2020, 4, 27.

AMA Style

Guilley S, Karray K, Perianin T, Shrivastwa R-R, Souissi Y, Takarabt S. Side-Channel Evaluation Methodology on Software. Cryptography. 2020; 4(4):27.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Guilley, Sylvain; Karray, Khaled; Perianin, Thomas; Shrivastwa, Ritu-Ranjan; Souissi, Youssef; Takarabt, Sofiane. 2020. "Side-Channel Evaluation Methodology on Software" Cryptography 4, no. 4: 27.

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