3.1. Kabul River Basin Dynamics
Afghanistan, being a land-locked country, possesses ample water resources and produces 80 billion cubic meters of water per year. Almost all the major rivers of Afghanistan drain into neighboring countries, such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Pakistan [
33]. Interestingly, the two neighbors share a minimum of nine freshwater riveters; however, there is no legal or contracting device available on the mutual administration of the shared rivers. Kabul River is the major water body shared by the two countries. The KRB is a cross-border basin and is situated in the northeast of Afghanistan and the northwest part of Pakistan. The basin has a drainage area of 76,908 square kilometers and is distributed into 12 sub-basins spread through 10 provinces in Afghanistan, including Kabul. The upper catchment area of the KRB consists of sharp highland vales in the Hindukush Mountain range, at an elevation of 7,500 m above sea level which mostly rests as ice caps. The lower watershed area comprises farming land and inhabited space with an altitude of 300 m above sea level [
34]. The KRB, as a transboundary basin, pours into Pakistan benefiting nearly 21 billion cubic meters yearly. Additionally, the river basin is an essential source of freshwater for the community, cultivation, and power generation in both riparian nations [
9,
35]. Furthermore, approximately 70% of the “principal river (named Chitral River in Pakistan and Kunar River in Afghanistan) originates in the Chitral area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province in Pakistan which then courses into Afghanistan (Kunar Province) and returns to KPK’s Peshawar Valley via the Kabul River, an important tributary of the basin thus, both Pakistan and Afghanistan become upper and lower riparian states,” making the KRB’s yearly highest streams up to 4,500 million cubic meters [
13]. Therefore, the KRB plays an important role in regional water security for the two bordering nation states, and the basin is extremely delicate to climate change through fluctuations in rainfall and temperature due to the ice-capped nature of its origin. Nevertheless, Afghanistan has not exploited the complete value of the river appropriately hitherto, and there is no cross-border cooperation system with Pakistan on the Kabul River. Random endeavors were taken in the past but failed, largely due to Afghanistan not taking the move seriously. In cross-border water basins, the construction of new reservoirs and deviation points can affect tail-region riparian’s, which frequently results in tensioned relations [
36]. This relates to expansion initiatives by Afghanistan on the KRB, as the basin is encrusted with an intricate structure of natural, societal, and political systems. Furthermore, the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan is permeable; ethnic clusters, stretched families, and dissatisfied groups reside in both states.
3.2. Pressure on Water Resources and Water Needs
With the advent of the new millennium, the earth’s water supply came under extra stress. Indeed, freshwater is considered a valuable natural source: an instrument for generating energy, an element of agrarian production, a tool for industrial development, a geo-hazard, a vital component of the environs, a beverage, and it is now encircled by a larger number of glitches than in the past [
37]. Any modern-day argument about freshwater resources must commence with the essential issue of the shortage of freshwater. This is the case in many parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the pressure on inhabitants is significant. This shortage of freshwater resources is compelled by the demand for natural resources, which is increasing at a rate that has not been seen previously. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the pressure on national water is measured by calculating the total water extraction as a percentage of total renewable water resources (TRWR) [
38]. The stresses are regarded to be high if the TRWR value is higher than 25%. Out of the three neighboring states, India measures at 34% pressure, Afghanistan measures at 31% pressure, and Pakistan has an extremely high pressure of 74% [
39,
40]. The gravity of the freshwater predicament in Pakistan is to be determined by the certitude that Pakistan will be converted into a water-deficient state by 2025 [
33]. Water inadequacy means, “a lack in the accessibility of renewable freshwater compared to demand” [
41]. With the surge in the populace of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the demand and supply bracket are widening, consequently giving rise to water conflicts between Pakistan’s provinces and between the two neighboring states [
42]. According to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, Pakistan ranks third among the world’s most freshwater scarce countries [
43]. For that reason, the water resource concerns of Pakistan require immediate consideration. Similarly, under the United Nations banner, the freshwater requirement in Pakistan is snowballing at an annual rate of 10% [
44]. On the contrary, as a result of population growth and a larger freshwater requirement in Afghanistan, including a substantial number of repatriates and refugees from bordering Iran and Pakistan, have also amplified pressure on previously strained freshwater resource supplies [
45]. Political analysts are of the view that a more restful Afghanistan being a head-riparian would demand more claims on freshwater resources at the cost of tail-riparians, such as Pakistan and Iran [
24]. Further, Kabul is among the rapidly developing cities and is anticipated to mass a populace of approximately nine million by 2050 [
46]. This would further put pressure on freshwater demand in the region and make room for bilateral negotiations in the region.
3.3. Hydro-Politics and Water Diplomacy
The rise in the global population and continuous water requirements has compelled riverine states to consider water diplomacy and hydro politics. Formerly riparian nations preferred freshwater convenience to freshwater availability [
17,
18,
47,
48]. Prevailing cross-border water conflicts will likely be aggravated by climate change; this may result in intensifying global water pressures and could even lead to armed clashes [
49]. Cross-border water challenges are very important in maintaining international relations among nation-states, as can be envisaged from the United Nations, “Agenda 2030- on the name of Sustainable Development Goals”. Therefore, combined and collaborative management of freshwater resources, all-encompassing and crystal clear among co-riparian nations, can serve as a better model based on the joint identification of opportunities and benefits. This may help to negotiate adjustable freshwater management devices, which ultimately would result in regional economic amalgamation rather than divided entitlements for water [
50]. However, the authors of [
3,
17,
18,
47,
51] argue that “to be sustainable and effective, transboundary cooperation needs to be based on solid science and a factual analysis of the prevailing challenges, potential solutions, and shared benefits emanating from alternative solutions.” On the contrary, among water management strategies, water diplomacy is a new method to address difficult water issues. According to Harold Nicholson, water diplomacy is “the art of conducting dialogue between and among states” [
8] and is a strategic instrument employed for viable water resource administration and for improving cooperation through negotiation between riparian countries. In the view of the author [
50], it is an action beyond theory; however, authors of [
52] call it the “water diplomacy framework (WDF) and value-focused approach to managing water allocation issues such as optimization, cost-benefit analyses, and scenario analysis towards decision making regarding multipart water problems.” Similarly, the authors of [
53] determined that “water diplomacy aims for resolving conflicts related to water availability, allocation, and shared use between and within riverine states.” However, the element of sustainable solutions is missing in the aforementioned literature on water diplomacy.
Indeed, the cross-border KRB, shared between Afghanistan and Pakistan, offers prospective hope for cross-border collaboration. Socioeconomic development in the KRB has been slowed down by local conflict in the recent past; however, very recently, there appears to be increasing attention from Afghanistan on the manipulation of its freshwater resources to deal with contemporary challenges comprising power deficits, scarce freshwater quantity, and susceptibility to deluging [
4,
13]. Thus, the KRB is regarded as a vital tool for Afghanistan in order to achieve its objective of complete municipal electrification by 2032. Similarly, energy security is of paramount standing in Pakistan, and Pakistan recognizes growth in hydro-electricity production as an important element of its energy set [
3]. It is pertinent to mention that energy security is linked to water security for both neighboring nations and is also important for socio-economic development in the cross-border areas between the two countries. Cooperative hydro-electricity development projects on the KRB can also afford a chance to strengthen two-pronged cooperation, as emphasized in some of the recent conferences held on the issue of water security and sustainability [
54]. However, for this purpose, identification, and realization of ideal settings and operational arrangements, besides consideration of the qualified impacts of freshwater management strategies and climate change concerns, are indispensable. Nevertheless, the study [
3] discussed the “hydropower production potential and transboundary flow impacts of projected climate change, planned water infrastructure development on the Kunar River, and potential unilateral water management policies by Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Yet, the work delivers an addition to the extant body of literature by giving a comparison connected to mutual and one-sided freshwater administration in the KRB. It also reveals the comparative degree of extrinsic factors such as climate change, and intrinsic factors such as water resource management strategy elements that influence water and energy patterns in the KRB. The distinctive hydrology of the KRB, with both co-riparian being concurrently upstream and downstream, increases the chances of suspicion and water clashes between the two neighboring states, provided that expansion of the KRB is achieved separately. This suggests that the geography and historical water flows of the KRB are attached to its cross-border nature, thus it requires a persuasive prospect for cooperative infrastructure expansion and administration. In this regard, the author [
3] suggests that the application of “a process-based distributed hydrologic model and a reservoir operation and routing model to simulate hydropower production potential and water balance impacts under future scenarios featuring differing dam development, reservoir operations, climate projections, and water management policies” is instrumental; it was further suggested that “under joint operation of reservoirs, winter hydropower generation in the downstream dams increases significantly due to the increased system wide storage capacity; this occurs without affecting upstream hydropower generation. The increase in winter hydropower generation is not at the cost of summer generation, which is minimally affected. The objective of reservoir operations was found to be the most dominant factor in determining winter hydropower. However, the entire storage capacity of the reservoirs is significantly smaller than the peak summer flows in the river. This means that for seasonal water flow, climate change impacts are slightly larger than those caused by reservoir operations.” However, the study is limited to an optimization-based reservoir operation and routing model. The prototypes employed to replicate systems with extensive influence under historic and anticipated climate predictions utilize different infrastructure, constructions and dam operations, and freshwater management developments. The work is also important with regard to climate change issues and its influence on water flow, as it measures the effects of cultivating water needs and dispensing, and the likely application of reservoir maneuvers to lessen effects. The World Bank provided a hydro-economic model of the KRB to prioritize water resource development, and the model used to “optimize economic benefits of agricultural production and hydropower generation, highlighted the importance of reservoir storage on the Kabul River in accommodating local water requirements and compensating for energy shortfalls away in the basin. In addition to this, a water evaluation and planning system (WEAP) model was developed and used to optimize water infrastructure development in the KRB in Afghanistan while incorporating sectoral water supply-demand relationships, this work estimated the economic value of water in the basin” [
7]. Yet, the aforementioned studies have lacuna in terms of overall cross-border strategies benefiting both riparian nations on the KRB.
3.4. Pakistan–Afghanistan Water Issues
In modern times, Pakistan–Afghanistan bilateral affairs are manifested by ceaseless allegations, such as training of militants and terrorists, safe havens for terrorists, mistrust, deteriorating economic reliance, encounters at territorial borders, intervention in domestic affairs, etc., due to the porous nature of the boundary between the two countries [
12]. In 1921, the Treaty of Kabul was discussed and contracted between Afghanistan and Pakistan, although the treaty was initially contracted between Afghanistan and the colonial power of Britain. Pursuant to the terms of the treaty, Afghanistan was bound to allow present-day Pakistan to exploit the Kabul River for navigation while keeping prevailing cultivating rights from the water resources of the Kabul River for Afghanistan. Nevertheless, after the British left, Afghanistan refused to abide by the terms of the aforementioned treaty, with the main argument that Pakistan was no longer a dominion of Britain and was not an heir state to Britain; however, a new state emerged from British India does not have those rights. Furthermore, it was an arrangement with the British, and the British had no stakes in the KRB region [
55,
56]. However, this assertion got no transnational support.
Regardless of uncertainties in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, there seems to be an improvement in bilateral relations, as joint meetings on water issues have been called. However, the water distribution concerns of the KRB remain unsettled. Additionally, India’s proposal to construct the “Shahtoot” hydropower dam is a concern for Pakistan owing to possible repercussions on the river water course and the closeness of India at the adjoining border with Pakistan [
6]. The Shahtoot dam is built on “River Maidan, a tributary of River Kabul, and is presumed to carry 146 million cubic meters of water. Once in full operation, the Shahtoot dam is estimated to deliver water to Kabul’s 2,000,000 occupants, engulf 4000 hectares of the surrounding area, and source drinking water to Deh Sabz, another city on the limits of Kabul. Construction of the Shahtoot dam fuels fears in the downstream area of River Kabul in Pakistan. There, it is believed that once in operation the dam will constrain the flow of the river in downstream regions. According to a report published in the Pakistani National daily Dawn, there could be a 16 to 17% drop in water flow in Pakistan after the completion of the Shahtoot dam and other arranged dams on the transboundary river” [
57].
With regard to reaching an agreement on the KRB, Pakistan recalled the formation of a nine-member technical committee in 2003 to commence writing a water accord with Afghanistan; however, the working group failed to devise a draft due to the scarcity of data on the river flow from Afghan authorities [
58]. Furthermore, in 2006, the World Bank (WB) presented backing for a meeting between the two neighbors as a new impetus to draft a “bilateral treaty”; however, the WB’s offer did not help as the Afghan authorities refused. In the last decade, the two neighbors have been involved in several regional forums focusing primarily on trade matters. However, cross-border cooperation in the field of water was not on the agenda for any of these sessions [
35,
58]. In 2010, it was revealed for the first time that, besides the construction of the three dams already built (Naghlu dam, Surobi dam, and Darunta dam), Afghanistan was constructing a total of 12 water reservoirs in the KRB to produce more than 1177 megawatts of energy with the support of India and the WB. These water structures are anticipated to have a storage capability of 4.7 million acre-feet of freshwater on the Afghanistan side, thus possibly reducing the freshwater flow coming into Pakistan while severely affecting the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similarly, Pakistan is also constructing some water bodies and hydroelectric power projects on the KRB without informing Afghanistan (the top riparian) [
59]. Concurrently, Pakistan initiated erection work of the “Mohmand Dam Hydropower Project” in the KRB in Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the project is expected to be completed in 2025 as per the timelines from the Water and Power Development Authority [
6]. Furthermore, the management of the KRB by head-region riparian Afghanistan exerts pressure in a way that unfavorably lessens the stream into tail-region riparian Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan is apprehensive of the structures of the KRB, as Afghanistan has refused to enter diplomatic negotiations in spite of repeated appeals from Pakistan. However, it is worth noting that the two co-riparian states talked in the year 2013 about “a joint hydropower project development on River Kunar, which begins as River Mastuj, originating from Chitral Glaciers in Pakistan.” This meeting between Afghanistan and Pakistan on freshwater concerns surfaced as a surprise, especially for the WB and the United States Aid for International Development [
35].
Nevertheless, in 2013, a World Bank-funded study revealed that out of the aforementioned 12 projects, six main projects were planned in the KRB and the water flow in Pakistan would only shrink by three percent. The other remaining six projects would have nearly no influence and are not considered to be located on cross-border rivers. Moreover, the research highlighted that freshwater reservoirs in Afghanistan may possibly contribute to electricity generation, and such power supply is greatly required for Pakistan. Yet, this scholarship could not alter the attitudes and approaches of the Afghanistan bureaucracy toward “dialogue” and collaboration [
35]. While top riparian Afghanistan presents a real “water threat”, Pakistan can react by diverting River Chitral (being at the top riparian) away from its original doorway into Afghanistan. However, given Pakistan’s unique landscape, such a change would undoubtedly be "extremely expensive," and changing the watercourse in Afghanistan would also provide significant benefits to Pakistan [
6,
60]. Pursuant to work carried out by the “Islamabad Institute of Policy Studies, there is a possible decrease of 15%–20% in the flow that was being supplied by River Kabul after the operation of 13 dams” [
35]. In order to deal with this conflicting and competing situation, it is vital to reach an agreement by realizing water issues, sustaining “past irrigation rights”, and reaching the “benefit-sharing” choices for co-riparian states. Moreover, a proper “water-sharing agreement” with the involvement of all stakeholders (including non-state actors) is similarly significant for an effective and prosperous water-sharing settlement [
59].
Potential water scarcity has stimulated shared discomfort in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as habitual farmers and ranchers have suffered from water scarcity. Furthermore, due to changes in weather and climatic patterns, the possibility of an unavoidable water clash is primarily enlarged [
61]. According to a survey led by the “Asia Foundation”, Afghanistan is immensely reliant on buying energy resources from its bordering republics in Central Asia. Moreover, Pakistan is presently an energy-deficient country, and an estimated 51 million people have no access to electricity. Furthermore, the unpredictable electricity supply and power outages on a day-to-day basis put an additional 90 million at risk, ensuing in a grave bearing on the state’s economy. As both Afghanistan and Pakistan have a scarce availability of electricity, offering support to each other in this regard can result in the groundwork of a partnership. Yet, the two neighbors are functioning in separation and are perceiving or creating lonely projects in the KRB [
6].
3.5. Sustainable Cross-Border Water Management
Water management is characteristically a conflict management or resolution technique. Water resources function as manifold objectives across several societies and differ in time and space, thus the state of water resources frequently causes problems between societies that depend on a joint water source [
62,
63]. Conversely, cases exhibit that this kind of water intricacy can probably be dealt with through concomitance and shared appreciation of numerous activities, comprising legislative options and dialogues. Reaching an agreeable remedy for freshwater issues allows numerous nation states to attain more operative and justifiable use of their freshwaters [
4,
64]. The global community is fronting encounters concerning the preclusion of differences over freshwater wealth and the formation of supportive organized tools for freshwater resource management. Combined water control provides a pathway to circumvent the uncertainty, perils to civic wellbeing, and ecosystem harm often involved in water issues, and improved accommodation of the requirements of water consumers.
With regard to water management, there are four phases involved in the process of transformation, from “conflict to cooperation” [
64]: in the opening phase, countries situated on the basins with cross-boundaries initiate an interpersonal approach while emphasizing “trust building” and analyzing competing “parties’ position” and “interests”. Though the talks are frequently adversarial and heavily stressed upon “rights of the parties”, the second phase entails a shift of perceptions on basins and is inter-sectorial in nature. This phase concentrates on “skill building” and examines “the gap from the current state of affairs to future perspective.” The deliberations in the phase convert from adversarial to reflexive and state parties describe their needs for each other. The third phase is marked by “enhancing benefits” and the process is shifted “beyond basin”, with a prime target on “consensus building” with an aim on the “benefits of cooperation.” Dialogue becomes holistic and “integrative” in this phase and state parties focus on and define benefits. The last phase concerns the creation of “Institutional and Organizational Capacity and Sharing Benefits.” This stage is transnational in nature and targets “capacity building” and analysis of “institutional capacity.” Consultations at this point are “in the action” where equity is challenged and institutionalized.
According to the author [
4] “benefit sharing is a technique by which riverine collaborate with each other in improving rightful circulation of the goods, products, and services linked directly or indirectly to the river, or arising from the use of its waters.” The main purpose of the “benefit sharing approach” is to change from “a logic of sharing of water quantities” to “a logic of sharing of benefits” so that water users can benefit from water resource usage. The authors of [
65] define benefit sharing as the process through which co-riparian coordinates maximize and fairly distribute the goods, products, and services related to the watercourse, either directly or indirectly, or resulting from the usage of its waters. Benefit sharing is projected as a tactical method to avoid the quarrelsome issue of “water rights” to the “shared pool resource” through cross-border water resources. The focus is on emphasizing and categorizing the principles resulting from freshwater resource consumption, expansion, and sharing such benefits between co-riverine parties. The social, economic, political, and environmental benefits can produce an accommodating and two-way setting in cross-border river water flows. The “economic benefits” may be referred to as energy production and dispatch, fisheries, agricultural advancement, and industrial progression. The “environmental benefits” can be considered as the management of river basins, water-related legislation, land preservation, and flood control mechanisms. The “social capital benefits” can be designated as “capacity building, training, and skill sharing” while “political benefits” can be described as “political stability, cooperation, and integration” [
4]. “Benefit sharing” can be applied to cross-border riverine nation states, across different segments, inter-society, and different social groups. When freshwater passes from domestic terrain to another state’s boundary, it then converts to a cross-border water resource, and, as a result, it becomes noticeably more complex to deal with. These freshwater-linked events in one state are highly expected to influence the freshwater position of other states. Therefore, freshwater-connected concerns may only be resolved through cross-border collaboration. However, cross-border freshwater can be demarcated as “freshwater resources shared by two or more states and comprising rivers, lakes, and aquifers” [
66].
The authors of [
65] argued that “negotiating on a project-by-project basis can easily result in a stalemate -whereas the basket of benefits approach means opportunities can be modified and changed until an acceptable outcome is agreed by all.” The prices necessary for cooperation are financial, institutional, political, and any other prices of one-sided opportunities (benefits). The opportunities which can be altered or transformed are classified into three categories (security, economic, and environmental) [
67] and these opportunities are provided by cross-border cooperation. Cross-border cooperation is characterized by four forms, each with its own advantages and challenges [
68]. With regard to benefits or opportunities, the security benefits are those that arise from river benefits. Cooperation on a transnational river will lead to lower costs as a result of the river; these are interchangeably also regarded as political benefits, as the pressure between co-riverine nations will permanently be extant to a larger or minor degree and such pressure will incur costs. While expenses due to the river are not permanently visible or enumerated, they may appear as tangible and significant and may composite other strains resulting in increased expenses. Furthermore, as transnational river basins can be buffer agents, a collaboration that produces advantages from the river and minimizes costs because of the river can lead to the path of much greater mutual aid between neighboring states. It also helps economic integration between co-riparian states, generating “benefits beyond the river” which can create indirect economic benefits. Well-organized, cooperative management, and development of shared rivers can result in profit benefits from the river. Lastly, environmental benefits will help in the better management of ecologies, providing benefits to the river, and underpinning all other benefits that can be derived.
Over the past few years, emphasis has been placed on Afghanistan and Pakistan working together to achieve socio-economic development during existing tensions associated with the development of hydropower in the KRB. Thus, a benefit-sharing approach as an analytical framework to assess the intricacy of two-pronged interactions over sustainable development in the KRB is worthy of study. Furthermore, the type and significance of water resources propose opportunities for cooperation and benefit sharing across the states. For instance, hydropower generation in one country can benefit industries in another. The KRB offers watering benefits to riverine communities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and has the potential for deluge control provided that storage reservoirs are established. Since the KRB hydroelectric power potential can produce electricity and additional benefits to both countries, a benefit-sharing procedure will probably be an important feature of scheme discussions. The immediate benefit of hydroelectric power development in the KRB is electricity generation, to encounter increasing power demand and ensure energy security in both countries. The location of the KRB, with its close proximity to the mainland in Afghanistan and the Pakistan border, can help electricity export.
Furthermore, water storage potential in the form of dams in the KRB can also offer irrigation and deluge control benefits for populations downstream in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The KRB’s hydroelectricity potential may also rise socioeconomic progress in the Kunar province of Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan [
13]. Ease of use of low-cost energy can operate as a significant driver of mutual cooperation for the two neighboring countries. In 2013, the two nations made an important development to engage in the establishment of a 1500 MW hydroelectric power project on the Kunar River, an effort towards a bilateral formula of cooperation (agreed minutes of the meeting between finance ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan held on 25 August 2013). The shared operation of the KRB would build a collective objective, possibly enhancing discourse on other collective economic, social, environmental, and security interests, and therefore, it is highly likely to improve the relationship between the two neighboring countries. Moreover, cooperation through the KRB hydroelectric power engagement could result in persistent contemporary activities in the region. Such projects on the KRB can serve as a catalyst for regional prosperity as sustained interactions between the countries may lead to additional joint ventures and developments that deal with mutually beneficial development, helping better market assimilation in the region.
With upgraded energy access, the nation-states in the region can gain bonuses in the form of larger economic progress. In short, benefit sharing in connection with an all-inclusive basin reflects how consuming and managing water resources effectively through all segments in amalgamation can produce new benefits. In particular, it may instigate research into how a joint method of energy production or basin management can offer a novel outlook on water usage for food production. Cooperation between hydropower, agronomic, or ecological development schemes within a sole state can indeed end in new and supplementary benefits. For example, the schemes may allow the sharing of knowledge, skills, and apparatus, and as a consequence, it can lessen expenses and surge production. Correspondingly, schemes based in two diverse states could also collaborate on new methods to realize larger benefits. For instance, collective approaches to basin management can decrease investment expenses and can result in more effective management of the shared environment and resources.
Despite the enormous mutual benefits of riparian water collaboration, there are no successful cases of water cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan attempted several times to reach an agreement with Afghanistan, but these attempts were unsuccessful due to Afghanistan’s lack of willingness, mainly due to government instability, episodes of terrorism, and insecurity in Afghanistan. They have not signed any agreement, nor have they begun any project to alleviate tensions between the two countries. Pakistan also faces the same issues with India. Despite mutual security concerns, they managed to establish the Indus Water Treaty, under which both countries successfully manage the Indus basin’s water. This treaty is still in force, surviving three major Indo–Pak wars of 1965, 1971, and the Kargil War. This treaty is regarded as a successful example of water sharing management between unfriendly riparian states.