Games

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Open AccessArticle

Climate Change and Market Collapse: A Model Applied to Darfur

by Ola Olsson

Games 2016, 7(1), 9; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010009 - 18 Mar 2016

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 6019

A recurring argument in the global debate is that climate deterioration is likely to make social conflicts over diminishing natural resources more common in the future. The exact mechanism behind such a development has so far not been successfully characterized in the literature. [...] Read more.

A recurring argument in the global debate is that climate deterioration is likely to make social conflicts over diminishing natural resources more common in the future. The exact mechanism behind such a development has so far not been successfully characterized in the literature. In this paper, we present a general model of a community populated by farmers and herders who can either divide up land in a market economy or in autarky. The key insight from our model is that decreasing resources can make trade between the two groups collapse, which in turn makes each group’s welfare independent of that of the other. Predictions from the model are then applied to the conflict in Darfur. Our analysis suggests that three decades of drought in the area can at least partially explain the observed disintegration of markets and the subsequent rise of social tensions. Full article

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Open AccessArticle

The Impact of the Irrelevant: Temporary Buy-Options and Bidding Behavior in Auctions

by Ronald Peeters, Martin Strobel, Dries Vermeulen and Markus Walzl

Games 2016, 7(1), 8; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010008 - 01 Mar 2016

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5886

Abstract

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the application of [...] Read more.

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the application of the buy-option avoids revenue-enhancing bidding; at high buy-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started). The latter suggests a particular type of anchoring, where bidders use the buy-price to update their expectations about the strengths of their opponents. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)

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Open AccessEditorial

Recent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games

by Ananish Chaudhuri

Games 2016, 7(1), 7; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010007 - 26 Feb 2016

Cited by 7 | Viewed by 6229

Abstract

I provide a broad overview of the findings reported in the articles submitted for this special volume on experimental studies of social dilemma problems. I start by providing a synopsis of where current research stands on this topic. Then I go on to [...] Read more.

I provide a broad overview of the findings reported in the articles submitted for this special volume on experimental studies of social dilemma problems. I start by providing a synopsis of where current research stands on this topic. Then I go on to discuss the specific papers and how those papers extend our knowledge in this area and add value to the current state of the art. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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Open AccessEditorial

Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Games in 2015

by Games Editorial Office

Games 2016, 7(1), 6; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010006 - 02 Feb 2016

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Abstract

The editors of Games would like to express their sincere gratitude to the following reviewers for assessing manuscripts in 2015. [...] Full article

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Open AccessArticle

Revenue Implications of Strategic and External Auction Risk

by Andrea Robbett, Michael K. Graham and Peter Hans Matthews

Games 2016, 7(1), 5; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010005 - 27 Jan 2016

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5747

Abstract

Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common [...] Read more.

Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common auction mechanisms except for the English auction. We do not find evidence that bidders’ measured risk preferences can explain these patterns of overbidding. To enhance salience, we introduce a second novel treatment with external risk. This treatment captures the risk, prevalent in online auctions, that winners will not receive a good of value. We find that dynamic auctions—including the English—are particularly susceptible to overbidding in this environment. We note that overbidding is somewhat diminished in later periods and that our results may thus have particular relevance for bidders who are not highly experienced or who have not directly experienced losses. We conclude with a brief discussion of research implications. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)

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Open AccessArticle

Pledges of Commitment and Cooperation in Partnerships

by Lachlan Deer and Ralph-C. Bayer

Games 2016, 7(1), 4; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010004 - 20 Jan 2016

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6636

Abstract

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships; and (3) [...] Read more.

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships; and (3) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners. Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction of relatively large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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Open AccessArticle

Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

by Priyodorshi Banerjee, Sujoy Chakravarty and Sanmitra Ghosh

Games 2016, 7(1), 3; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010003 - 19 Jan 2016

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5958

Abstract

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients choose whether or [...] Read more.

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients choose whether or not to select a particular proposer. We find that offers can increase in the ultimatum game both with non-competitive selection with a single potential proposer, and more so with competition, where the recipient chooses one of two potential proposers, as compared to the no selection baseline. Furthermore, the offer is rejected with higher probability if the promisemade by the selected proposer is higher than the eventual offer. Our dictator environment does not give the power to reject offers, thus selection power carries no benefits in the dictator game. Finally, independent of the game institution or proposer selection mechanism, promises provide credible signals for offers. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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Open AccessArticle

Malevolent Governance, Intra-Group Conflict and the Paradox of the Plenty: An Experiment

by Klarizze Anne Puzon and Marc Willinger

Games 2016, 7(1), 2; https://0-doi-org.brum.beds.ac.uk/10.3390/g7010002 - 29 Dec 2015

Viewed by 5492

Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, [...] Read more.

Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent. Full article

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